CWWG: Citizens' Solution 2007 Update

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Citizens' Solution for Safe Chemical Weapons Disposal
Review and Recommendations on the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program
on the Tenth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention

April 29, 2007

Introduction

On April 29, 1997 an historic milestone occurred in the U.S. chemical demilitarization program: the U.S. ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC is an international treaty mandating worldwide chemical weapons disposal within ten years (or fifteen, if nations asked for a five-year extension). The CWC applies to all "declared" chemical weapons which for the U.S. meant the stockpile of weapons stored at in the Pacific and eight continental sites: Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Newport, Indiana; Kalama Island (Johnston Atoll) in the Pacific; Richmond, Kentucky; Aberdeen, Maryland; Umatilla, Oregon; and Tooele, Utah .

The Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG) is a coalition of citizens living near the U.S. and Pacific chemical weapons stockpile sites. The group formed in 1991 in order to coordinate opposition to incineration as the U.S. Army's technology of choice for weapons disposal, and to promote safer solutions for weapons disposal as well as direct citizen involvement in the chemical demilitarization program. We were concerned that the dioxins, furans, PCBs, heavy metals, and trace amounts of nerve agent emitted from incinerators as part of routine operations would harm the communities' health and environment. Upset conditions at incinerators were less predictable and could mean larger release of toxics into the environment. In 1994, the CWWG wrote and released the Citizens Solution for Safe Chemical Weapons Disposal, which recommended the immediate disassembly of rockets and projectiles, neutralization of all chemical agents, and secondary waste treatment with non-incineration technology.

To many people living in the shadow of chemical weapons stockpiles, there is no real separation between concerns about international disarmament and protection of our health and the environment. The success of the chemical demilitarization program depended not merely on destroying the weapons, but doing so without destroying our communities.

In 1997, the CWWG achieved a major victory for safe weapons disposal when Congress mandated a program to identify, demonstrate and implement non-incineration alternatives for chemical weapons disposal. The program, called the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program consisted not only of detailed technology review but a national dialogue process through which all program decisions -- such as technology criteria, assessments and reports -- were made by consensus. The program recommended neutralization as a safe, viable means of chemical weapons destruction, with follow-up biological and Supercritical Water Oxidation technologies. Indiana, Maryland, Colorado and Kentucky sites were selected for neutralization technology and non-incineration secondary treatment, with full support from local citizens, state and federal government.

The ACWA program was a clear indication that community members, the military and contractors could come together and agree how to move forward in a win-win scenario from the standpoints of protection of public health and the environment, as well as compliance with the treaty and wise use of taxpayer dollars. However this positive and cooperative spirit has not been shared throughout the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA). Unfortunately the Army moved forward with incineration of chemical weapons in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon and Utah over the protest of the CWWG and hundreds of organizations all over the country. Myriad technical problems plague the chemical weapons incinerators, conflict follows secondary waste disposal shipments, chemical agent monitors are failing, and citizens have little information on facility operations. The results are skyrocketing costs and a failure to meet CWC deadlines.

Ironically, CMA's scapegoats for the cost escalations and schedule delays are the sites with non-incineration technologies; design changes and Pentagon funding cuts to Kentucky and Colorado's chemical weapons disposal facilities will stretch the timeline for weapons disposal to 2023 -- 11 years after the CWC extended deadline.

The good news is that for each problem in the chemical demilitarization program, there is a solution that can bring this program on track. This paper brings to light some of the major challenges in the program since ratification of the CWC ten years ago, and gives specific recommendations through which these challenges can be overcome, for the health and safety of our communities, and for the ability of our government to be a leader in international chemical demilitarization efforts.

The Army has not provided 'maximum protection' at incinerator sites.

