Statement of Craig Williams
Director, Chemical Weapons Working Group
Before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
April 25, 2001

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to present testimony before you today. My name is Craig Williams. I am the Director of the Chemical Weapons Working Group (the CWWG). The CWWG is a coalition of over 160 organizations that support the destruction of chemical weapons in a manner which does not destroy the health of our communities and the environment, and is implemented in an honest, open process.

The CWWG supports the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the international campaign to rid the world of these weapons.

However, we put the safety of workers and the public as a priority over any arbitrary deadline, for we live in the communities where the destruction is to take place.

I come before you today with a message - that the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD), the agency responsible for carrying out the chemical weapons program, has run amuck. Although I consider many individuals within the agency to be hard working and honorable people, the current structure and leadership in PMCD is more concerned with defending its own bad decisions rather than ensuring "maximum protection" of the public, as was directed by Congress.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, the Guinness Book of World Records cites VX chemical warfare agent as the "deadliest substance in the World." It is not material that should be put in the care of an agency that chronically misrepresents facts to the Congress and the American people. Yet, I will present to you evidence of systemic misrepresentation of technical capability, schedule compliance, cost, permit fraud, fiscal mismanagement and outright lies to citizens and to you, the Congress of these United States.

First, let me begin with PMCD claims on their capability to meet CWC treaty deadlines.

Schedule:

The schedule of disposal operations as offered to Congress on September 30, 2000, shows the operational period at all four incineration sites ending by January 2007. Three months before the Treaty deadline. Colorado and Kentucky have no closure dates in this Report as the technology for these sites has yet to be determined. But the 1999 Status Report shows a Kentucky completion date of April 2007 and Colorado at August 2007, using incineration.

In the packet of information provided is an internal report produced by PMCD which shows that these representations are knowingly false. The Report, "Operations Schedule Task Force 2000: Final Report" is accompanied by a memo to the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Disposal and copied to every high ranking person in PMCD. It also has a "concurrence " page signed off on by each Task Force member.

Since the CWWG, received this Report through unofficial channels, we have consulted with three experts with a cumulative total of more than fifty years of experience in chemical weapons related activities. Based on the Report, the CWWG developed a methodology and a set of calculations, which resulted in the actual operational schedule on the chart before you.

If PMCD had any inclination to be honest with the communities or this Committee they would have presented a schedule to you in late 2000 that at least made some attempt to reflect accurately its knowledge of the true schedule.

But their deception goes further. The chart I am holding up is in your packet. It is the schedule presented at a Public Meeting in Anniston, Alabama on March 17, 2001 - five months after the Task Force Report was completed. This chart presented to the citizens of Anniston, the emergency personnel and the local elected officials, shows an intentionally false schedule for Alabama. It clearly shows operations conclude in 2005. Yet their internal Report shows operations will not conclude in Alabama until 2014, a nine year difference!

The story is the same at the other sites as reflected in the summary chart in your packet and displayed for you here.

What is being told to the American people and the Congress simply isn't the truth!

No one wants these weapons destroyed more than the citizens living closest to them. But we should not be forced to risk the health of our communities by burning the weapons, when safer disposal technologies exist. Time and time again, PMCD has claimed that incineration can get the job done faster; that it was the only way the U.S. can meet the 2007 CWC deadline.

PMCD has repeatedly used Congressional deadlines, and now the Treaty deadline as a means to manipulate communities into accepting this dangerous incineration technology as the only way to met schedule.

Now we have a report by the agency's own leaders, showing that incineration can't make the Treaty deadline - or even come close.

Additionally, we now know citizens will be exposed to the toxic emissions from these incinerators for much longer than they are telling us.

All this is unacceptable.

Cost:

In the 1999 Status Report to Congress PMCD stated the cost of the stockpile disposal program was $13.6 Billion; in the 2000 Status Report it was up to $14.1 Billion. I believe their latest publicly stated cost projection is $15.7 Billion. But, like the representations on schedule, this information is false.

Provided to you is a one page memorandum received from an anonymous source in government which reconstructs the findings within another internal PMCD document.

This report is as tightly held within PMCD, as was their schedule document. The CWWG has not been able to obtain the original. Perhaps the Committee would request a copy.

