Mr. Dennis Downs
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste
288 North 1460 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116-0690

Dear Mr. Downs,

The following comments pertain to the RCRA Class 3 permit modification request by the U.S.
Army on the Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility in regard to baseline mustard agent processing.

1. (Page A-1): The modification description presented in the Executive Summary as being
“moderate” is misleading and creates a false impression of the magnitude of the changes in
equipment and procedures being sought.

2. (Page A-2): “Impurities” noted in the Introduction are not identified. As far as can be seen
from the documentation associated with the MOD request, only higher than 1 ppm Mercury (Hg)
concentrations will be attempted to be identified. What are the other “impurities” and how will
they impact incineration of the solid phase contained in the Mustard Ton Containers (TC’s)?

3. (Page A-2): The Army and the state should consider the “baseline” and “non-baseline”
approaches to mustard agent disposal as a whole, rather than in separate permit modifications.
Attempting to separate the mustard stockpile by mercury content – that is, mustard agents
containing less than 1 ppm mercury will be processed by the baseline incineration method while
mustard agent with greater than 1 ppm mercury will be processed in a non-baseline approach –
prevents all parties, including citizens, from dealing holistically with safe solutions for the disposal
of mustard agents. It may be that the best processing methods for the mustard agent with higher
mercury concentrations should also be applied to mustard agents with less mercury. Therefore any
approval of this baseline permit modification request should be amended as
per any recommendations that relate to the upcoming non-baseline permit modification request.

4. (Pages A-3 / A-4): The State should require greater explanation of the quality assurance/quality
control method and more specific details on the analytical methods for determining mercury
concentrations in the mustard agent. Any sampling or analytical error in determining the mercury
concentrations in the mustard agent could result in chronic miscategorization of the containers, and
ultimately result in mercury emissions at levels far above what is safe or what is allowable by state
or federal regulations. Having sampled only 12 of over 6,300 TC’s the conclusion that there is a
“correlation between the concentration of Hg found in the liquid Mustard and that found in the
solids within the same TC” is presumptuous and should not be assumed to be consistent
throughout the untested TC’s.

        - Potential sampling errors due to too few samples taken per container or
        inappropriate samples being collected indicating lower mercury concentrations than
        is representative of the container, could allow the container to be classified as less
        than 1 ppm mercury when it was actually more than 1 ppm mercury.

        - Container sampling for mercury is distinctly different than analytical methods in the lab. If
        the sampling is poorly conducted but the lab analysis is correct, there can still be a bias
        toward less than 1 ppm Hg even when the lab procedures are appropriate.

5. (Page A-3) and (Page A-6) Module V (11): Controlling mercury emissions by controlling the
feed rate of the mustard agent will do nothing to limit mercury emissions or exposure, or exposure
to any other toxic emissions associated with mustard agent incineration. It will merely spread out
the contamination over a longer period of time. This approach may allow the Army to squeak by
mercury emissions regulations but this approach does nothing to protect the environment or Utah
citizens from mercury exposure. The dangerous effects of mercury on wildlife and human health
are well established, and the State appears to be taking some interest in preventing mercury
contamination from other sources.

        - For the Army to process mustard agent– even that which contains 1 ppm mercury or less --
        without Pollution Abatement System (PAS) equipment specifically suited to control mercury, is
        unacceptable. If the Army has the capacity to use mercury emissions control equipment, and if
        the Army is committed to operating TOCDF in such a manner that provides maximum
        protection to workers and the public, it should explain to the State and to the public why it does
        not want to use PAS equipment for the mustard agent with lesser quantities of mercury.
        Analytical equipment and methodologies are not fail proof, and neither the Army nor the State
        should assume that a mustard agent ton container thought to have a mercury concentration of
        no greater than 1 ppm may not actually have concentrations that exceed that.

