Asserting the Need for Improved
Airborne Chemical Agent
Monitoring Systems at U.S.
Chemical Weapons Stockpile Sites


Compiled by:
Chemical Weapons Working Group
PO Box 467  Berea, KY  40403
phone: (859) 986-7565    
fax:  (859) 986-2695   
web:  http://www.cwwg.org

April 2004


Introduction

Millions of U.S. citizens live within harmful range of old stockpiles of chemical weapons, stored or being destroyed on eight military bases in Utah, Oregon, Colorado, Kentucky, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana and Maryland.  The chemical weapons are filled with lethal nerve agents VX and GB, and mustard, or blistering, agents.  

As the weapons are destroyed--whether by incineration or non-incineration methods--one of the basic means of ensuring the well-being of citizens living nearby these stockpiles is to monitor for the release of chemical agents as completely, accurately and quickly as possible.

However, the Army’s current monitoring system is woefully inadequate, particularly at its incinerator sites, where chemical agent can be released along with tons of daily gaseous emissions through smokestacks.  Chemical agents can also be released from places other than incinerator smokestacks, including: ash bins; rooms that are not sealed; and during movement of weapons from storage igloos to the disposal facility.

This primer will clarify the inadequacies of existing monitoring systems and the benefits that additional airborne chemical agent monitors offer.


I.  Existing chemical agent monitoring systems

The Army relies primarily on two monitoring systems at its chemical weapons stockpile sites to sample the air for mustard and nerve agents:  Agent Continuous Air Monitoring Systems (ACAMS) and Depot Area Air Monitoring Systems (DAAMS). Both ACAMS and DAAMS monitors are positioned throughout chemical weapons disposal facilities, including in the smokestacks of incinerators. Additionally, DAAMS stations are also positioned outside of the plants, at the perimeter of depot property.    

ACAMS are very sensitive and can detect even trace levels of chemical agents.  ACAMS are connected to an alarm system, which sounds as soon as chemical agent is detected.  DAAMS are not connected to alarm systems.  Rather, DAAMS tubes collect air samples and are used to confirm readings from ACAMS.

Although the sensitivity of the ACAMS is definitely a plus, there are frequent “false positive” readings.  That is, when an ACAMS alarm sounds, it may be because of chemical agent but it may also have resulted from some other industrial chemical or interferent.  In fact, the Army has said it is common to have as many as 5000 such alarms every month.  Such a high number of false readings can lead to a “cry wolf” environment in which workers disregard ACAMS alarms.

Since ACAMS can only be calibrated to monitor one type of chemical agent at a time, they do not fully identify chemical emissions.  For example, an incident on March 30, 1998 at the Tooele, Utah incinerator resulted in the release of an unidentified airborne chemical at a very high concentration.  The Army has insisted that the release was not chemical warfare agent, however they cannot say what it was, or what the environmental or health impacts of the release may have been.

The effectiveness of DAAMS tubes placed on the outside of chemical weapons disposal plants is extremely limited.  The distance between DAAMS stations located at depot perimeters is great enough that a plume of chemical agent could easily be missed.  There are no alarms associated with these monitors, and DAAMS tubes outside of the facilities are collected every 8 - 12 hours.  In February 2004 in Anniston, Alabama, a routine pull of DAAMS air sampling tubes revealed a reading for VX nerve agent.  No ACAMS alarm ever sounded, and there is no way to know exactly when the detection occurred during the 12 hours prior to their being collected.  The Army used all three DAAMS tube samples to run the same confirmation test, leaving no other sample with which a more detailed test could be conducted.  All three tubes confirmed VX agent. However, the source and concentrations of the confirmed agent readings remain a mystery.  

The Army does not monitor for toxic compounds such as PCBs, dioxins or heavy metals except for a limited time during the trial burn phase.  The concentrations of these kinds of toxic emissions during routine incinerator operations is unknown.


II.  Workers at chemical weapons facilities have testified on the limitations of the Army’s existing monitoring systems, and the failure of the Army to fix the problems

Over the years, in state and federal court hearings in Utah and Oregon, Army experts from chemical weapons incinerators have testified as to the limitations of the ACAMS and DAAMS monitoring systems.  Following is a summary of issues raised by workers in Oregon district court in 2003:


It is important to note that workers who raised these issues internally and publicly have been harassed, even by the Army’s attorney, right in the courtroom!  On August 13, 2003, under cross examination by Army attorney Robert Foster,  Mr. Tom Cramer, testifying to the inadequate monitoring systems, was told that if he testified, his “head would be on the chopping block.”   This shows the Army’s willingness to quash those who challenge the effectiveness of its monitors.