Fortunately there have been no chemical agent emissions-related deaths at any chemical weapons incinerators. However the number and wide range of incidents at each of the incinerators mirror the concerns originally expressed by the CWWG. Since the first chemical weapons incinerator on Kalama Island began operations, a stream of whistleblowers, including high-ranking safety managers at the Utah incinerator, have alleged that Army and contractors were covering-up safety flaws in the facilities. A few of the most troubling are:

MC-1 bomb incident in Utah. In March 1998, while processing MC-1 bombs there was an overfeed of GB into the Metal Parts Furnace resulting in an agent monitor in the stack alarming at more than 500 times the allowable stack concentration (asc) of the nerve agent.
Toxic exposures of workers at the Oregon incinerator. In September 1999, 34 construction workers were overcome by toxic vapors, which they believe to be some kind of warfare agent. They claimed the Army ignored their symptoms and was negligent in monitoring.
Releases of GB from the Utah incinerator. In May 2000 the Army confirmed that from 11:30 pm May 8 to 1:00 am May 9, GB was released from the deactivation furnace and out into the atmosphere, with the peak concentration being 3.6 times greater than the asc.
Workers' exposure in Utah. In July 2002, four workers were exposed to GB in the liquid incinerator room, with one worker showing clear signs of acute agent exposure.
Improper monitoring procedures in Utah. In 2003 there was sworn testimony before a circuit judge in Oregon that improper procedures have been used at chemical weapons facilities in Utah that makes it likely that agent alarms will be discounted as false positives.
Nerve agent exposures in Alabama. In February 2004, two workers were exposed to GB and the Army was finally forced to admit that agent alarms had gone off in the medical building as well as the weapons disposal facility.
Nerve agent detected outside Alabama incinerator. On March 1, 2004, monitors at the perimeter of the Anniston depot confirmed the presence of VX and the Army was unable to determine the source of the nerve agent.
Fires where they are not supposed to be. In Utah, Arkansas and Oregon there have been several fires outside the furnaces in chutes into which chopped rockets are dropped and then start blazing for reasons that have still not been determined.
At total of 18 chemical agent releases have occurred that CWWG can document; it is likely there have been many more.

Many of these incidents resulted in shutdown of the incinerators for months at a time.

Major components of the incineration complexes, and the operation of the incinerators, have been drastically altered over the years. For example the furnace designed to burn dunnage (chemical weapon related wastes such as protective suits and other agent-contaminated items) was included in the blueprints of each incinerator though after that particular furnace failed in Utah, the furnace was abandoned at all the other sites. In Alabama, the Army proposed running chemical munitions through a metal parts furnace at a rate much higher than originally approved, even though that particular furnace was not designed to handle whole munitions still filled with chemical agent. It should also be noted that the projected operational life for incinerator equipment is six years -- though due to technical delays at the facilities incinerator operations will last years longer than this threshold.

Several new problems have come to light, and it is unclear how the Army will be able to address them. For example, mustard agent contains levels of mercury so high that the Army is not able to process the waste as it did when burning the nerve agents. Changes in the incineration process in Utah (and, subsequently at the other incinerators) include building some type of neutralization process into the incinerator in order to water down the mercury. This process will do nothing to prevent more mercury from being released into the environment; it merely spreads the mercury emissions out over a longer period of time.

Neutralization has proven to be safe and effective, yet the Army betrays communities on secondary waste disposal.

In 2000, Indiana and Maryland abandoned incineration and instead used neutralization to safely destroy the chemical agents. Maryland completed mustard agent disposal operations in 2005, and neutralization of nerve agent in Indiana is ongoing. The communities were supportive of neutralization and on-site treatment of the neutralization hydrolysates with non-incineration technology. However in 2002, in an emotional reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Army decided -- with no cost or schedule data to back up their decision -- that it would be faster to abandon the hydrolysate treatment on-site and instead ship the waste to an off-site waste disposal facility. It quickly made arrangements with DuPont to treat Maryland's mustard agent hydrolysate in its biological waste facility in New Jersey. Few community members knew about the waste shipment.

The CWWG advised the Army numerous times to adhere to the original plan. High-profile military waste shipments have often been rejected by targeted communities after years of wasted time and taxpayer dollars. Four five years CMA management tried, but failed to ship the Indiana waste off-site, first to PermaFix in Dayton, Ohio and then to DuPont in Salem County, New Jersey. Then on April 16th 2007 the Army began shipping the VX hydrolysate to Port Arthur, Texas after secretly contracting with a hazardous waste incineration company there and without informing the general public.

