ARMY, GAO ADVOCATE CREATING
SINGLE CHEM DEMIL PROGRAM
But Congress Not Ready to Act
Though the Army is set to fold the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives
(ACWA) program into the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA)—and to some degree
is already operating that way since both entities are led by the same person
(CCBW&D Monitor, Vol. 5 No. 15)—and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
is basically urging the consolidation, it appears Congress has not been moved
to lift the statutory requirement preventing the reorganization.
This move was addressed at an Oct. 30 hearing on the Army’s organization
of the chemical demilitarization program convened by Jim Saxton (R-N.J.),
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. The hearing also focused on a recent
GAO report (GAO-03-1031), which charged that the Army’s program was “in turmoil”
because of “long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational,
and strategic planning issues” (CCBW&D Monitor, Vol. 5 No. 18). At the
hearing, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Demilitarization
and Logistics Pat Wakefield made it clear that the Army was indeed considering
such a consolidation—a possibility revealed by CMA and ACWA head Mike Parker
in an exclusive interview with CCBW&D Monitor last July (Vol. 5 No. 15).
Wakefield’s reasoning for proceeding in this direction was generally endorsed
by GAO’s Managing Director for Defense Capabilities and Management Henry
Hinton, Jr., who reiterated GAO’s position articulated in the report. But
their arguments did not evoke any positive reaction from the lawmakers.
A staffer, however, told CCBW&D Monitor after the hearing that the committee
“[plans on addressing the] plan in next year’s [defense] authorization bill.”
But standing in the way of congressional reorganization will be the continued
staunch opposition by the anti-incineration Kentucky-based Chemical Weapons
Working Group (CWWG), headed by Craig Williams, which played a key role in
getting the ACWA program created to evaluate alternatives to incineration.
CWWG’s efforts have long been supported by key Republican leaders including
Sens. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Alabama’s Richard Shelby (R). Williams
is not supporting consolidation at this time. In an exclusive interview with
CCBW&D Monitor, he made his position very clear. “Based on the risk associated
with diminishing the progress made in execution and cooperation that ACWA
has achieved over the past seven years, to merge it into a system that still
is restricted by the oversight methods deployed by [the Department of the
Army Acquisitions Office], I strongly oppose merging ACWA into CMA.” Williams
suggested however, that he would be willing to “reconsider supporting the
merger” if ACWA sites are changed from the Acquisitions program to the Operations
side.
In addition to Wakefield, Parker and Hinton, witnesses testifying at the
hearing included: Claude Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics); and Craig Conklin, Chief, Nuclear and Chemical
Hazards Branch Preparedness Division, FEMA.
The Case for Consolidation
Wakefield told the Subcommittee that the consolidation “would significantly
improve the overall management of the chemical demilitarization program by
making the executive agent of the program, the army, responsible for the
program in its entirety.” In the previous CCBW&D Monitor interview, Parker
noted that if Congress “decided to make the move,” CMA was “well positioned
to receive [the] two sites.” Though as head of both programs, he is essentially
already the “embodiment” of the programs merged. He pointed out that it is
“cumbersome in the business sense because information goes out one side and
goes in the other. With the full endorsement of the OSC and Army leadership
we’re looking for opportunities for leverage between Army sites and Pueblo
and Blue Grass (the ACWA sites) in order get business efficiencies while
remaining respectful of the law and keeping the decision making—when the
formal decision making is done—in the appropriate chain of command.”
Wakefield’s and Parker’s arguments were fully backed by GAO’s Hinton, who
claimed that the bifurcation of Army and ACWA programs is indicative of the
leadership problems that have long plagued the chem demil program, and has
been one of the contributing factors causing program delays and budget problems.
To correct the program’s shortcomings, Hinton reiterated the GAO report recommendation
that the chem demil program develop an overall strategy with a program mission
statement and implement a risk management approach. He warned that without
changes, “further delays will occur and costs will grow even higher.” The
cost of the program to complete destruction has grown from an estimated $1.7
billion in 1986 to an estimated $25 billion. Saxton pointed out that over
the last 13 years, $6 billion has been spent on 26 percent of the chemical
weapons destruction . At the current pace, that would be $20 billion dollars
over the next nine years. “This is a lot of money,” Saxton sighed. Ranking
Member Martin Meehan (D-Mass.), said that although he has “much to say in
praise of the chem demil program” he is “frustrated with political opportunism
within the Pentagon,” and blamed “politics [and] indecisive management” on
the setbacks. Bolton admitted that he initially resisted taking over the
program from the Office of the Secretary of Defense