III.  By adding advanced chemical agent monitoring systems to existing monitors, a much-needed layer of protection would be provided to depot workers and community members

A.  What do we mean by improved or advanced chemical agent monitoring systems?

One such advanced monitoring system, recommended by the National Research Council, is an infrared monitoring system called the Open-Path Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectrometer.  There are numerous companies producing infrared technology and the CWWG does not endorse any one provider.

B.  How does the technology work?

FTIR technology uses an infrared light beam, shot horizontally from an instrument that looks like a telescope, to monitor the air for pollutants.  The system can be used to simultaneously monitor more than 50 chemicals and pollutants, including chemical warfare agents. FTIR can be deployed in the open air surrounding the chemical weapons storage and disposal facilities.  

Infrared technology can  “fingerprint” airborne gases generated by chemical weapons incinerators, meaning it can monitor the emissions, and accurately identify and measure the concentration of the chemicals it identifies.    It is a computer driven system, which means complete information on chemical readings are available immediately on a computer screen.  This information can be downloaded, saved, and even used as a means to track changes in air quality.

The technology can work effectively when infrared beams are configured in a set of concentric grids surrounding the source of air pollutants (be it an oil refinery, landfill, incinerator, etc.).   For a chemical weapons facility, this would mean having two grids of infrared beams surrounding the facility, within the depot.  Any chemical agent that crosses that space would be identified in near real-time.  

C.  What are the advantages of using this technology in addition to ACAMS and DAAMS?

For use at chemical weapons facilities, infrared technology would fill a void by providing prompt, accurate detection of chemical agents outside the facility.  The benefits are huge:



IV.  The National Research Council has for 10 years advised the Army to use improved monitoring systems

Following are excerpts from a variety of NRC committee reports regarding monitoring systems at chemical weapons facilities.

A.  Review of Monitoring Activities Within the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, 1994:  

The major finding of the committee is that the monitoring system currently in use at JACADS should be improved prior to employment at sites in the continental United States....The Army should initiate a substantial program to upgrade the monitoring systems for continental U.S. sites....The Army should undertake whatever instrument development is necessary to ensure that improved instrumentation is available to the chemical disposal program is suitably rugged and operational forms....The Army should test and use new monitoring instrumentation at JACADS before such instrumentation is employed at  Tooele (3-4).

The relatively slow response of the ACAMS means that, in the event of a sudden release of agent, plant workers and the local population might be exposed to a concentration of agent above acceptable levels (25).”

The sampling of the DAAMS range from one hour when detecting in the exhaust stacks, to eight hours when monitoring plant work areas, and twelve hours at the site perimeter.  These times do not include analysis time.  The response time of DAAMS confirmation of ACAMS alarms requires about 15 to 20 minutes for sample tube collection, transportation to the laboratory, and analysis (27).

Remote sensing or point source sampling, employing infrared spectroscopy techniques, could be used to provide more rapid agent detection in plant work areas.  The instruments could operate continuously and have a response time on the order of 10 seconds or less (31).

B.  Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions, 1994:

The ACAMS generates frequent false alarms because it cannot adequately differentiate agent from other commonly encountered organic contaminants....Further, when an alarm sounds, the retrieval and laboratory analysis of the DAAMS collection tubes to verify conditions typically require half an hour or more (93).

C.  Review of Systemization of TOCDF, 1996:

Both the Stockpile Committee and the Army recognize that new monitoring technology will be required to reduce the desired response times to a few seconds, rather than the few minutes possible with staggered ACAMS.  The Army has contracted for the development and demonstration of a Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) multipass absorption technique, which should be capable of real-time (> 1 second) detection of high agent release levels (24).

D.  Occupational Health and Workplace Monitoring at Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities,  2001:

Current workplace monitoring systems for chemical agents are generally adequate for normal operations but may have serious deficiencies during accidents or departures from nominal operating conditions.  Potential employee exposures as a result of process upsets and/or accidents can be detected by existing monitoring systems, but not in real time (29).
Advances in monitoring technology could reduce response times and/or false positive alarm rates....This could reduce the risk of worker exposure during both disposal and closure operations (29).

The Army should continue to pursue improvements in airborne agent monitoring, including improved ACAMS technology (for multi-agent monitoring and lower false alarm rates), and in methods for identifying interferents that cause false alarms.  It should also pursue new analytical techniques that could lead to real-time agent detection (29).

 E.  Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities,  2002:

Relatively frequent false positive ACAMS alarms for airborne agent and the lack of true real-time (<10 s) monitoring for airborne agent have long been a concern of [NRC] committees assessing and examining the chemical demilitarization program.  Improvements in the sensitivity, specificity, and time response of the ACAMS system and the development of an additional airborne-agent monitoring technology robust at the parts-per-trillion level have previously been recommended...Although [PMCD] has made some efforts to develop better agent-monitoring technology, results to date have been disappointing (52).

