By Lee Davidson
Deseret Morning News

As the second Iraq war loomed and created new chemical weapons threats, Air Force commanders in the Middle East heard that the Pentagon was developing a new hand-held chemical agent detector said to be better than equipment they were using.
     
So they begged in late 2002 for 100 early models to be bought and sent to them.
     
Officials complied, at a total cost of $1 million. Trouble is, they knew manufacturer's tests showed the detectors didn't work well in hot areas or under battle conditions. And they didn't wait for other planned tests, including some at Utah's Dugway Proving Ground, which would conclude that the equipment is not worth purchasing until it is improved significantly.
     
So, a Defense Department Inspector General report says the Air Force not only wasted $1 million on unreliable detectors, but it may have put airmen at increased risk while they depended on the equipment. The report says officials appear to have violated a variety of federal laws and military rules to do that.
     
The Pentagon also ordered the Air Force to cease using the 100 detectors that were bought and to collect and return them to military testers working on improving them.
     
The information is in documents obtained by the Deseret Morning News through a Freedom of Information Act request.
     
Inspector general documents say the military began developing a new hand-held chemical arms detector after the first war in Iraq, when "a major deficiency identified was the inability of U.S. forces to effectively detect and identify chemical warfare agents."
     
British Aerospace Systems was chosen as the contractor to develop a "joint chemical agent detector." After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that company also began marketing a virtually identical commercial version called the "JCAD ChemSentry."
     
Amid such marketing, the inspector general report says, Air Force Central Command overseeing the Middle East erroneously "perceived that the JCAD ChemSentry technology provided greater operational capacity than the capabilities of fielded detectors" it was already using.
     
The command filed an "Unusual and Compelling Urgency Need" request asking officers who oversee development of the detector to buy and send 100 models. When told it would take three months to verify that need, Air Force commanders said that was unacceptable and that they would buy commercial versions directly from the manufacturer.
     
In response, the military's JCAD Program Office decided to go ahead and buy the requested detectors quickly. But instead of purchasing them as part of its normal programs to test and verify the early military version, it opted also to buy the commercial model instead.
     
The report complains that the Air Force officials improperly sought to evade rules that require proof before purchase (of the military version) that it meets required standards. The inspector general says the JCAD Program Office knew the detectors did not do that, based on the manufacturer's own testing, but thought they worked well enough to be of use.
     
"The JCAD Program Office knew that the system had a high number of false alarms, that it had failed high temperature and humidity environmental tests and needed an additional shade of some kind to shield against solar radiation," the report said.
     
In short, tests suggested it may not work in battle conditions or in the Iraqi desert.
     
"The pending Iraqi conflict and widespread concerns about the potential for U.S. warfighters to be exposed to chemical or biological contaminants placed the JCAD Program Office in the difficult position of wanting to be responsive and yet needing to comply with DoD (Defense Department) policy," the report says.
     
But it adds, that office "should not have agreed" to buy the detectors "before having an independent verification conducted to ensure that the JCAD ChemSentry units perform better than existing equipment."
     
In February 2003, the Air Force requested another 100 detectors. This time, the Pentagon said it would allow the purchase only if testing, including some planned at Utah's Dugway Proving Ground, proved the JCAD was better than existing detectors.
     
The tests, finished in March 2003, concluded that the detectors "did not satisfy all JCAD operational requirements and did not add a significant military capability over the fielded units." Among many problems, it was determined that the detectors simply did not perform well enough in identifying when chemical agents were present, the report said.
     
With that, the report said, no further detectors were bought. The inspector general called for the Air Force to cease using those that it already had. The assistant secretary of Defense for nuclear and chemical and biological defense programs concurred and ordered that the detectors be collected and sent to military testers.
     
A side story is that the inspector general's office also complains about the affordability of the JCAD program. It notes that original guidelines expected that detectors would cost about $2,000. The 100 that were purchased cost nearly $10,000 each.
     
Even as production increases and unit prices drop, it said current estimates envision an overall cost of about $4,150 each for the first 37,460 JCAD units.
     
The inspector general complained that with higher costs, currently projected budgets won't allow buying the 274,876 JCAD units that the military figures it needs over the next few decades, especially because British Aerospace can currently make only 7,300 units a year.
     
"We estimate that it would take the contractor 37 years to fulfill the government's requirement," the report said.