Craig Williams, Director,
Chemical Weapons Working Group
Statement to the Press

April 20, 2004


Good morning ladies and gentlemen.  We all appreciate your taking the time out of your busy schedules to join us today.  My name is Craig Williams, I am the director of the CWWG, a coalition of community based organizations focused on the safe and expeditious disposal of chemical weapons in the U.S., the Pacific and Russia.

Our primary objective is to ensure safety of the workers, the citizens surrounding the chemical weapons stockpiles and protecting the environment during this effort.

Today we want to focus on one particular aspect of the U.S. demilitarization program, which for too long, has been overshadowed by other facets of the program - such as which technology to deploy, treaty schedules and costs.  It is the monitoring regime used within the Army's de-mil program - it's capabilities and shortcomings and most importantly what step can and should be taken to provide maximum protection to the workers and the public.

Our goal is to insure that the most advanced agent monitoring systems are deployed at all chemical weapons storage and disposal sites - regardless of the disposal technology being used.  We recognize that, based on the performance history, that the need is greatest at those sites using incineration, as it has demonstrated repeatedly, an inability to contain agent under certain upset conditions. However, even during storage, and particularly during accessing and transportation of the weapons/agents to the treatment facility of any type, adequate monitoring is a must.

For more than a decade, the National Research Council has been recommending the Army upgrade its monitors.  But, like most recommendations made to them, the Army "cherry-pick" those which fit their agenda, timetable or budget and ignore others. The antiquated monitoring capability, still deployed by the Army  is a perfect example of  ignoring recommendations which don't fit into their program mentality.

Primarily the NRC has focused on three areas: 1) time ; 2) certainty; and, 3) quantity.

The Army currently relies primarily on two monitoring systems at its chemical weapons stockpile sites to sample the air for mustard and nerve agents:  Agent Continuous Air Monitoring Systems (ACAMS) and Depot Area Air Monitoring Systems (DAAMS).. Both ACAMS and DAAMS monitors are positioned throughout chemical weapons disposal facilities, including in the smokestacks of incinerators.  ACAMS are very sensitive and can detect even trace levels of chemical agents.  ACAMS are connected to an alarm system, which sounds as soon as chemical agent is detected.  DAAMS are not connected to alarm systems.  Rather, DAAMS tubes collect air samples and are used to confirm readings from ACAMS.

DAAMS stations are also positioned outside of the facilities, on depot property, usually around the outer perimeter.

In 1994 the NRC stated:

* The public is justifiably concerned with demilitarization operations like those at JACADS, A disposal facility, if operated close to a civilian population area, will likely require  more stringent monitoring standards to ensure acceptance by, and protection of, the public.

* The ACAMS and DAAMS are able to detect agents at the levels required by regulations, but that alone does not ensure safety.

* The relatively slow response of the ACAMS means that, in the event of a sudden release of agent, plant workers and the local population might be exposed to a concentration of agent above acceptable levels.

* The sampling of the DAAMS range from one hour when detecting in the exhaust stacks, to eight hours when monitoring plant work areas, and twelve hours at the site perimeter.  These times do not include analysis time.

* State- of- the- art analytical methods are available that are more sensitive (by a factor of 1,000 or more) than the Automated Chemical Agent Monitoring System (ACAMS) and the Depot Area Air Monitoring System (DAAMS) at the Johnson Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS).

* Remote sensing or point source sampling, employing infrared spectroscopy techniques, could be used to provide more rapid agent detection in plant work areas.  The instruments could operate continuously and have a response time on the order of 10 seconds or less.

In 1996 the NRC stated:

*  The Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) multipass absorption monitoring technique, should be capable of real-time (> 1 second) detection of high agent release levels.

In  2001 the NRC stated:

* [R]ecent advances in monitoring technology could reduce false alarm rates and decrease response times and,  Current workplace monitoring systems for chemical agents are generally adequate for normal operations but may have serious deficiencies during accidents or departures from nominal operating conditions.

