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Incidents and Accidents and Shutdowns at the Tooele CW Incinerator between 1996 & 2000

Links to More Information on What's Wrong With Incineration

• Events around stack releases verify Utah incinerator dangerously out of control
• Letters, secret documents confirm Utah incinerator still endangering the public, workers and environment
• Army report undermines key argument for incineration
• Chemical Weapons Incineration: Haz Waste Disposal or Dispersal?
• The Citizens' Solution to the Costly Mistake of Incineration
• Dioxin and Agriculture
• Army Conceals Methods for Protecting Communities
• Background on the Pentagon's New PR Firm
• Is the Tooele, Utah Incinerator Safe?

• Press Releases

• August 24, 1996-- Shutdown due to agent detection in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning filter bank vestibules. Possible agent release into the environment.

• September 9, 1996-- Shutdown due to complete power failure in the plant. Possible agent release into the environment.

• September 18, 1996-- Shutdown due to potentially agent- contaminated decontamination fluid leaking through cracks in the concrete floor into electrical room below.

• September 19, 1996-- Shutdown due to Liquid Incinerator Slag Removal System malfunction during a shakedown trial burn.

• December 19, 1996-- Shutdown due to M-55 rockets jamming in the feed gates to the Deactivation Furnace.

• January 20, 1997-- Toxic spill in the 90-day storage yard improperly cleaned up. Haz-mat team called back to the plant prior to clean-up in "order to continue processing." Toxic material snow- plowed against the boundary fence and left.

• January 26, 1997-- Shutdown due to agent migration inside the observation corridors of the Munitions Disposal Building. Possible agent release to the environment.

• February 6, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• February 14, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• March 13, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• March 20, 1997-- Army Project Manager, Tim Thomas admits in Federal Court to six confirmed nerve agent stack alarms. Nerve agent releases require shutdowns.

• March, 24 1997-- M-55 Rocket campaign halted due to trial burn failure for PCBs under Toxic Substances Control Act Requirements for 99.9999% DRE for PCBs. Public not notified until October 18, 1997.

• April 10, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• April 13-14, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• April 18, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• April 20, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• April 21, 1997-- During routine maintenance alarms sound indicating an unusually high agent reading ( > 1200TWA) inside TOCDF.

• April 22, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• April 23, 1997-- Shutdown due to "Notice of Insufficient Quality." Army Project Manager issues notice to curtail operations due to failure to follow operating procedures. The plant remains shutdown until June 15 for "routine maintenance."

• April, 25 1997-- Over 4,000 pages of official TOCDF documents arrive at CWWG office showing improper analysis, characterization, manifesting, tracking and disposal of Hazardous Waste leaving TOCDF.

• May 3, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 6, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 7, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date). Second occurrence on same day.

• May 8, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 9, 1997-- Army admits to reporters that it "misled" the public about the cause of the six week shutdown.

• May 13, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 14, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 15,1997-- Accusations of illegal burning of Lewisite made by CWWG. Army first denies illegal burning then later admits to having burned some containers that previously contained Lewisite. Plaintiffs' evidence indicates Lewisite was burned.

• May 24, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• May 28, 1997-- Citizens from Oregon and Kentucky are escorted through TOCDF into an area with a GB-contaminated bomb casing present. Citizens are not notified until after an anonymous call from TOCDF notifies Utah DEQ and an OR citizen.

• July 6, 1997--Shutdown due to Pollution Abatement System (PAS) blockage. Amount of agent and other toxics emitted unknown.

• August 1, 1997-- Former Chief Safety Officer, Steve Jones is ruled for in his Dept. of Labor "Wrongful Termination Action." Judge awards Jones his job back and $500,000 or no rehiring and $1 million. Judge calls EG&G managers "liars."

• August, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• September 8, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• September 9, 1997-- Former Chief of Hazardous Waste Management, Trina Allen wins on her discrimination part of Dept. of Labor claim against EG&G. Allen is awarded $5,000. A Hearing on the merits of the remainder of her claims is scheduled for December,

• September 12, 1997-- Army admits, in documents sent to Utah DEQ, that it has been burning Lewisite (L) contained in Ton Containers of GB previously contaminated with "L," confirming allegations made by citizen activists that TOCDF has illegally operated.

• September 14, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• September 18, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• September 30, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 1, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 2, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 6, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date). Second and third occurrences on the same day.

