GAO: Chemical program mismanaged

Original estimated cost of demilitarization program - $1.83B - was at $242B by 2001

By Patricia L. Pastore/Tribune-Star

October 30, 2003

Escalating costs, 10 years of missed scheduled milestones and leadership problems are cited by the U.S. General Accounting Office as reasons for the Chemical Demilitarization Program's poor performance.

The 2001 cost estimate for the program totaling $242 billion was increased by the Department of Defense by an additional $1.2 billion and "other factors to be considered, could raise these estimates even more," the September GAO study said.

In 1985, the original estimate for the entire program was $1.83 billion.

More than 1,200 tons of nerve agent VX, the world's most deadly chemical weapon, awaits neutralization at the Newport Chemical Depot 30 miles north of Terre Haute.

Newport is one of eight sites across the country where chemical weapons are to be destroyed prior to a 2007 deadline mandated by a multi-national treaty in concert with 150 other countries.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. Army accelerated its program to neutralize VX housed at Newport. Plans to begin neutralization this month were scrapped because of safety and environmental issues.

The Army has said each day of delay costs $250,000 or more.

The next target date to begin VX neutralization at Newport is January, but that date is not without risk, said Jeff Brubaker, government program site manager at the Newport Chemical Demilitarization facility.

"At the Newport site, construction problems will delay the start of operations, missing the program manager's October 2003 estimate for starting agent destruction operations," the GAO report said. The September report also stated starting operations might be delayed because the VX neutralization program expected a commercial hazardous waste treatment facility in Ohio to handle the hydrolysate treatment.

The Board of Commissioners of Jefferson County, Ohio, refused to approve a permit Perma-Fix of Dayton, Ohio needed to handle the VX hydrolysate. "... If the Army is unable to use an off-site facility, the disposal may have to be done on-site, requiring the construction of a waste byproduct treatment facility further causing delays and increasing costs," the GAO wrote about a month before the Army decided not to use Perma-Fix.

The Army and its contractor, Parsons Technology Inc. of Pasadena, Calif., eliminated Perma-Fix on Oct. 13 as an option to treat and dispose of the VX hydrolysate when a stalemate was reached with Jefferson County officials.

The September GAO report indicated the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing in conjunction with managing the program.

"The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number of long-standing leadership, organizational and strategic-planning issues remain unresolved," according to the report. "The program lacks stable leadership at the upper management levels."

This isn't breaking news to most familiar with government reports since May 1990 on the Chemical Demilitarization Program. Thirteen years worth of reports cite program mismanagement.

The September GAO report to Congress also cautioned lawmakers about the rising price tag of demilitarization.

"Cost estimates for completing the Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program have doubled since 1985 and are likely to continue to grow. " ... Close management attention over the cost estimating process will be needed to maintain effective control over future multibillion-dollar expenditures for this program," the 1990 report said.

In November 1991, the GAO recommended "that the secretary of the Army determine whether faster and less costly technologies exist for destroying the stockpile," than incineration, the Army's preferred method of stockpile destruction at every site at that time.

"In prior reports, we have expressed concern about the Army's lack of progress in and the rising costs of the disposal program," said the '91 report.

Year after year of continued criticism brought about "An Assessment of the External Factors influencing Schedule and Cost risks of the Chemical Demilitarization Program," submitted in March 2000 by Arthur Anderson LLP, an accounting and consulting firm hired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, .

"Clarify the organization and the hierarchy of the program," the Anderson report said. " ... Historically, CDP has occasionally established new schedule and budget baselines. Rebaseliningmasks ineffective project controls. This diminishing effectiveness has a continually increasing impact on schedule slippage and the overall cost of the program."

After reading historical GAO reports that address management issues, the Chemical Weapons Working Group did its assessment.

"It is apparent the Pentagon and the Army refuse to face the fact that fundamental and substantive change is needed to 'fix' the chemical weapons disposal program," said Craig Williams, spokesman for the Chemical Weapons Working Group. "It is also obvious that regardless of where responsibility is shifted, in the midlevel bureaucracy, things never improve. Instead of putting this program under a different 'shell' in the game at the midlevel, Congress needs to elevate the responsibility and oversight upward within both Departments, the Army and the Department of Defense, if this program is to ever be given the attention it requires and the oversight it demands. Our own weapons of mass destruction deserve, at the very least, the same level of attention as the Administration is willing to place on those halfway around the world."

Last month's GAO report to Congress indicates immediate change is needed.

The GAO recommends the Department of Defense "develop an overall strategy for the Chemical Demilitarization Program that would articulate the program's mission, identify the long-term goals and objectives, delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices and establish near-term performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk management approach that anticipates the influences, internal and external factors that could adversely impact program performance."

The Department of Defense concurred with the GAO's recommendations and said it is taking steps to implement them.

Army Pubic Affairs press officer Cynthia Smith did not return phone calls. Messages were left at her office in the Pentagon.