December 12, 2002

The Honorable Claude M. Bolton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology
103 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0103

Dear Secretary Bolton,

I write to express my support for the steps the Army is taking to reorganize the Chemical Demilitarization Program. I am hopeful this change will be successful in terms of the new leadership and accountability you seek to bring to this troubled program. However, I would draw your particular attention to several unresolved concerns of mine and look forward to learning what actions will be taken by the new management to remedy them.

On May 2, 2001, the United States Environmental Protection Agency published in the Federal Register Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) for many toxic chemicals, including the deadly agents stored at the chemical weapons stockpile located at the Anniston Army Depot: G agents (A, B, D and H) and VX. These AEGLs represent the most accurate and up-to-date toxicity thresholds for these chemical agents which are scheduled to be destroyed by incineration over a twelve year period starting next year.

On October 19, 2001, at the last Operational Assessment Team (OAT) meeting, convened by Undersecretary of Defense (AL&T) Pete Aldridge, Denzel Fisher, Special Assistant to Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Raymond Fatz, pledged to adopt these new AEGLs for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) and to begin using them. Mr. Fisher's verbal commitment was confirmed in writing by Undersecretary Aldridge's November 11, 2001 letter in which he released his findings from the OAT process and authorized $40.5 million in additional CSEPP funding for Calhoun County and the State of Alabama.

Unfortunately, the Army has never fulfilled its commitment. Shortly after Undersecretary Aldridge's letter was released, the Army issued an administrative directive saying that, while it planned to use the AEGLs, the CSEP program would not have to comply with them until November 20, 2002. After more than one year, the Army still has not implemented the AEGLs and instead continues to use the thoroughly discredited 1972 toxicity thresholds which the Army originally developed for healthy male soldiers in battlefield conditions. In fact, I understand this week the Army announced at a conference in New Orleans the AEGLs will not be implemented until September 2003.

The Army's own study (Reutter-Wade) which was released in 1994 concluded the 1972 toxicity thresholds were set far too high. In 1998 the National Research Council (NRC) produced a study of the Army's 1994 report which found that the thresholds should be lowered even further than what the Army proposed in 1994. The EPA's AEGLs are far closer to the NRC's comments than the 1972 Army thresholds which continue to be the basis for all emergency planning at Calhoun County and throughout the CSEP program.

Last month, it appears the Army and FEMA began a quiet process to reject the EPA's AEGLs by replacing them with their own AEGL definitions and toxicity thresholds. This initiative would clearly serve to weaken the EPA's AEGLs by "playing down" and redefining the effects of exposure to toxic chemicals and AEGL levels 1, 2 and 3. At the same time the Army has formulated its own toxicity thresholds through a study conducted by IEM which has concluded that the toxicity thresholds for VX should be set much higher than what EPA has published. Although the Army is attempting to get CSEPP communities to accept their new toxicity thresholds, the Army has not provided anyone with the methodology as to how it reached conclusions so at variance with the EPA.

To fully appreciate how the Army is attempting to "play down" the effects of the AEGLs it is only necessary to compare the scientifically recognized and generally accepted definitions the EPA published in the Federal Register on May 2, 2001, with the Army's recently proposed revisionist AEGLs.

AEGL-1 - EPA - Federal Register May 2, 2001

AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm (parts per million) or mg/m3 (milligrams per cubic meter) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.

AEGL-1 - Army

People who are exposed to an amount greater than AEGL-1, may experience symptoms that range from no symptoms to mild discomfort.

AEGL-2 - EPA - Federal Register May 2, 2001

AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AEGL-2 - Army

People who are exposed to an amount greater than AEGL-2 may have an increasing severity of symptoms, up to some level of impairment. With chemical agents this impairment would be temporary eye effects that may make driving difficult in dark or low-light conditions.

AEGL-3 - EPA - Federal Register May 2, 2001

AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.

AEGL-3 - Army

Without medical treatment, exposure to an amount greater than AEGL-3, could become life threatening or result in death.

As a reading of these definitions clearly shows, the Army is attempting to claim that an AEGL-1 exposure involves no symptoms. EPA's AEGL-1, of course, says otherwise. As disturbing as this development may appear, when the Army's proposed AEGL-1 definition is read in conjunction with the proposed modification to CSEPP Policy Paper 20 it becomes doubly alarming. CSEPP Policy Paper 20 states: "Application of AEGL-1 may be incorporated into planning and response as a notification level, but no protective action would be required except to limit activities and request continued contact with the emergency alerty system." Thus, the Army is attempting to redefine AEGL-1 as a justification for not being required to continue to make a protective action recommendation for an AEGL-1 event. Yet, under current Army regulations, if an AEGL-1 plume leaves or is predicted to leave the depot boundary, a level 4 chemical event is deemed to have occurred and the Army is required to notify the off-post community and make a protective action recommendation. The Army must not be allowed to redefine scientific information which was published in the Federal Register in order to escape its obligation to make a protective action recommendation. Given the fact that our community is totally dependent on the Army to inform us as to the nature and severity of a chemical event (we lack any monitors on the incinerator stack or at the boundary of the depot to independently verify the nature and severity of a chemical event), this newly defined AEGL-1 could easily become a "black hole" which could be abused by the Army in an effort to gloss over a chemical event.