• October 11, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 12, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 16, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October 17, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• October/November 1997-- Sources inside TOCDF (who wish to remain anonymous) communicate to CWWG several shutdowns/incidents at TOCDF due to computer malfunctions, slag build-up in the PAS, numerous agent migrations within the facility, and alarm ring-offs in the common stack, MDB and HVAC stack (averaging 2-3 per week).

• November 2, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date). Second occurrence on the same day.

• November 6, 1997-- House Government Reform and Oversight Committee unanimously approves Human Resources Subcommittee Report on Gulf War that concludes exposures to low-level chemical agents (lower than the amount set as "acceptable" at TOCDF) caused or contributed to Gulf War Illness.

• November 18, 1997-- TOCDF is cited for 25 violations by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality. Citations included "numerous instances of noncompliance," but not enough to shut them down, according to a DEQ spokesperson.

• November 26, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• November 27, 1997-- Sources inside TOCDF (who wish to remain anonymous) communicate to CWWG that both Liquid Incinerators (LICs) are "down" due to malfunctions. According to sources, one of the LICs has been down for over a month. Chronic problems with the Brine Reduction Area (BRA) and the Pollution Abatement System (PAS) continue to plague TOCDF.

• November 30, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 1, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 2, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 3, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date). Second and third occurrences on the same day.

• December 5, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 7, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 20, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 21, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• December 26, 1997-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• January 1, 1998-- After almost 20 years of denial, a document surfaces showing that the Army had proof as early as 1970 that the 1968 sheep kill in Skull Valley was a direct result of nerve agent exposure by the Army. Recent depositions in CWWG federal lawsuit disclose that Army officials have come to the conclusion that the sheep were killed as a result of the combined effect of the nerve agent sprayed and pesticides already present.

• January 28, 1998-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• January 31, 1998-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• January 31, 1998-- Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge, Samuel J. Smith orders EG&G to reinstate whistleblower Trina Allen and to "cease and desist" any retaliation against her and other employees for protected activities in the conduct of performance of their duties.

• February 1, 1998-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• February, 1998-- Worker on the hazardous waste crew discloses that vials filled with chemical warfare agent, and having contamination on the outside of the vials, were misplaced for a few days. Later they were found in the toxic maintenance area. Had these vials not been located, they would have been sent off-site as generic waste to be disposed of at a commercial facility.

• February 4, 1998-- Site masking alarm and/or stack alarm. Potential case of chemical warfare agent release or release of other related toxic chemicals (unidentified to date).

• February 12, 1998-- According to the Deseret News, TOCDF experienced an "all mask" alarm situation while attempting to go back on line after a 30-day "routine maintenance" period. According to Utah DEQ, "They (TOCDF) did confirm that this was not a false alarm."

• March 11, 1998-- Five TOCDF employees fall ill with symptoms of dizziness, headache and nausea. Army officials say industrial materials are suspected.

• March 16, 1998-- Sources inside TOCDF (who wish to remain anonymous) communicate to CWWG that alarms have been sounding regularly in the Unpack Area during the recently initiated MC-1 bomb campaign. These sources also claim that workers in the area are not wearing "Level B" protective gear as required.

• March 30, 1998-- Shutdown occurrs when the metal parts furnace (MPF) overheats due to feeding an illegal amount of nerve agent GB into the furnace. The ACAMS alarm in the MPF duct rings off at approximately 850 times the allowable stack concentration for agent. The ACAMS alarms in the common stack register a large chemical spike. No DAAMS tubes are located at the duct ACAMS to confirm for agent and no one knows if the DAAMS tubes in the stack at the time of the incident have been analyzed to confirm for agent. Army officials claim that agent did not go out the stack, but can't prove that the large amount of chemical released was not agent. The chemical plume was neither quantified or qualified.

• November 21, 1998 - January 7, 1999-- There are seven instances of Unpack Area ACAMS alarms with individuals wearing inadequate protective clothing.

• November 25, 1998-- Vapor leaks of GB (sarin) are detected from three 105mm projectiles. The agent is detected while one of the projectiles is being processed into an incinerator.

• November 28, 1998-- Another vapor leak of GB is detected from a 105mm projectile which is in an on-site container.

• December 4, 1998-- It is reported that 24 vapor leaks have been detected in the past two months, all involving 105mm projectiles. Each of these 16-inch long bullet-shaped objects contains .17 gallons of GB. 16 of the leaks were detected after the projectiles were transferred from the storage igloos to the incinerator building. Eight of the leaks occurred when crews were removing a heavy bolt screwed into the nose of the projectile.