This summary page reflects what PMCD really knows about cost - and what does it tell us? That the actual projected cost of this program is not the $15.7 Billion you and I have been told, but is actually closer to $24 Billion. However the 2000 Status Report cited the Life Cycle Cost Estimate at $14.1 Billion at a time when their true estimate was $24 Billion.

Cost and Schedule Information Integration:

Note the line items "Operational Extension "Known" and "Likely" cost increases in the cost chart. It shows a total of $4.7 Billion in additional costs for operations.

Calculating the cost of schedule slippage and the figure is $4.21 Billion.

Looking at the information from both documents, I submit to you that we have all been intentionally misled about the schedule and cost of this program.

Permit Fraud:

In addition, PMCD has committed permit fraud under federal law. You now have a confidential memo sent from Oregon's chief regulator on the chemical demilitarization program to the Director of the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission.

The memo's author points to the Army's "commitment to treat secondary waste "on-site," and then says, "The Army made these commitments to secure issuance of the permit...."

Under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) laws (42 USC § 6925 & 40 CFR § 270) , applicants are required to accurately represent the capabilities of any facility they seek a permit for. Information that would substantively change the accuracy of the application is required to be submitted in a timely manner during the application process and before the permit is issued, if known about before issuance.

The Oregon memo reads, "We [Oregon DEQ] now know that the Army [PMCD] knew as early as the late 1980's that the Dunnage Furnace would definitely not be able to process carbon, and would only be able to process other wastes (primarily wood) with major design modifications to the DUN furnace and it's pollution abatement system."

It then reads, "The application we received in 1995 includes the following statement, 'On the basis of the incinerator design and the JACADS date, it is anticipated that the Dunnage Incinerator will meet the applicable incinerator performance standard.'"

The memo goes on to say, "The Army (PMCD) has presented information to DEQ that clearly shows they knew in 1994 that the DUN would not meet the required performance standards." That Members of the Committee is permit fraud under federal RCRA law and PMCD should be held accountable.

Furthermore, since the Alabama and Arkansas permit applications were also submitted on or after the Oregon application, PMCD repeated this illegality at those locations as well.

Agent Releases:

Over the years the CWWG has been tracking live chemical agent releases from the Army's incinerators in the Pacific and Utah. But how forthcoming has PMCD been about these releases? Consider the following:

When asked about the number of live chemical warfare agent releases from their incineration facilities, PMCD's answer is, "There have been a total of four releases, three at JACADS and one at TOCDF." But this is not accurate.

· In a memo to Congressman Scotty Baesler in 1995, the Army acknowledges three JACADS releases, as well as 9 chemical agent releases at CAMDS, the Utah prototype incinerator.

· A 1995 Report to EPA shows another release at JACADS.

· A 1999 incident report submitted to the State of Utah said the alarms"...did not confirm agent." But a subsequent internal report on the same incident concludes that agent did migrate outside."

This internal report also shows how the agent confirmation methods used by PMCD, "have allowed false assumptions to be made" for the thousands of alarms that have rung off - always presented to the public as false alarms (ie: not confirmed for agent). We believe this is by design.

Counting the May 8, 2000 Utah incident, rather than the four agent releases PMCD admits to, we have 15 that can be documented.

This is unacceptable.

Oversight and Accountability:

What it all boils down to then Mr. Chairman .... Members of the Committee.... is a total lack of accountability and oversight. Based on what I have presented to this Committee in both oral and written form today there should be absolutely no question that both accountability and oversight are in short supply in this program.

I have provided excerpts to you from over ten years of reports generated inside and outside of government all reaching the same fundamental conclusion - when it comes to chemical weapons disposal and PMCD - nobody is minding the store.

In the 2000 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congressional Defense Committees on the Management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program it states,

"CDP requires a number of management improvements. These relate to leadership, organizational structure, public outreach and current contracted support for the program." and that , "No one individual or office appears to have day-to-day authority or responsibility for the program whether internally or in the CDP's external relations with the public and the Congress. "

The Secretary's recommendation: "Restructuring of the organization." But the Report also said, "Merging the management of the programs would require amending legislation."

Based on the evidence presented, it should be clear that the chemical weapons disposal program must be reorganized to bring about honesty and accountability to the public and the federal decision-makers.

Thank You for holding these Hearings on this very serious matter.