        - In view of mercury's exceptional volatility, especially at the temperature regime in a
        combustion unit at TOCDF, mercury will tend to partition more to the gas phase and escape as
        a gaseous emission than partitioning into the bottom ash of the incinerator. Controlling mercury
        cannot be achieved by incineration.

6. (Pages A-2 / A-3): The process outlined in the permit modification for accessing and treating
heels in the ton containers is unacceptable. The permit modification request notes limitations in the
drain tube approach (i.e. that the tubes cannot penetrate the heel, and may get broken in the
process). The State and the Army should be aware of the risks of feeding chemical warfare items
into a furnace with a substantial heel; the1998 MC-1 bomb incident illustrated these risks quite
clearly. Burning ton containers with substantial mustard agent heels, with the added risks of high
mercury content and likely concentrations of other heavy metals and toxics, is unsafe.

7. (Page A-5) Module V (1): Greater feed rates demonstrated for DFS DRE during previous trial
burns with agent other than Mustard are not transferable to the Mustard Campaign.

8. (Page A-6) Module V (4): Identify “previous analyses” used to identify regulated compounds
found in Mustard Agent and Spent Decon. Identify the compounds.

9. (Page A-6) Module V (6): Commenters agree with deleting items treated in previous campaigns.

10. (Page A-6) Module V (7) and (Page A-7) Module VI (3) and Module VIII (3) and (Page A-8)
Attachment 14 (1) (2) (3) (4): The 5% heel restrictions were placed in the original permit for a
reason. It is assumed that reason was to have the furnaces perform specific tasks according to their
design capabilities. Removing the 5% heel restriction indicates desired usage of various furnaces
(in particular the MPF) for purposes and in a manner not considered in the design.

11. (Page A-7) Module VI (2): Post Trial Burn feed rate should be maintained at 50% of the trial
burn demonstrated rates until review and approval of the ATB by UT DSHW.

12. (Page A-7) Module V (12) and Module X (B)(1): Lewisite is strictly forbidden from being
incinerated in the existing permit. Although Lewisite may be less thermally stable than Mustard, the
unknown concentrations, coupled with its being mixed with Mustard and “additional impurities”
raises unanswered questions as to its DRE under the proposed action. Therefore, this prohibition
should not be revised.
       
        - Module V.B.1.a.i requires only one chemical agent be fed to the LIC. The presence of
        unquantified amounts of Lewisite mixed with Mustard violates this requirement.

        - Section 2.2.1.1 of the Waste Analysis Plan requires Analytical parameters based on previous
        analytical results – not applicable in this case; or, the homogeneity of the waste – not
        determined in this case using the sampling analysis regime envisioned. Other requirements
        contained within this section are also not achievable and violate 40 CFR 268.9.

        - Suspension of ACS tank sampling after the LIC Mustard ATB assumes continuity of contents
        between all TC’s to be processed post ATB. This is an assumption that can not be
        demonstrated by the Waste Analysis Plan.

13. (Module V – page 3): (V.A.2.a.): POHC DRE for Mustard in the LIC at 99.9999% is
sidestepped via allowance of greater than 5% (up to an undetermined %) to be processed in the
MPF which requires only a 99.99% DRE. SIGNIFICANT quantities of Mustard will be permitted
to be burned at the lower DRE than were initially intended for the LIC, which was the basis of the
higher DRE requirement in this furnace. This MOD therefore circumvents a primary safety and
emissions requirement and contradicts the intent of the original permit and the protections
incorporated therein.

14, (Module V – page 10): (V.B.2.i.): Commenters seek explanation of the revision switching from
negative pressure to sealed system design of the LIC combustion chamber.

15. (, (Module V – page 11): (V.B.3): Commenters seek explanation of the modifications to the
LIC AWFCO contained in (attachment 19 Page 6) regarding the apparent lowering of standards for
an AWFCO from specific operating temperatures to “one-hour rolling average”. Commenters
infer from this modification that the ability to maintain optimum furnace conditions during Mustard
LIC operations is understood to be more challenging than during the GB and VX Campaigns. The
modifications to the AWFCO expanded time at temperature indicate variations will be permitted
under which incomplete combustion of the POHC will occur.

