CWWG



Letter  to Indiana Depot Commander and Indiana Regulators Seeks Halt of VXH Shipments


Mick G. Harrison, Esq.
The Caldwell Eco Center
323 S. Walnut Street
Bloomington, IN 47401
859-321-1586 (cell)
812-323-7274 (office)
859-986-2695 (fax)
email: mickharrisonesq@earthlink.net

CONTACTS: Mick Harrison, Esq.   859-321-1586
                           Craig Williams    859-986-7565

For Immediate Release: April 17, 2007

Letter to Indiana Depot Commander and Indiana Regulators Seeks Halt of
VX By-product Shipments
Attorney Representing Citizens Groups Cites Unacceptable Risks and Inadequate
Waste Characterization

Today attorney Mick Harrison, representing Citizens Against Incineration at Newport (CAIN) and the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG) sent an urgent request to the Army and the State of Indiana to immediately halt off-site transport of chemical warfare agent VX hydrolysate (VXH) from the Newport Depot. Off-site transport of this waste, generated by the Army's VX neutralization process, began today. This request by the two citizens groups was prompted by multiple confidential sources disclosures to CWWG that the VXH will contain more than 48 parts per billion (ppb) of agent VX and 500 ppb of the highly toxic VX byproduct called EA2192. The sources also disclosed that the VXH containers have a history of leaking.

Mr. Harrison expressed concern in their letter to the Army and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) that Indiana's law governing transport of chemical munitions, Indiana Code section 13-22-7.5-2, which requires a transportation safety plan, risk assessment and coordination with police and emergency management agencies in each of the 8 states on the route, cannot be complied with until the levels of VX and EA2192 have been accurately determined and fully disclosed. He pointed out that The Army's Finding of No Significant Impact and the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the off-site shipment of the VXH were based on the assumption that the VXH would not contain any detectable amounts of agent VX or EA2192.

The Dupont facility in New Jersey originally slated to receive the VXH stated that they would not accept the VXH if it contained detectable amounts of VX. Given the sources' disclosures, a new EA or EIS is required before further transport. Further, the VX and EA2192 levels reported by the sources are not allowed to be shipped even under the Army's/CMA's own policies, which prohibit shipment of VXH containing more than 20 ppb VX or 100 ppb EA2192.

Based on corroborated information from multiple sources, Harrison on behalf of the citizens groups expressed concern that agent VX and possibly EA2192 are reforming in the VXH during storage after initial testing. Thus the manifests will not accurately reflect the actual amounts of the highly toxic VX and EA2192 in the VXH, and the receiving facility, law enforcement and emergency responders will all be misled as to the actual dangers involved. The Army's failure to retest the VXH violates the federal and State laws that require hazardous waste characterization and accurate hazardous waste manifests.

Harrison's stated concerns about the public health dangers of shipping VXH included that infants and children are at least 10 times more vulnerable to problems than adults if exposed; the VX and EA2192 will concentrate by a factor of 33 in the upper organic layer; mixtures such as VX and EA2192 due to synergy may be 50 times more toxic than expected; and, even without detectable VX and EA2192 the Army's tests show the VXH to be the toxic equivalent of 550 parts per million (or 550,000 ppb) VX.

Studies also show serious harm may occur at VX concentrations 1/4 of the lethal dose. The letter also identified transportation risks.

The Army reported risk of a release of VXH due to an accident (without considering the history of leaking containers) is 1/1 3000-pgLtrip. More than 400 trips will be required. EPA's  unacceptable cancer risk standard for hazardous waste facilities is a 1/100,000. Given the toxicity of the VXH and the VX and EA2192 in the VXH as described above, an accident would be very likely to cause serious illness, injury and possibly fatalities

Given these concerns, Harrison, on behalf of himself and CAIN and CWWG called upon IDEM and the Army to halt the VXH shipments now.
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A copy of the entire letter is available from Mr, Harrison or the CWWG upon request.



 

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