Mr. Paul Hoeper
Assistant Secretary of the Army (RD&A)
103 Army, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310

Mr. James Bacon
PMCD
ATTN: SFAE-CD-Z
Building E4585
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010

LTC Christopher Ross
PM NSCM
SFAE-CD-N
Building E4405
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401

June 13, 2000

Dear Gentlemen,

As you may know, the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition (Coalition)
recently received, through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, information on
disposal of secondary wastes from the Rapid Response System (RRS) and Munitions
Management Device - 1 (MMD-1). This new information, in addition to more recent
information on incineration and poor performance at NSCMP subcontractor facilities,
validates our call for NSCMP to halt its plans to incinerate RRS and MMD-1 secondary
wastes and by-products in favor of using non-incineration technologies.

Our primary concern is the inability of Safety-Kleen to safely and effectively destroy the
secondary wastes. Safety-Kleen is subcontracted by the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel
Program (NSCMP) through primary contractor Teledyne Brown, to treat wastes from the
RRS and MMD-1. First, Safety-Kleen is suffering from acute financial problems. Last
Spring the company was charged with "accounting irregularities," incidents over which high
level managers were released. Last week, Safety-Kleen admitted to having missed around
$60 million in debt payments; a large number of its facilities have filed for bankruptcy.
These announcements apparently represent only a few of Safety-Kleen's recent financial
problems.

Second, information from the RRS and MMD-1 secondary waste manifests, which we
acquired through the FOIA request, and a recent independent audit performed on the Safety-
Kleen Deer Park, Texas facility intensifies our distrust of the current secondary waste
handling and incineration strategy. A review of the waste manifests shows that on numerous
occasions shipments of waste were rejected by one Safety-Kleen facility only to be rerouted
to another. In one instance, a shipment of RRS secondary waste was in transit for more than
45 days, during which time it passed through at least four states before being destroyed in
the Aragonite, Utah Safety-Kleen incinerator not far from where the waste originated.
Increased transportation means increased risk to the general public and workers and
increased liability. A 1998 independent audit of the Safety-Kleen Deer Park, Texas incinerator,
reveals some disturbing information about facility operations. The auditor's
report states

The problem is the seriousness, frequency, and apparent underlying cause of some
of these incidents concerning fires, explosions and/or exothermic reactions. In all
there were a total of 47 incidents recorded by Safety-Kleen during the years 1997
through 1999....there were 13 fire related incidents, one explosion, one exothermic
chemical reaction inside a tank, seven incinerator emergency vent hatch releases, six
spills and nine opacity excursions.

The auditor's report also notes problems with the incineration of unauthorized waste,
improperly monitored stack gases, improper storage of incompatible wastes, problems with
waste profiles, manifests and drum management, potential off-site migration of waste,
unauthorized incineration of PCBs during "air stagnation" conditions, and more.

Additional compliance audits for this and other commercial incinerators currently contracted
to treat RRS and MMD-1 secondary wastes may reveal additional threats to worker and
public safety. We expect to acquire these additional compliance audits shortly as a result of
FOIA litigation.

Lastly, the Coalition's opposition to incineration is well-documented, and NSCMP has
stated its desire to move away from the use of incinerators. New information on the hazards
of incineration, coupled with continued advances in the non-incineration technology arena,
supports this approach:

• the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) July 1998 Development of a Hazardous
  Waste Incinerator Target Analyte List of Products of Incomplete Combustion(PICs),
  which determines there may be "entire classes of PICs" that are not currently being
  monitored for; and that the majority of PICs in incinerator air emissions are unidentified;
  and
  
• a leaked draft of EPA's dioxin reassessment, which shows the risk of human exposure
  to dioxin -- such as through incinerator air emissions -- to be ten times greater than
  previously thought.

Meanwhile, groundbreaking for neutralization-based chemical weapons stockpile disposal
pilot plants has recently occurred in Indiana and Maryland. Two non-incineration
technologies demonstrated through the federal Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment
(ACWA) program are moving forward to the pilot plant phase. Three additional ACWA
technologies will begin demonstrations this Summer. While the Coalition has not endorsed
specific treatment technologies, we believe that non-incineration systems, such as those
which will be used in Maryland and Indiana and those which have successfully demonstrated
through ACWA, are more protective of worker safety, public health and the environment
than incineration.

We believe that it is past time for NSCMP to exercise control of its secondary waste
treatment processes. In a January 13, 1999 letter from Mr. Paul Hoeper to me regarding
RRS and MMD-1 secondary waste treatment, Mr. Hoeper wrote that the Army

share[s] your concern that the commercial firms selected to dispose of this waste are
properly permitted, highly competent firms using proven waste treatment
technologies. We are committed to, and under the permits anticipated for these
systems, will be required to, perform assessments to ensure that the selected waste
disposal firms meet high standards.

We do not characterize the current secondary waste disposal strategy as either safe or
efficient. For NSCMP to continue with the decision to use the incineration technology is
compromising its promise to ensure "high standards" of secondary waste disposal, and
unnecessarily putting the general public at risk. Given that NSCMP intends to begin testing
operations of the RRS and MMD-1 this Summer, we urge you to act now to determine safer,
more efficient means of disposal using advanced non-incineration technologies. As
recommended in our comments to NSCMP's draft Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement, we request that these secondary wastes be stored until such time as NSCMP is in
a position to take advantage of these technologies.

Thank you for your attention. We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth Crowe, Coordinator
Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition

cc: Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera
Ms. Sherri Wasserman-Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense,
Environmental Security
Ms. Gloria Patton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Chemical
Demilitarization