Defense
Environment Alert
an exclusive biweekly report on defense policies for cleanup, compliance and pollution prevention
Vol. 15, No. 18
September 4, 2007
ARMY ADVISED TO EXPAND CITIZEN ROLE IN CHEMICAL WARFARE CLEANUPS
The Army should expand citizen and other stakeholder involvement in making decisions about cleanup technologies for chemical warfare material (CWM) at the nearly 100, but expanding number of, formerly used defense sites (FUDS), according to recommendations developed by an environmental watchdog group at the request of the the Army Corps of Engineers.
The group also suggests that to ensure "trust" has been established when site-specific cleanup decisions are made about non-stockpile CWM, "FUDS project managers must be prepared to work cooperatively with communities and reminded of the importance of developing such relationships," the report says. And, it says, if the Corps understands the concerns of FUDS communities upfront, it can achieve its mission of recovering and destroying buried CWM "with a minimum of delay, expense, and controversy."
The Center for Public Environmental Oversight (CPEO), a military environmental watchdog group, conducted the study at the request of the Army Engineering & Support Center, a division of the Army Corps of Engineers. The study reviewed existing technologies used to destroy CWM and evaluated community attitudes toward various technologies or methods for disposing of CWM found or being found at FUDS. CPEO in August publicly released a report on the study.
The report, Communities and Chemical Warfare Disposal, is available on InsideEPA.com. See page 2 for details.
While the Corps has documented nearly 100 FUDS sites with CWM presenting explosive or chemical agent hazards, the number of sites believed to have CWM continually increases as such material continues to be found. Further, regula tory requirements and community acceptance of recovery and disposal methods may vary greatly from place to place, the report says. Also, new technologies may be necessary to address emerging response scenarios. To address these issues, the Corps requested the investigation by CPEO. Disposal of these types of material at FUDS - deemed not to be part of the chemical weapons stockpile falls under the Army's Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project.
The advice comes as the Army and DOD "are considering new ways to organize the remaining Non-Stockpile [CWM] missions, primarily the recovery and destruction of buried CWM," the report notes.
"The key lesson of this study was that stakeholders' acceptance of CWM treatment technologies is primarily a function of the level of trust that they exhibit toward the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other government officials at their sites," the report says. This view was consistent among individuals with both favorable and unfavorable experiences with the Corps, the report says.
To conduct its study, CPEO visited five communities with FUDS that have known CWM issues, including American University Experimental Station in Spring Valley, Washington, D.C.; Amaknak Island, Unalaska/Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, AK; the former Lowry Bombing and Gunnery Range in Aurora, CO; Black Hills Ordnance Depot in Igloo, SD; and the former Camp Sibert in Steele, AL.
Non-stockpile CWM at FUDS can encompass various types of material, including chemical munitions such as mortar rounds, artillery shells and aerial bombs, as well as Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS), which are containers of small amounts of diluted chemical agent that were used to train soldiers to recognize chemical agents by smell. An unknown number of these sets were disposed of by burial, the report says. Bulk storage containers of chemical agent can also be found at FUDS, and CWM laboratory debris has been found in significant quantities at at least one site - Spring Valley.
The experience the Army has had at its chemical weapons stockpile sites over many years "illustrates how the storage and disposal of chemical warfare materiel can generate intense emotional reactions from host communities," the report notes. The stockpile program, which has focused mainly on using incineration for destruction purposes a controversial method - has been slowed by legal and political challenges, and technology and regulatory issues, with the most recent occurring over the Army's push to dispose of secondary nerve agent waste at a commercial off-site facility rather than on-site at the Army's Newport, IN, facility. Citizen activists are suing over the Army's latest plan to ship the waste off-site to be incinerated in Texas. Previously, activists thwarted plans by the Army to ship the Newport waste to facilities in Ohio and New Jersey.
The report notes that in contrast "the Non-Stockpile Project has avoided such challenges by institutionalizing a give-and-take relationship with community activists, regulators, and others through the Core Group," a body from which the Army's non-stockpile program regularly seeks advice. The Core Group includes representatives from environmental regulatory agencies and public stakeholders such as the national activist coalition Chemical Weapons Working Group. At periodic meetings throughout the year, the Army briefs the Core Group on existing and emerging technologies and activities. "The stakeholders provide feedback, and the Army takes those views into account. Thus, when new sites are uncovered, there is a body of experience that can help new stakeholder groups understand the technological options," the paper says.
"To promote the development and/or acceptance of chemical warfare material disposal technologies and strategies at [FUDS], the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers should work to include public stakeholders from FUDS in the Core Group or a similar national dialogue on buried CWM response," CPEO recommends.
There are a number of different treatment and disposal technologies the Army could potentially use to address buried CWM. These range from open detonation and trailer-mounted technologies that can be brought to a site to treat and dispose of CWM to large-scale incinerators to which CWM would have to be transported. The study found that the public at selected FUDS was generally unaware of the range of possible technologies.