Defense Environment Alert
June 17, 2003

ALABAMA GOVERNOR KEY TO ARMY'S EFFORT TO START ANNISTON FACILITY

Observers of the Army's chemical weapons program are closely watching Alabama Gov. Bob Riley (R) to see whether he continues to insist that certain safety measures are in place before the Army begins any type of chemical weapons disposal activities at its incinerator in Anniston.

At issue is a draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) among the Army, the emergency preparedness and response section of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Alabama, which would allow the Army to begin "interim" processing of the Anniston stockpile while initiating, but not fully completing, several safety measures that Riley, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) and local county officials have said must be in place before incineration begins.

Sources say that while none of the parties has yet signed the agreement, the Army and DHS have approved it, leaving Riley the apparent hold-out. Riley's office told Alabama's Birmingham News two weeks ago that Riley "cannot, and will not, allow the incinerator to begin operations" until the four safety measures are in place. Riley will refuse to sign the MOA and would block the state's Department of Environmental Management from issuing a final permit until he approves of the emergency preparations, his office told the News. Riley's office did not return calls from Defense Environment Alert.

And Shelby last week reiterated his stance, saying in a statement, "I am very concerned about safety loopholes that exist in the current MOA. I continue to support full implementation of the safety measures that have been identified to protect the local community and will not endorse any agreement to begin operations at [Anniston]. While I am not a party to the ongoing startup agreement process, I hope the final agreement will prepare the community for incineration operations."

The pressure for Riley to sign the MOA comes as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfwitz June 4 officially notified Congress that it is aiming to start incineration on or about July 1. This notification, however, is merely a legal requirement and actual operations are likely to occur after that date, the head of the Army's Chemical Materials Agency, Michael Parker, told industry representatives June 5 in Arlington, VA. Parker said the Army is getting closer to being able to start operations at Anniston, but said it is unclear whether processing can begin in the next weeks or months rather than at the end of the year. Relevant documents are available on InsideEPA.com. See page 2for details.

And the MOA comes as the mayor of Anniston and the mayors of six other Calhoun County municipalities have signed a resolution calling on the Army to begin incineration as soon as possible. The mayors say continued storage of the weapons poses a danger to area residents that increases each day as the weapons continue to degrade. They "urge any and all state, federal, and local agencies, as well as private sector groups, to eliminate any impediments that would further delay the incineration of the chemical stockpile."

The four safety measures are: a "collective protection program" for 31 schools and community facilities; a plan on how to assist "special needs" individuals living near the incinerator; the installation and activation of emergency sirens and tone alert radios; and the implementation of updated toxicity thresholds for chemical agent. According to the MOA, interim operations could begin with just the initiation of these measures, not their full implementation, which is expected to occur in October.

The MOA also outlines what is meant by interim operations, allowing the Army to begin processing sarin-filled M55 rockets 24 hours a day, seven days a week, but limiting the time when liquid agent would be incinerated to evenings and weekends.

Rockets will be removed from storage bunkers and brought to the incineration facility where they will be "punched and drained" of agent, with the liquid agent collected and stored for delayed disposal on weekends and evenings, following 24-hour notification to the state, the MOA says. The rocket pieces, however, will be immediately fed into the deactivation furnace for incineration.

Until the collective protection systems are in place, the Army would refrain from processing rocket lots that it believes, based on historical data, may contain gelled agent, the draft MOA says. But, if a gelled agent rocket is discovered during the punch-and-drain operations, then the Army will continue to process the gelled agent in the deactivation furnace for safety reasons, the document says. Additional rockets from that lot will not be fed into the system though.

Once all the safety measures are implemented, the facility will transition to full agent operations, the MOA says.

But the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG), a national coalition of citizen groups who support nonincineration destruction methods, says it has serious concerns over the interim processing plan. The interim plan fulfills only one of the four areas agreed to be in place prior to agent operations commencing -- activation of sirens in so-called pink zones. "Initiation of operations, at any level, under any provisions contained within the Interim plan violates the agreement between the Army and the citizens of Calhoun County, their local, state and federal elected officials," CWWG says.

"Regardless of any provisions noted in the MOA, the indisputable fact is that the Army will NOT have lived up to [its] promises surrounding the Safety Check List prior to agent operations, [be] they termed 'interim' or otherwise," CWWG says.

The group cites a 1994 National Research Council (NRC) report that says the transportation of munitions from the storage area to the demilitarization facility poses the highest level of risk to workers and the communities, and notes the MOA places no restriction on this transportation.

While the Army presents its interim plan as a way to reduce the risk until all the measures are in place, CWWG says the history of the chemical demilitarization program at other sites shows most of the incineration problems have been tied to the operation of the deactivation furnace, not the liquid incinerator. CWWG points to several problems at the Tooele, UT, facility where rocket pieces have become jammed in the deactivation furnace there, resulting in 2000 in a release of sarin from the facility.

CWWG is also concerned about plans to burn rockets with gelled agent, if they are discovered during processing, saying there has never been a trial burn conducted anywhere to demonstrate compliance with permit regulations while burning gelled rockets in the deactivation furnace. CWWG says the NRC has strongly recommended against burning fully agent-loaded munitions in a single furnace because this material separation is a major safety feature. And the group says that according to the NRC and Army officials, the probabilities of encountering "problems" are greatest during the initiation of operations.

"The modifications represented within the Interim Plan and the MOA serve no purpose other than to create a false perception that the agreed to safety issues that are outstanding need not be fully implemented because the risks posed to the community will not be as great under this Plan as they would be under normal initiation of operations," CWWG says. "This is not the case, and this effort reflects the willingness of the Army, its contractor and [DHS] to place community well being behind schedule, profit and image."