Opposition in Indiana, Texas and elsewhere is growing, with local elected officials, concerned citizens and environmental justice groups speaking out against the shipment. Home to dozens of oil refineries, industrial chemical plants and waste disposal facilities as well as a population that is nearly 80% people of color and around 25% living under the poverty line, Port Arthur has been described by local residents as a "poster child for environmental racism and injustice." Meanwhile, workers in Indiana allege that nerve agent concentrations in the hydrolysate are much higher than what the Army is publicly reporting. New insider information indicates that since shipment to Texas commenced, changes are being made to the neutralization process that results in hydrolysate with higher flammability.   Citizens on both ends of the waste shipment feel that their trust has been betrayed.

In Kentucky and Colorado, ACWA program officials, contractors, local elected officials and community representatives are working together on plans to ensure that neutralization of chemical weapons moves forward safely and efficiently. As in Indiana and Maryland, the Army has suggested off-site shipment of hydrolysate. However the agency's own studies indicate that off-site shipment is likely to cost millions of dollars more, and take years longer than if the waste were destroyed on-site as currently planned. Local officials and community members are adamantly against the shipment for reasons including maintaining higher local employment, environmental justice, and transportation risk.

Secrecy and information withholding is pervasive in the Chemical Materials Agency.

In 1996 the Army opened public outreach offices at each chemical weapons stockpile site in an attempt to show an effort toward open communication with the public. To many local residents the offices represented a sales pitch, with glossy brochures and models of the incinerator but no process to involve or consult with citizens on important decisions, or to troubleshoot when problems arise. As incinerators began to go on-line, it became clear that information was going to be harder to come by. Numerous CWWG requests to the Army for information on incinerator operations, secondary waste disposal, and on specific incinerator incidents remain unanswered even after years have gone by.

Whistleblowers frequently reveal information about unsafe or fraudulent facility operations and monitoring that would otherwise not be known. Yet instead of dealing effectively with the problems the Army tries to stifle and marginalize the employees. In one instance, the Army allowed a criminal case to be fabricated, using false evidence against a Utah worker thereby effectively facilitating criminal prosecution as a vehicle to punish whistleblowers.

Army refuses to address monitoring failures.

The Army's current monitoring system is woefully inadequate, particularly at its incinerator sites, where chemical agent can be released along with massive amounts of gaseous emissions through smokestacks daily. Chemical agents can also be released from places other than incinerator smokestacks, including ash bins; from rooms that are not sealed; and during movement of weapons from storage igloos to the disposal facility. Smokestack alarms can only be calibrated to monitor one type of chemical agent at a time, they do not fully identify chemical emissions. The effectiveness of perimeter monitoring tubes outside chemical weapons disposal facilities is extremely limited. The sporadic placement of these monitoring stations means that a plume of chemical agent could be missed. There are no alarms associated with perimeter monitors, and the monitoring tubes outside of the facilities are collected every 8 - 12 hours.

Chemical agent monitors are the first line of defense against chemical agent exposures, for depot employees and for nearby communities. Millions of dollars have been spent on emergency preparedness planning -- even protective hoods for people living within the 'kill zone' of the Alabama weapons incinerator -- that depends on accurate data in the event of a chemical agent release. Yet even faced with the shortcomings of its current monitoring system, the Army has consistently dismissed the need for advanced monitoring systems.

Pentagon funding cuts cripple progress toward CWC compliance.

In 2005 the CWWG revealed Pentagon plans to cut funding in Kentucky and Colorado's chemical weapons disposal funding to the extent that activities would grind to a halt. Prompt response from Congress restored much of that funding, but more cuts quickly followed. Now in 2007 the struggle for adequate funding of these sites' work continues.

This annual budget tug-of-war is itself costly and inefficient, as government contractors are forced to slow weapons disposal facility construction, and spend countless hours re-designing the facilities to attempt to save funds. In the end, the time spent trying to save money is costing more money that originally anticipated, and is significantly delaying the program. The Army and State Department have tried half-heartedly to pass these delays off as related to the lack of maturity of the neutralization-based technologies, but this is not the case.

The consistent lack of funding shows that the Department of Defense itself is demoting the importance of chemical demilitarization here in the U.S., at the same time it is responsible for deploying soldiers and hiring civilians overseas due to the "threat of weapons of mass destruction."

