Defense Environment Alert
an exclusive biweekly report on defense policies for cleanup, compliance and pollution prevention


Vol. 12, No. 7--April 6, 2004


U.S. MAY MISS 45 PERCENT CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Despite assertions otherwise from Pentagon officials, it is "questionable" whether the United States will meet aninternational treaty's extended deadline to destroy 45 percent of the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons by December 2007, according to the General Accounting Office (GAO). And unless the chemical demilitarization program "is able to resolve the problems that have caused schedule delays," the United States also risks missing an extended 100 percent destruction deadline of 2012, GAO told a House panel April 1.

But Army and DOD officials countered GAO's conclusions on the 45 percent destruction deadline, maintaining they can meet it.

GAO's Director of Defense Capabilities and Management Raymond Decker, in testimony before the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee, also raised concerns about spiraling costs for a community emergency preparedness program the Army funds. Communities' requests for funding in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 have exceeded approved military budgets by $88 million, Decker said. "These unfunded requirements have caused further delays in overall program operations because funds have to be diverted from other sites' approved budgets to pay for these communities' requirements," he said.

As of March, the Army has destroyed 27.6 percent of the original chemical weapons stockpile, but GAO also noted that very little agent destruction - about 1.5 percent of the total - has been destroyed over the past six months. In response to a question from Rep. James Langevin (D-RI), Patrick Wakefield, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical demilitarization and counterproliferation, said the penalties for not meeting the treaty's final 2012 deadline are undefined, and noted that Russia has only destroyed I percent of its stockpile to date. Wakefield also said that because the United States received an extension to meeting the original 45 percent destruction deadline, "in principle, the United States has received an extension to 2012" for the 100 percent deadline. The Chemical Weapons Convention requires parties to completely destroy their stockpiled chemical weapons by 2007, but allows parties to request a five-year extension to that deadline.

Start-up of incinerators at Umatilla, OR, and Pine Bluff, AR, remain behind schedule, according to GAO. Last fall, the Army estimated Umatilla would begin operations in March 2004 and Pine Bluff would begin destroying weapons in April 2004, but GAO said those estimates have slipped to July for both sites. Relevant documents are available on InsideEPA. com. Seepage 2 for details.

Additionally, bulk agent neutralization sites at Aberdeen, MD, and Newport, IN, have missed scheduled milestones under an accelerated destruction schedule, put in place after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Although Aberdeen has shaved off four years from its original agent destruction timeline - even with the delays - GAO said the hardening and congealing of residual mustard agent in the ton containers will require additional operations.  Dale Klein, assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, said it turns out the so-called "speedy neut" efforts at Aberdeen will save time on demilitarization activities but not cost.

Newport is now scheduled to begin destroying its stockpile of bulk VX agent in August, but the military's plan to ship secondary waste to New Jersey for treatment has not been finalized and faces opposition from residents, workers and environmental groups, GAO said.

These delays have increased the cost of the chemical demilitarization from $15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in 2001. DOD told GAO last fall that costs had increased to $25.5 billion, "and this estimate is certainly going to rise further, given the information we obtained on schedule delays from fiscal year 2005 budget documents and from program officials," GAO said. Program officials will present new cost estimates to DOD in preparation of the FY06 budget, GAO said.

The schedule delays "stem from ongoing incidents during operations, environmental permitting issues, concerns about emergency preparedness, and unfunded requirements," GAO said. And the rising costs have caused the military to reallocate funds in the FY05 budget, Decker said (see related story).

Army and DOD officials asserted at the hearing that they can meet the 2007 45 percent destruction deadline, although they acknowledged that it will be problematic to meet the 2012 deadline for the Pueblo, CO, and Blue Grass, KY, sites for both technical and budget reasons.

"I hate to be the skunk at the party," Decker said, but the Pentagon is being extremely optimistic if it thinks it can destroy 45 percent of the original stockpile by 2007. The only way that will happen "is if all the stars line up," he said.

Claude Bolton, Army assistant secretary for acquisition, technology & logistics, said meeting the destruction deadlines are "a challenge for the leadership," but by using lessons learned from the Newport and Anniston, AL, sites, the Army hopes to get ahead of its current schedule.

Decker also raised concerns in his testimony about the lack of a clear definition of the term "maximum protection," as it relates to the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). The program is a joint effort between the Army and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that communities near chemical weapons stockpile sites are protected in the case of an accidental release of agent.

The Army needs to sit down with communities and local emergency preparedness officials and discuss just what "maximum protection" means, because currently the boundaries are open, he said.

CSEPP has made significant strides in recent years, helping communities to reach 95 percent of their benchmark compliance, GAO said. "But despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise" because state and local communities continue to identify additional requirements that exceed programmed funding, especially as the destruction facility in their community is about to start operations, Decker said. 'This causes fluctuations in data on benchmarks showing how prepared a community is, and causes the, military to transfer funds from demilitarization activities to CSEPP, resulting in further delays to the destruction schedule, he said.

Craig Conklin, chief of the DHS nuclear and chemical hazards branch, agreed that the definition of "maximum protection" is open ended. But he rejected Decker's call to better define the term through meetings with local officials. Coming up with a more stringent definition would take a lot of debate and may not be worthwhile at this point, he said. And having a flexible definition can actually help lower CSEPP costs because it allows DHS to use "functional equivalents" in meeting protection benchmarks, he said.

Communities now have greater buy-in to CSEPP, which has lowered costs, he said. Conklin gave an example of an original budget of $67 million to protect sensitive populations near Anniston, but through negotiations, that budget is now $6.3 million.

Decker maintained that it would be worth a dialogue to improve the CSEPP process, but Conklin dismissed that idea, saying communities will not view the threats in a common way, making it difficult for them to reach agreement on what "maximum protection" would be.