• December 13, 1998-- Liquid Incinerator is shut down after 140 gallons of GB (sarin) are spilled while being fed into the incinerator, raising serious questions about the engineering and design of the technology.

• April 13, 1999-- Shutdown occurs when TOCDF back-up power system fails after Depot-wide outage. This failure compromised the negative air flow system, fans leading to the stacks and other critical systems. Possible agent release to the environment and worker exposure.

• April 16, 1999-- There is confirmed agent reading in the DFS Cyclone Enclosure which is adjacent to the outside--possible agent release to environment.

• May 1, 1999-- ACAMS alarms at 508.4 twa in Unpack Area with three workers in inadequate protective clothing. During feed stop on LIC 1, there is ACAMS duct alarm at 1.26 asc and a stack alarm at .34 asc.

• May 5, 1999-- Agent vapor leak forces workers out of certain areas within TOCDF.

• May 21, 1999-- Agent migrates from a Level A to a Level C area where agent is not supposed to be present. The ACAMS reading in the Level C area is 75 times the alarm point of .2twa. After alarm for agent presence, seven workers have to don the masks that are at their hips and evacuate. They are not in adequate protective clothing. Army officials testified in federal court that they don't know if any agent escaped to the outside environment during this incident.

• May 24, 1999-- Workers removing nose closures from 105mm projectiles encounter liquid agent in a burster well where liquid agent isn't anticipated. Workers are not in adequate protective clothing. According to testimony of Project Manager Tim Thomas the ACAMS rang off at approximately 1900twa--50 times the maximum level of agent for the clothing the workers were wearing.

• May 26, 1999-- Workers in the Toxic Maintenance Area are removing plastic bags of waste when the ACAMS alarms at 1985twa causing them to evacuate. One of the bags containing liquid agent is ripped. Again workers are not in adequate protective clothing. Workers still ring off positive for agent after doffing their clothing in the airlock. They then ring off positive after being rinsed with water and still ring off positive after a further rinsing with bleach. They have final positive readings as they depart from the airlock.

• June 4, 1999-- County-wide power outage causes TOCDF negative air flow system (HVAC) to go down. It is 25 minutes before the emergency backup power system comes on. Backup power is supposed to come on automatically. Loss of the HVAC system causes agent to migrate into Level C areas where agent isn't supposed to be. There are 3 site masking alarms during the power outage event. Army officials testified in court that they don't know if agent migrated to the outside environment.

• June 5-June14, 1999-- TOCDF is in "Stand Down" by order of Chem Demil according to testimony of Col. Joseph Huber in federal court. No munitions are processed during this period while a Review Team from Aberdeen is looking at recent agent events at TOCDF.

• June 14, 1999-- TOCDF starts up after "Stand Down." Processing of M-55 rockets is resumed. However TOCDF is shut down again because within 6 hours of start-up, allowable feed rate for rocket processing is violated.

• August 1 - September 13, 1999-- There are 19 "potential" worker exposures. 4 are in Level B clothing. 11 are due to rips in protective ensembles or gloves and 4 workers are present in over 500 IDLH atmosphere.

• August 9, 1999-- Tangled air hoses prevent DPE entrants from reaching egress air locks.

• August 9, 1999-- Worker exposed to nerve agent with tear in protective suit not seen at clinic until three and a half hours later.

• August 25, 1999-- ACAMS in Unpack Area alarms at .21 twa. The ACAMS heat trace is discovered to be burning.

• Week of Aug. 31-Sept. 4-- DFS feed chute gets jammed with rocket pieces. Site team shuts down DFS to change out warped section of feed chute. Angle irons used to dislodge previous jam get jammed in chute also.

• Week of Aug. 31-Sept. 4-- Internal report blames cracks in concrete floor of MDB for decon seepage into electrical room and states that new cracks continue to be identified.

• September 9, 1999-- Cleanliness and organization of toxic areas is so bad that processing is shut down for 59 hours to get housekeeping issues straightened out.

• September 20, 1999-- Internal report states that SOPs are happening too quckly for people to keep up and more often than not, new SOPs are not being carried out.

• September 21, 1999-- Internal report reveals that workers are performing unapproved SOP of hitting wooden pallets with a steel mallet to loosen pallet covers which results in projectiles falling from pallets onto to UPA floor.

• September 23, 1999-- Internal report blames poor contamination control and inadequate decontamination attempts for high levels of contamination in airlocks.