Recommendation 6a.  To reduce the rate of false positive alarms for both airborne and condensed-materials agent contamination, [PMCD] and the relevant [DoD] research and development agencies...should invigorate and coordinate efforts to develop chemical agent monitors with improved sensitivity, specificity, and time response (52).


V.  Adding advanced chemical agent monitoring systems is cost effective and can be accomplished quickly without impacting the chemical weapons disposal schedule

Infrared monitoring systems like FTIR are “off the shelf” technology, meaning they are already being used widely by the military and in the private sector. Examples of their use include:
Deployment                                         Location                   Date                Sponsor    
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             May 96           UNSCOM
Fenceline Monitoring                        Aberdeen, MD           Aug 96           U.S. Army
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Nov 96            UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             March 97        UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Aug 97            UNSCOM
Iraq                                                        Iraq                             Sept 97            UNSCOM            
Process Monitoring                            Hill AFB, Utah           Dec. 98            U.S. Air Force
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Louisiana                   July 99            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Memphis                    April 00           U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Ogden, UT                 Sept. 00           U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Anniston, AL             May 01            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Spring Valley, MD    June 01            U.S. Corps of Engineers
Chemical Weapons Remediation      Anniston, AL             Apr 02             U.S. Corps of Engineers (Gamiles)
As noted in the chart above, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers uses Op-FTIR air monitors at remediation sites where buried chemical weapons are being un-earthed.  The system is used to warn workers, and nearby residents in the event of a release.  Releases have been accurately detected and reported.   It should be noted that Op-FTIR air monitoring was used during the remediation of Pelham Range, at Fort McClellan, Alabama during the Spring of 2002.  As part of routine operation, intrusive work does not commence unless the Op-FTIR air monitoring system is operational.  This is standard practice for all of the sites operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers when open-path air monitors are used.

The U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has published a fact sheet on Op-FTIR monitors, which states

FTIR is used to perform air quality studies of industrial sites, residential communities, landfills, and more.  The technology can identify all compounds present in a cloud of smoke emitted from an industrial plant, and it can predict how a cloud of smoke will disperse due to wind speed.  This may be helpful as an emergency evacuation monitor to protect public health.  Open-path FTIR technology can also be used to determine air quality conditions in a neighborhood setting; determine source-specific fenceline fugitive and stack pollutant emission concentrations from selected industries; identify compounds emitted from factories as they change processes, batches, or shifts; study impurities from vehicles in traffic; perform perimeter monitoring around remediation sites; determine ambient air quality pollutants in a Community Bases Environmental protection area; and determine the effectiveness of a water spray curtain on cloud concentrations.

and, “As required, FTIR would be an ideal tool for use by refineries, environmental agencies, citizen groups, and state and local governments.”

Vendors for these systems estimate that the total cost of deploying infrared monitoring systems at all chemical weapons disposal facilities could be in the range of $16 million.  That is a proverbial ‘drop in the bucket’ for the chemical weapons program, projected to cost over $25 billion, and considering the safety benefits gained by facility managers, depot workers and nearby community members.

Vendors also believe this technology could be deployed at chemical weapons sites within months after funding is secured.  Deploying these systems does not require the facilities to shut down, so the chemical weapons destruction schedule would not be impacted.


Works Cited

Chemical Materials Agency, Anniston Chemical Activity.  “Monitoring station detects VX at perimeter of Pelham Range; no emergency involved.”  Press release, March 3, 2004.

CWWG et al. vs. U.S. Department of the Army et al., US District Court District of Utah.  Case No. 2:96-CV-425(TC).  Testimony, June 1999. 

Fiori, Mario, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and Environment (former).  Personal correspondance, December 2001.

Gamiles, Donald.  CWWG et al. vs. U.S. Army et al. US District Court, District of Columbia.  Case No. 1:03CV00645. Affidavit, August 6, 2003.

GASP et al. vs. Oregon Environmental Quality Comission et al., US Circuit Court, State of Oregon, County of Multnomah.  Case No. 0009-09349.  Testimony, August 2003.

National Research Council.  Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities.  Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002.

-  -  -.  Occupational Health and Workplace Monitoring at Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities.  Washington, D.C.:  National Academies Press, 2001.

-  -  -.  Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions.  Washington, D.C.:  National Academies Press, 1994.

-  -  -.  Review of Monitoring Activities Within the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.  Washington, D.C.:  National Academies Press, 1994.  

-  -  -.  Review of Systemization of TOCDF.  Washington, D.C.:  National Academies Press, 1996.

U.S. Army SBCCOM.  “Open Path Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometer.” Fact sheet, 2002. <http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/ecbc/pdfs/ftir.pdf>.

-  -  -.  “Monitoring at Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities.” Fact sheet, 2003.  

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