Chemical Weapons Working Group
PO Box 467, Berea, KY 40403
(859) 986-7565 fax: (859) 986-2695
www.cwwg.org
for more information: Craig Williams:
(859) 986-7565
or 302-1103 (cell)
GAO REPORT: CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION
PROGRAM
"REMAINS IN TURMOIL"
Incineration problems
include: “plant safety issues; difficulties in meeting environmental permitting
requirements; public concerns about emergency preparedness and budgeting
shortfalls"
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) today (Sept.
5) released another in a long series of reports severely criticizing the
Army's Chemical Demilitarization Program. Focused primarily on the
management and the "lack of sustained leadership" within the program, the
report also identifies what many have long held to be the root cause of the
program's failures--a bad technology choice for disposal: incineration.
The report says, "Nearly all of the incineration sites
will miss DOD-approved 2001 schedule milestones because of substantial delays
that stem from a number of problems that DOD and the Army have not been able
to anticipate or influence." These include: "plant safety issues; difficulties
in meeting environmental permitting requirements; public concerns about emergency
preparedness and budgeting shortfalls."
Craig Williams, director of the Chemical Weapons Working
Group (CWWG), a national anti-burn coalition, "The fundamental problem stems
from the fact that the Army's decision to use incineration was wrong in 1982
when they chose it, and remains unworkable today."
But the report also said that "Although the neutralization
sites have not missed their milestones yet, they too have experienced delays."
Earlier this week the CWWG issued a press release stating that the only operating
neutralization plant, in Aberdeen Maryland, would soon be shut down for approximately
a month for engineering modifications.
"The difference," according to Williams, "is that the
one neutralization plant has only been operational for 6 months, while the
incineration plants have been collectively trying to operate for 17 years.
One would expect some short delays in a first generation plant, but to have
consistent delays, often for months at a time, after an approach [incineration]
has been used for almost two decades should tell us something about their
reliability."
The GAO also noted that the DOD increased the 2001
cost estimate for the program--$24 billion--by an additional $1.2 billion
and that, "other factors, yet to be considered, could raise these estimates
even more." The original 1985 estimate, for the entire disposal program,
was $1.83 billion.
Regarding DOD and Army policy and guidance documents,
the GAO said, "all documents were out of date and did not reflect changes
to the program." They also found that "Neither DOD nor the Army has
adopted a comprehensive risk management approach to mitigate potential problems."
It further states that delays at incineration sites have resulted from various
"long-standing" issues because the Army, "does not have a process to identify
and mitigate them [problems]."
The Army often touts it's "Lessons Learned Program"
to the public as the primary means to avoid repeating the same mistakes and
problems that have occurred at incinerators in the Pacific and Utah.
The GAO report however exposes the distance between the Army rhetoric and
its execution. The GAO says, "An effectively managed program would
have an approach such as lesson learned, to identify and mitigate issues."
But, "....the Chem-Demil Programmatic Lessons Learned Program has been shifted
to individual contractors from a headquarters centralized effort. By
decentralizing the program, it is uncertain how knowledge will be leveraged
between sites to avoid or lessen potential delays due to issues that have
previously occurred."
Williams said, "It's sad - but not surprising - how
the incineration program's Public Information Office has never mentioned
this to citizens in any of the communities."
The report concluded by saying, "...the program continues
to flounder" noting the program's, "continued instability, ineffective decision
making and weak accountability."
According to Williams, "This program, when measured
against any criteria point - safety; agent containment; environmental compliance;
worker protection; cost or schedule, fails each. Yet the Army insisted
on firing up the incinerator in Alabama last month, while simultaneously
breaking their promises to provide protective capabilities for schools and
the handicapped there should an event occur. It appears the worse things
get, the more desperate they [Army] become to burn these weapons. How
many reports will it take before the Pentagon or the Congress will take the
actions necessary to prevent a disaster?"
--30--