• September 27, 1999-- Control room operator discovers that two "pressurized" ton containers have been in the 90-day storage site for greater than the allowed time. Report of incident states that information transmitted to management after discovery of tons is "less than adequate,...training received on environmental inspections is inadequate." Incident results in a Government Nonconformance Report and an EG&G Deficiency Report.

• November 3, 1999-- Manager orders worker to make DPE entry against advise of monitoring team who informed him of questionable ACAMS reliability in hot area.

• November 3, 1999-- TOCDF system engineer calls LIC slag removal system "fatally flawed"--engineers have to "jumper" the system code to get the system to operate correctly.

• November 3, 1999-- ACAMS alarm of .37 in LIC Secondary room goes unnoticed for 2 hours during which time several workers enter the room.

• November 9, 1999-- ACAMS in EHM alarms at 1.23 twa with unmasked workers present. Personnel are told to exit into airlock but are not told seriousness of situation and are not told to mask.

• December 6, 1999-- The protective suits of two workers are melted during slag removal operation in one of the liquid incinerators.

• December 7, 1999-- In a fire in the upper gate of the deactivation furnace feed chute, three rocket sections burn. Flames are also seen on the floor and at the shear blade. The time of the fire is uncertain "due to unreliability of the fire sensor." Instructions have been given to avoid leaving rocket sections on the upper gate "even if it means burning them in the chute." Three hours earlier, the lower gate malfunctioned and resulted in a stop feed. It takes ten days to prepare report on the incident.

• February 20, 2000-- Two workers exposed to nerve agent GB when it leaks into room where they are working.

• February 23, 2000-- 40 to 45 gallons of molten slag spills from a drum and starts a fire that burns the covering of the concrete floor and electrical equipment in a secondary room of the liquid incinerator.

• April 30, 2000-- A maintenance man just happens to walk past the Cyclone Ash Bin Enclosure of the Deactivation Furnace (DFS) and notices smoke, heat and a bulged out door. There is a fire going on that no one had detected. The fire ignites and decomposes the charcoal in the filter system of the Ash Bin and would have entered the filter banks of the MDB if it hadn't been discovered by a worker out for a walk. The fire was precipitated when the blind flange was installed in preparation for an entry into the DFS to clear a jam in the Heated Discharge Conveyor.

• May 8, 2000-- After workers finish maintenance on deactivation furnace feed chute there is confirmed release of nerve agent GB out of common stack into environment at 11:26 pm. Army reports that afterburner was blown out due to malfunction of air flow meter which was clogged with liquid. Stack alarm rings off for about 20 minutes at somewhere between 3.7 and 8.6 times the allowable stack concentration of GB. Army reports on the alarm reading are inconsistent. Mysteriously, after stack alarm rings off, alarm in furnace duct leading to stack rings off for agent presence. Facility managers say they have no clue as to why sequence of alarms was apparently backwards.

• May 9, 2000-- A confirmed release of GB to the environment takes place at about 1:15 am (less than an hour and a half after the confirmed release May 8) when workers attempt to relight deactivation furnace afterburner. Local emergency officials not notified until four hours after first GB release. Decision made by Army manager not to immediately notify local officials is in violation of Army SOPs, facility's operating permit granted by State of Utah and agreements with local emergency responders. Facility is shut down until investigation team, headed by the Army, makes final report on the incidents. EG&G manager predicts investigation will lead to physical modification, not just new SOPs. Shut down could last several weeks.

• June 6, 2000-- TOCDF is still shut down. It is reported that the facility's shut down is costing about $285,000 per day--totaling almost $8 million to date.

• July 26, 2000-- TOCDF has been shut down for 79 days. At $285,000 per day--the cost so far is more than $22 million.

• July 28, 2000-- The Utah DEQ authorizes the restart of the two liquid incinerators and the metal parts furnace after the entire facility had been shut down for 81 days following the May 8-9 agent releases.

• September 19, 2000-- The Utah DEQ authorizes the restart of the DFS after it had been shut down for 133 days following the May 8-9 agent releases.

• October 19, 2000-- At the Utah CAC meeting, it is stated that there had been 97 agent alarms at TOCDF since May 8. 14 of the alarms were in the common stack.

• November 16, 2000-- At the Utah CAC meeting, it is stated that there had been 41 agent alarms at TOCDF since October 19. Three of the alarms were in the common stack and five were in ducts leading to the common stack.

• November 25, 2000-- The nerve agent GB (sarin) is detected in employees' work clothes. The workers come in from inspecting filters outside in cold weather and apparently the sarin begins vaporizing as their clothing warmed up.