Recommendations

On the tenth anniversary of CWC ratification, and thirteen years after the CWWG first released the Citizens' Solution, we are making the following recommendations to Congress and the Army -- both CMA and ACWA -- in order to redirect the U.S. chemical demilitarization to more closely comply with the CWC while providing maximum protection to citizens and workers.

1.   Neutralization of all mustard agent munitions in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon and Utah. To date, the Army has not produced to the public a plan for how incinerators will be able to destroy mustard agents with high mercury concentrations. And in April 2007 a circuit court judge in Oregon ruled that the Oregon state Environmental Quality Commission must reassess whether or not incineration is the "best available technology" for mustard agent disposal.

In August 2006 the CWWG released a report titled the Incinerator Retrofit/Stand-Alone Neutralization Feasibility Study, a blueprint for how a chemical weapons incinerator could either be retrofit with, or have a stand-alone, neutralization system for safe disposal of mustard agent munitions.

The Army can act now to move forward with neutralization of mustard agent in a safe, expeditious manner. To do so could shave years off of the chemical demilitarization schedule and save millions of dollars. As a logical next step, Congress should demand that the Army fill data gaps on the CWWG???s proposal and be prepared to shift to a 'plan B' approach for mustard agent disposal. Congress should also commit to providing adequate funds to put neutralization of mustard agent on a fast track, recognizing that investment now in safe disposal process will save money in the long run.

2.   Full funding of chemical demilitarization program, particularly to address cuts in Colorado and Kentucky. At a time when homeland security and reducing the global threat of weapons of mass destruction, it is unconscionable that the Pentagon would actually cut funding to weapons disposal here in the U.S.

Congress must work with citizens, local government officials, ACWA management and technology vendors to pinpoint annual funding needs now, and adhere to funding needs that are tied to the CWC deadline. This would prevent the Army from using the CWC deadlines as an excuse to cut corners on worker safety and environmental and health impacts.

3.   On-site disposal of chemical agent hydrolysate with safe, publicly acceptable technology. Supercritical Water Oxidation (SCWO) was approved by citizens and government alike as an environmentally sound technology for destruction of nerve agent wastes in Indiana and Kentucky. Bioremediation was selected for mustard agent wastes, and is also broadly supported by legislators and the Pueblo, Colorado community.

The CWWG recommends that the Army immediately halt shipment of VX hydrolysate from Indiana, and invest in and deploy treatment units such as SCWO at the Newport facility to destroy hydrolysate. These same units can also be used in Kentucky to destroy nerve and mustard agent hydrolysate there. We also recommend that CMA and ACWA look to the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project for guidance on how communities can provide input -- early and often -- on waste disposal issues beyond the hydrolysate.

4.   Use of advanced monitoring systems. Adding advanced chemical agent monitoring systems to existing monitors, a much-needed layer of protection would be provided to depot workers and community members. The National Research Council has for 10 years advised the Army to use improved monitoring systems, specifically recommending that the Army utilize "real time" monitoring such as the Open-Path Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectrometer. In 2004 Kentucky Senator Jim Bunning appropriated $2 million toward an advanced monitoring system for Kentucky. In 2005 the Army agreed to host a one-day forum on monitoring that involved some community representatives, but has not followed through with any actions.

We restate our recommendation that the Army invest in advanced monitoring systems at all chemical weapons sites, to include real-time infrared monitors surrounding weapons storage igloos as well as between the disposal facilities and the perimeter of the depots. This can be accomplished quickly and without impact to the weapons disposal schedule.

5.   Government accountability and transparency through public involvement in the chemical demilitarization decision-making process.

The success of the chemical demilitarization program depends on transparency and trust. Neither of these is present in the Chemical Materials Agency. In order to increase the regular flow of accurate information to communities, and involve local citizens in decisions that will affect their families, neighbors and the environment, we urge Congress to mandate a national dialogue on chemical weapons disposal, in the spirit of the successful ACWA dialogue, or the Non-Stockpile Core Group. The investment in time and resources to bring stakeholders together to discuss disposal technologies, monitoring, worker safety, security and impediments to full CWC compliance will pay off in greater efficiency in the overall program.

Conclusion

The CWWG believes that where citizens are encouraged and empowered, solutions will follow. We support the goals of the CWC and are prepared to work collaboratively with the Army and other government agencies in order to bring a safe end to our nation's chemical weapons legacy.