for more information contact:
Craig Williams: 859-986-7565
Mick Harrison: 859-321-1586
For Immediate Release: Tuesday, July 16, 2002
Four workers at the Army's chemical weapons incinerator in Utah were under observation for exposure to deadly GB (Sarin) nerve agent yesterday. One worker reportedly showed clear signs and symptoms of acute agent exposure. The exposures began in the liquid incinerator room, as workers conducted maintenance operations related to transition from processing GB agent to processing VX agent. The incident could easily have been avoided if the Army and EG&G had been not been in such a rush to begin the VX campaign.
Workers wearing only Level E protective gear -- cotton coveralls and industrial respirators -- cut into compressed air lines in the liquid incinerator room in order to perform maintenance. When they did, chemical agent escaped, contaminating the workers. Agent readings were as high as 1500 Time Weighted Average (TWA) in the air in the liquid incinerator room. TWA is a worker agent exposure standard. A reading of 1500 TWA equates to 4.5 times the Centers for Disease Control's exposure level, immediately dangerous to life and health. It also is greater than the EPA acute exposure level for lethality. Agent readings from their clothing were very high.
Workers showed a reading of 180 TWA, even after putting on clean coveralls. After leaving the liquid incinerator room, the workers underwent decontamination procedures for hours at the plant's clinic. Blood tests performed at the clinic showed that one worker was exposed 2 1/2 times over the Army's standard exposure limit, showing a blood cholinesterase level drop of more than 25%.
Numerous worker safety incidents at the plant have been blamed on the Army and EG&G's "rush to burn," to make up for years of schedule delays. Since the incinerator began operations in 1996, it has been plagued with malfunctions, and shutdowns resulting from chemical agent releases within the plant and out the smokestack. Citizens question whether this latest incident was also related to weapons processing delays.
"This was as close to a fatality as a result of exposure as we've heard about," said Craig Williams, Director of the watchdog organization Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG). "Workers have routinely been exposed to agent at this facility due to pressures placed on them from management to shortcut procedures and meet arbitrary schedule deadlines." The Army has denied most worker exposure allegations, and the issue of exposure measurements and standards have been a point of contention for years between workers and management.
Jason Groenewold, Director of Utah's Families Against Incinerator
Risk (FAIR) emphasized the need to put worker safety over schedules.
"Incineration has failed to protect workers. The best way
to ensure the safety of workers is to use a safer disposal technology."
The Utah Sierra Club's Cindy King concurred, saying, "We
in Utah have everything to gain by switching to a non-incineration
technology for disposal of the remainder of our chemical weapons
stockpile."
The incineration facility will be put to the test if and when
it begins disposal of VX nerve agent, at least 30-40 times more
potent than GB agent. "Had this incident involved VX agent,"
said Mick Harrison, CWWG and Sierra Club attorney, "I'd hate
to think of the consequences." Harrison concluded that federal
agencies should prevent start-up of VX processing at the plant
until the numerous worker safety concerns have been resolved."
The CWWG is a national grassroots coalition of citizens living at chemical weapons sites advocating non-incineration technologies for chemical weapons disposal, accountability of the Army and its contractors, and public involvement in the chemical weapons program decision-making process.
Documents associated with worker safety issues at the Utah
incinerator are available with the CWWG.
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