STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL REGARDING CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION - ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ASSESSMENT
Mr. President, I rise today to address the issue of Chemical Weapons Demilitarization. I do so in order to point out that the Department of Defense has consistently ignored Congressional directive and intent.
In 1996, I offered and the Senate accepted an amendment which directed the Army to identify and demonstrate technologies other than baseline incineration which could be utilized in the destruction of America's chemical weapons stockpile. This program, which came to be known as the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment, or ACWA, enjoyed tremendous inititial success. Through the involvement of the DoD, the Army, technology providers and citizens advocacy groups -- disparate interests, indeed -- agreement was reached on how the process shouldproceed as well as the criteria for success. It is also critical to point out that one area of consensus was that the timely destruction of the stockpiles remained a top priority. Nobody involved in this process advocates unnecessary delay in efforts to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention 2007 deadline. Certainly, I never viewed my efforts as anything other than a safeguard to ensure that once the destruction of the stockpile located in Kentucky began, only the safest method available was utilized.
Unfortunately, this is where the good news ends.
After rigorous evaluation and discussions, the decision was announced that six separate methods met the technological criteria necessary in order to be tested as alternatives to baseline incineration. These six were the only proposals of the almost 20 originally submitted for consideration which were deemed capable of producing safer methods. Unfortunately the Army and the Department of Defense made the decision to move forward and evaluate only three of the qualified technologies, leaving three untested. Further, this decision was made not on the basis of what was technologically feasible, but solely on the basis on what was cost-efficient. Not in the interests of finding the safest manner available to destroy the weapons, but on satisfying the minimum requirements so that the incineration could continue regardless of the results of the testing.
To help ease this budget difficulty, I offered and the Senate accepted, an amendment to the FY99 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill which gave the Secretary of Defense the Authority to reprogram up to $25 million in order to fully test each of the technologies which met the criteria for selection as potential alternatives to incineration. This provision was included in the final version of the Defense bill, and was eventually signed into law.
Mr. President, despite this clear expression of Congressional intent, the Army, the Department and the Administration have consistently refused to allocate sufficient funds to complete the testing. As a result, the ACWA program is in danger of losing its credibility -- the very quality that led to its initial successes. If the testing of the three technologies does not produce a viable alternative to incineration, then the legitimate question will be posed, "What about the additional proposals which were viewed to have merit as alternatives to incineration?" Not wishing to answer that question, I worked to encourage the administration to agree that further testing was cost effective and in the best interests of the country. Their responses, which I will submit for the Record, professed their strong support for the goals of the ACWA program, but claimed that the budget was simply too tight for the Department to reprogram funds for additional testing.
With all due respect, that contention is simply false. The truth is that the Department of Defense and the Army made a decision years ago that they would eliminate chemical weapons using incineration and have resisted considering other options since that time.
This year's report, Senate Report 105-53, states that "the Committee is concerned with the lack of oversight afforded the Chemical Demilitarization Program within the executive branch."
Further the Report states:
"In a review of the program's funding, the Committee discovered that funds had systematically been obligated without being expended and in some instances funds were unobligated. Rather than facing a shortfall in funding, the program had over $200,000,000 of Operation and Maintenance funds unexpended at the end of fiscal year 1998. In light of the unobligated and unexpended balances available to the Department, the program growth in the budget request is not justified."
Mr. President, this language is a stinging indictment of the Department's mismanagement of the Chemical Demilitarization program. Further it demonstrates clearly that there is no truth to the assertion that there were not sufficient funds available to allow for the demonstration of all viable alternatives to baseline incineration.
I intend to continue to press the Army to test all six technologies so that the citizens who live near our stockpiles may be assured that only the safest methods available are employed to destroy chemical weapons.
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