        - The above comment applies, even more so, to the Table D-6-2, the MPF AWFCO
        parameters /set points. (Attachment 19 Page 13).

16. (Module V: V.C.1) (Pages 12-15): General Comment: This entire section allows the TOCDF
Mustard Campaign to be conducted contingent on unreliable analysis capabilities; undemonstrated
waste characterization capabilities; predicted, but not demonstrated calculations regarding charge
weights and charge intervals relying on ATB that do not necessarily represent direct equivalents to
post ATB TC’s to be treated in the MPF. The approach underscores the “guessing-game”
approach being used by the Premittee in regards to the Mustard Campaign.

        - Commenters note that the process being proposed for the Mustard Campaign at TOCDF is
        also known within the Chemical Demilitarization Program as “Modified Baseline”. This
        approach was attempted at JACADS, resulting in failure of the Trial Burns there. Modified
        Baseline was also proposed for the Pueblo, Colorado stockpile and abandoned in lieu of
        community, regulatory and safety considerations. TOCDF, and in particular, the MPF, was not
        designed to “cook-off” large quantities of solidified Mustard agent in its design, hence the
        LIC. Based on JACADS performance and subsequent research done within the Chemical
        Materials Agency, Modified Baseline has been rejected as a viable option for Mustard disposal.
        Approval of this MOD will, however, permit this approach to be deployed.

        - Commenters believe such approval is also a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
        (NEPA), as none of the Environmental Impact Statements prepared for the Chemical
        Demilitarization Program, nor an SSEIS done for TOCDF contemplated nor addressed
        Modified Baseline as a disposal option.

        - Furthermore, Commenters point to successful completion of operations at ABCDF using
        nonincineration disposal technologies and recommend UT DSHW consider proposing such
        approaches to CMA for Mustard disposal operations at TOCDF.

In summary, the baseline process as outlined in the permit modification request is inappropriate,
especially when safer alternatives are available. The low-temperature, low-pressure neutralization
process could include a washout system for the ton containers that would, incidentally, effectively
dislodge and neutralize any mustard agent heels. The neutralization process can also effectively
capture mercury and other heavy metals, preventing them from being released into the air in an
uncontrolled manner. Neutralization of the mustard agent would also eliminate the risk of dioxin
formation and release. The “hold, test, release” capability of neutralization means that there would
not be uncontrolled release of other toxics including trace amounts of mustard agent.

Some of the changes that may be considered in the “non-baseline” approach may lend to use of
neutralization at TOCDF for the entire mustard agent stockpile. In this case the government may be
able to save time and money by choosing one process that can treat all of the stockpile, regardless
of mercury concentration levels, instead of trying to force the incinerator to perform in a manner
that is clearly beyond its design, and will lead to unnecessarily exposing the Utah environment,
wildlife and human population to more mercury.

Modification Request Number TOCDF-H-HD-HT-03-0828 represents an unequivocal example of
“trying to fit a square peg in a round hole”.

The Army’s own “lessons learned” program should certainly support translating the successes in
Maryland to sites like Utah. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program showed, in
its review of technologies, that neutralization and biological treatment of mustard agents works.

Since the Army has already destroyed the most “risky” nerve agent munitions, there is little
storage risk associated with mustard agent. In fact, the amount of time the Army may spend
tweaking the incinerator process, and moving to the non-baseline process eventually, may equal or
be greater than the amount of time it would take to use a neutralization process of all of the mustard
agent.

Thank you for accepting these comments. We welcome the opportunity to discuss them with you
as well as to review the non-baseline process description as soon as possible.

Sincerely,


Jason Groenewold on behalf of:
FAIR/HEAL Utah
CWWG
Utah Chapter Sierra Club