In 2002 the NRC stated:

* Relatively frequent false positive ACAMS alarms for airborne agent and the lack of true real-time (<10 s) monitoring for airborne agent have long been a concern of [NRC] committees assessing and examining the chemical demilitarization program, and that the Army and the Pentagon  should invigorate and coordinate efforts to develop chemical agent monitors with improved sensitivity, specificity, and time response.

Still, the same monitoring systems designed into the destruction program in 1986 are being used today!!

As you will note in the NRC recommendations, the current systems have significant problems in identifying and quantifying agents  coupled with an unacceptable time frame within which to warn Depot workers and communities of a possible release of agent.  This is completely unacceptable.
Monitoring systems available off the shelf today can identify agent with precision, all but eliminating false alarms; quantify the agent to enhance response activities and do so in near real-time (less than 20 seconds).

If chemical agent was released this minute at any of the sites, it could take up to twelve hours before the community knew about it - that is simply not reasonable - and we demand better.
Today, the U.S. is spending billions in Iraq, based on the perceived threat to Americans posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD's) we now know don't exist.  But right here at home millions of Americans are at risk from our own WMD's - while the government drags its feet on deploying adequate monitors to protect its citizens - and the Army says it can't afford such capabilities.

The chemical demilitarization program is currently pegged to cost $25 Billion plus. Advanced monitors, such as FTIR is estimated to cost approximately $25 Million over the course of the disposal -that's one tenth of one percent (.1%) of the program cost! Citizens living in close proximity to these weapons believe that is a small price to pay for safety.
Such monitors have a history of use and have demonstrated the capability to perform reliably.

Some recent examples include:

Deployment                                         Location                   Date                Sponsor    
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             May 96           UNSCOM
Fenceline Monitoring                        Aberdeen, MD           Aug 96           U.S. Army
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Nov 96            UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             March 97        UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Aug 97            UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Sept 97            UNSCOM            
Process Monitoring                            Hill AFB, Utah           Dec. 98            U.S. Air Force
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Louisiana                   July 99            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Memphis                    April 00           U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Ogden, UT                 Sept. 00           U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Anniston, AL             May 01            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Spring Valley, MD    June 01            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Anniston, AL             Apr 02             U.S. Corps of Engineers

Clearly this reflects confidence is this monitoring system.

As you will hear from the other presenters, there have been incidents during which such monitors would have been of enormous benefit.  But I would also like to bring one to your attention. On March 30 1998, there was a major problem at the Utah incinerator. A bomb filled with Sarin (GB) agent was inadequately drained and fed into the furnace.  The alarms in the duct leading to the stack rang off at the highest levels and the alarms in the stack were overwhelmed and malfunctioned.  The Army claims it wasn't agent (even though the duct alarms identified it as such) but they say they don't know what it was.

Three independent experts reviewed the incident reports and  one had this to say:
Richard Hamner of Huntsville, has a doctorate in mechanical engineering and is a specialist in fluid mechanics. He used to work for the engineering company Teledyne-Brown, where he was involved in the proposal plan for the incinerator at the Anniston Army Depot.
"I believe the Army is not telling the whole truth and that the sensors failed in the smokestack.  I have worked with sensors for a long time. I know them, believe me. I do not believe that the substance that went up that stack was benign. It is simple isn't it?  The furnace shut down and the nerve agent was not burned. Where did it go? It went up and out."

I would urge the media on this call to consider this same scenario played out in Anniston, Alabama, where 75,000 people live within the impact zone, or the other sites where populations are in close proximity to the de-mil facilities., and ask yourself this question. If I  and my family lived near one of these sites wouldn't I be demanding the best in monitoring capability?  In fact, I would urge you pose this question to the Army, the Pentagon and the various Senators and Representatives across the country and see how many say no.

Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) has put in a request for $2 Million in next years budget to procure such monitors for the Kentucky stockpile. We applaud his action and strongly urge other elected officials to follow his lead.