I am also very disturbed by the Army's proposed "playing down" of AEGL-2 events. According to the EPA, AEGL-2 exposure means: "It is predicted that the general population...could experience irreversible or other serious long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape." The Army's definition suggest that symptoms under AEGL-2 would only be "up to some level of impairment." Unlike the EPA, which states that the effects of AEGL-2 exposure could result in "long-lasting adverse health effects," the Army's definition says nothing about this and suggests that the effects would be "merely temporary."

I also must note that CSEPP Policy Paper 20 fails to address current Army procedures under AEGL-3 go/no-go decisions. Army Regulation 385-61, Department of Army Pamphlet 385-61, and Chemical Operations Decision Criteria all address operations for 1% lethality distance. The decision criteria states: "If the 1% lethality distance touches or extends beyond the depot boundaries onto public lands, operations will not be conducted." Given the Army's proposal to water-down the definition of AEGL-3, it appears that CSEPP Policy Paper 20's proposed update would overrule current Army procedures, thereby allowing the Army to continue operations in the event an AEGL-3 plume leaves the depot boundary. This would be totally unacceptable and very dangerous. I hope this is not the Army's intent.

I would further note with some alarm that an individual, or some group within the Army, appears to have decided to cut the EPA's AEGLs for VX (see attached chart from Federal Register), thereby dramatically increasing the level for permissible exposure of VX to the civilian population in each of these three categories. I have attached a document prepared by Michael Myirski, the Army's meteorologist in the CSEP program, showing the Army's "proposed" AEGLs. As you will note, the Army's "new" AEGLs for VX are dramatically higher than the "old" AEGLs published by the EPA last year. While I do not have any of the Army's computations that caused them to change the EPA's numbers so dramatically, I want to point out that when the EPA's AEGL-3 numbers for VX were programmed into the dispersion model in Alabama, the plume exceeded the fifty (50) mile radius of the dispersion model, thereby raising many questions about the Army's unilateral, undocumented proposed AEGL changes.

While I hope my concerns regarding the Army's toxicity standards serve to highlight the need for much greater transparency and explanation regarding the Army's intentions and schedule for implementing accurate, updated AEGLs, I would like to close by drawing specific attention to several major CSEPP safety issues associated with the Anniston Chemical Destruction Facility which remain unresolved.

The start date for the Anniston facility looms while both funding and implementation issues remain outstanding for collective protection of schools and special needs population planning. I applaud Under Secretary Brownlee for his diligent work to identify funding to meet the collective protection requirement in Alabama. However, with the Army Corps of Engineers setting the schedule for completion of collective protection work in Alabama at two (2) years, I would respectfully submit that the timely transfer of these funds is imperative.

Additionally, the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency, along with the other Alabama CSEPP counties, recently expressed concerns to me regarding SBCCOM's unwillingness to make essential D2PUFF and SafePort source code available to enable the previously authorized and funded EMIS software upgrade to move forward. Given the critical role the EMIS software plays in the notification and protective action process and being sensitive to the proprietary issues which may be involved, it is my sincere hope that every appropriate step can be taken to bring this project to an acceptable and expeditious conclusion.

As you continue to make positive changes in the Chemical Demilitarization program structure, the CSEP program is facing an alarming budget shortfall. As you know, during the meeting of state and county CSEPP officials here in Washington on November 13-14, the Army and FEMA presented a figure of $147.5 million in unfunded CSEPP requirements, above and beyond the Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE), as of October 1, 2002. In fact, the December 6, National Research Council report, "Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities" again underscored the need for greater coordination and cooperation between the Army, FEMA and the local stockpile communities to identify and meet CSEPP safety requirements. In order to make up this current shortfall and provide the resources necessary to meet additional requirements like the ones I have outlined above for Alabama, it seems clear the Army should look to provide more resources to the CSEP program.

I look forward to receiving your reply to the matters presented above. I want to work with you on these important issues and help you in any way I can to provide maximum protection for our stockpile communities. Thank you for your time and attention to this letter.

Sincerely,

Richard Shelby
United States Senator