Defense Environment Alert
an exclusive biweekly report on defense policies for cleanup, compliance and pollution prevention


Vol. 12, No. 9--May 4, 2004


CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY LOWERED RISK, BUT GOALS ELUSIVE, GAO SAYS

The international treaty that requires destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons worldwide has helped lower the risks from chemical weapons, but the treaty's nonproliferation goals have been more difficult to reach than originally estimated, the General Accounting Office (GAO) says in a new report. GAO says policy changes will have to be made to sufficiently address nonproliferation concerns.

The April 27 report evaluates implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which went into force in 1997. It responds to a request from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) to review member states' work to meet key CWC requirements, examine the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW) efforts to perform inspections in compliance with the CWC, and review Russia's program to destroy its stockpile. The report is available on InsideEPA. com. See page 2 for details.

First, as it has previously reported, GAO estimates that neither Russia nor the United States will meet destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles by the CWC's extended deadline of 2012. Russia and the United States are the main possessors of chemical weapons, with over 95 percent of the world's declared stockpile.

"According to OPCW officials and CWC possessor states, the destruction of chemical weapons has proven more complex, costly, and time consuming than originally anticipated," GAO says.

GAO, relying on DOD information, believes Russia will not destroy its stockpiled chemical weapons until 2027.  It notes that while Russia's two sites with portable nerve agent munitions have installed security upgrades, a large quantity of the country's chemical weapons "will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion until they are destroyed."

Russia, as of last September, had destroyed 1. 1 percent of its 40,000 metric ton stockpile, it says.

GAO has previously pointed out the significant management challenges that have plagued the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program, as well as cost growth and schedule delay concerns. Most recently, it reported that DOD was at risk of missing both the 2007 45 percent extended destruction deadline, as well as the 2012 100 percent destruction deadline, if extended under the treaty, and DOD has admitted that two of its destruction facilities will have trouble meeting this final deadline (Defense Environment Alert, April 6, p26).

"Persistent delays have occurred due to plant safety issues, environmental requirements, and funding shortfalls," GAO says of the U.S. program. The report notes other proliferation risks as well, including the fact that less than 40 percent of member states have passed laws criminalizing CWC-prohibited activities and the Department of State's belief that China, Iran, Russia and Sudan have failed to fully declare their chemical weapons programs.

The OPCW, the implementing body for the CWC, is also encountering resource challenges as it tries to accommodate an increased demand for inspections at both military and commercial facilities. As more chemical weapons destruction facilities come online, OPCW will have to increase its monitoring because the treaty requires it to maintain a continuous presence at these facilities to verify destruction of chemical weapons. At the same time, it wants to increase its commercial plant inspections to address proliferation concerns, and has had financial difficulties over the last few years. But, GAO says member states are discussing possible monitoring options that would cut costs without compromising the inspections' quality. Since April 1997, the OPCW has performed almost 1,600 inspections, with more than half at military facilities, GAO says.

In specifically reviewing Russia's chemical weapons destruction efforts, GAO paints a precarious picture, saying Russia has not developed a comprehensive plan for addressing all its declared weapons and to determine funding needs to completely destroy its stockpile, which could create even longer delays than are projected. For three of its nerve agent stockpile sites, the Russian Munitions Agency told GAO last November that it had not yet decided how it would destroy that agent. This represents more than 50 percent of the country's stockpile, the report says.

And, GAO says Department of State and DOD officials indicate that "Russia's planning efforts to date have been based on inaccurate assumptions and have lacked detailed information on how the destruction of chemical weapons will occur at each site."

To address all of these issues, GAO says, "Decision-makers will have to make some combination of policy changes in these areas if the CWC is to continue to credibly address nonproliferation concerns worldwide." For instance, to address Russia's proliferation risks, the United States and other financial donors to that program could increase funds to pay for security upgrades at the Russian sites, defer chemical destruction funding to Russia until it develops a credible destruction plan, or finance additional destruction facilities there, it says.

To tackle inspection issues, member states must decide on the best policies to address potential proliferation at the increasing number of dual-use commercial facilities, and could decide to offer more funding for additional inspections, GAO says.

Finally, it says the OPCW and member states should reinforce parties' obligation to adopt national laws implementing the convention and submit accurate declarations.

The Defense and State departments criticized a draft of GAO's report, calling it unbalanced for not including more examples of successful CWC implementation, GAO says. GAO responded, saying the final report acknowledges the CWC's accomplishments in reducing the chemical weapons threat.