June 12, 2003
The Honorable Claude Bolton
Assistant Secretary of the Army, (AL&T)
103 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0103
Dear Secretary Bolton,
I am in receipt of a copy of a letter dated 4 June 2003 addressed
to the Calhoun County Commission, Alabama and authored by Colonel
Nancy M. Ray on your behalf.
The letter addresses the Commission's request for the initiation
of a contingency plan for the disposal of the stockpile of chemical
weapons currently stored at the Anniston Army Depot. Specifically,
the Commission seeks to have such a plan developed should the
Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility (ANCDF) become permanently
inoperable anytime during its predicted 9+ years operational schedule.
The military has a long history of preparing contingency plans.
With your outstanding service record and my tour in Viet Nam,
I'm sure we can both appreciate the need for such planning. And
this concept is not new to the Chemical Demilitarization Program.
In 1990 Congress directed (PL101-510) a contingency plan be developed
should the stockpile begin "an accelerated rate of deterioration."
The plan called for the Secretary of Defence to submit such a
plan to include: schedule, costs, equipment and other resources
and a time line for executing the plan. These are the same elements
the Calhoun County Commission requested be developed for ANCDF.
A 1992 Office of Technology Assessment report (OTA-BP-0-95) stated,
"The prudent course would be to begin working on contingency
plans now."
However, Col. Ray's letter ignores these and other calls for a
"prudent" safety net and instead proposes to maintain
a one dimensional 'all our eggs in one basket' approach to chemical
weapons disposal in Alabama and elsewhere
The letter from the Commission outlined several 'what if' scenarios
which could result in the curtailment of incineration operations
in Alabama. In responding to these scenarios, which are neither
frivolous nor outside the realm of possibility, why would Col.
Ray take a position that contradicts the Army's tradition of having
a contingency plan to deal with just such potential realities?
Unfortunately, Col. Ray's response smacks of the arrogant posture
of the chemical demilitarization program over the past 19 years,
and one we thought was no longer in favor under new leadership
both at your office and within the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA).
That posture is one of misplaced optimism coupled with an emphasis
on exaggerated successes while ignoring the true track record
of the program and in particular, the baseline incineration technology.
For example, I find it ludicrous that Col. Ray would make the
following statement, "Since we began chemical weapons destruction
operations in 1990, three chemical events have occurred that resulted
in releases of very minute levels of agent."
In the first place, chemical weapons destruction operations began
in 1985 at the CAMDS facility in Utah. There were nine (9) confirmed
agent releases associated with CAMDS operations between 1986 and
1990. Between 1990 and 2002 there were six (6) confirmed agent
releases at the Johnston Island facility (JACADS), and there have
been three (3) confirmed agent releases at the full scale facility
in Utah (TOCDF). These are releases that Army and contractor
officials call "confirmed" in documents we have in
our possession. These releases were substantiated by an Army official
as recently as January 2002. In addition, workers and other sources
have provided evidence alleging dozens of additional releases.
But even if these eye witness accounts are ignored, Col. Ray's
statement is false.
Another offensive and false statement made by Col. Ray is that
none of the "challenges" encountered during demilitarization
"has resulted in harm to human health or the environment."
This is not true. For example, at least one worker involved
in the July 2002 incident at TOCDF is suffering serious health
effects from that event. And Col. Ray makes no reference to environmental
degradation that has resulted or will result from the release
of contaminates other than agent. It was specifically mentioned
in the Commission's letter that one scenario--increased regulatory
stringency for emissions other than agent--could create a need
for a contingency plan at ANCDF. However, Col. Ray ignored this
potential aspect of the need for such a plan.
The colonel's response to the Commission is rife with reassurances
of the certainty of mission fulfillment using the existing technology
based on "operational experience," "our ability
to predict and resolve challenges" and the infamous "lessons
learned" program.
If the situation weren't so serious, these claims would be laughable.
In the December 2002 National Research Council report (DAAD 19-01-C-0051)
it states, "In its analysis of JACADS and TOCDF chemical
incidents and events, the committee observed that repeating patterns
of causal factors occurred across the range of incidents, from
minor to severe. Repeating patterns of causal factors in most
incidents did not appear to have been used by management to generalize
incident findings beyond the immediate context of each incident."
In a September 2002 GAO Report (GAO-02-890) it states
It is obvious that Col. Ray's letter was an attempt to justify
a pre-existing position rather than an honest response based on
the real data of published reports and eyewitness information.
It is unacceptable to have the ECW Office continue the practices
of the past--avoiding the facts and giving a public relations,
smiley-face spin to serious issues brought to the attention of
the Office. Reassurances that lessons learned will ensure that
"these types of incidents do not occur again" are hollow
and patronizing.
In addition, the colonel's response inaccurately depicts the Commission's
request for a contingency plan as a request for technology retrofit.
If I'm reading the same letter that Col. Ray responded to, the
Commission did not ask for a retrofit. Although Col. Ray describes
in rather detailed language, the "most optimistic schedule"
for changing over to an alternative, I am sure that no study has
been done to substantiate the opinions she puts forward as facts.
No one I have spoken to, including several within the Chemical
Stockpile Disposal Program, the alternatives program, technology
providers, engineers and others associated with the program, has
seen or heard of such a study. That is precisely why the Commission
submitted its request.
It is the intention of the Commission's request to create a sound
factual basis upon which to identify, not only the applicability
of deploying such a plan under necessary circumstances, but also
to create a data base of information to address issues such as
redesign, permitting and conversion should it become necessary.
If the colonel possesses hard data on technology changeover to
support her assumptions, she should have referenced her sources.
But if she made statements ungrounded in real data, she should
explain the basis for her conclusions, in detail.
Finally, I would point out that, contrary to Col. Ray's claims,
certain "challenges encountered" at incinerator sites
have NOT shown that "we can restart operations in a timely
manner." The agent release at TOCDF in 2000 caused a shutdown
of almost three months for the entire facility and more than four
months for the deactivation furnace. The worker incident of July
2002 caused the entire facility to be shutdown for over eight
months. Similar events at ANCDF could add several months or even
years to an already anticipated operational schedule of 9+ years.
In conversation with your predecessor Dr. Mario Fiori (ASA/I&E)
on December 14, 2001, I posed the following question. "What
if there is a release of agent at the ANCDF that triggers a community
alert/response? Notwithstanding the later-determined quantity
of agent released, when do you think the facility would restart?"
His answer: "Never."
With all due respect, I strongly urge reconsideration of the Commission's
request for a contingency plan for ANCDF and the other baseline
incineration sites. If continued storage risk is indeed a concern
of the ECW Office, it is owed to the workers, citizens and elected
officials of the host communities to have a back-up to rid ourselves
of this risk should any one approach fail. It is reasonable and
protective.
Sincerely,
Craig Williams
Executive Director
cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (CBD), Dale Klein
Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee
CMA Director, Mike Parker
Senator Richard Shelby
Governor Bob Riley
Calhoun County Commission