November 7, 2005
Volume 83, Number 45
p. 19-24
GOVERNMENT & POLICY
THE SHCHUCH'YE DILEMMA
Civil unrest could undermine construction of a Russian chemical arms
disposal facility
Lois Ember
One of the world's largest industrial complexes is being built on the outskirts
of Russia's remote, impoverished agricultural region of Shchuch'ye. Instead
of being a boon to the local economy and raising the standard of living, construction
of this sprawling chemical weapons destruction facility has made life harsher
for the desperate local population.
International funding for building the disposal facility largely ignores
the socioeconomic issues that could ultimately hobble the project. A recent
study by Global Green USA's Legacy Program lays out the civilian issues beyond
the fence line that could clash with the laudable effort to rid the world
of deadly weapons.
Courtesy Of Global Green USA
Rough Ride Trucks hauling equipment to the new disposal
facility have further damaged the region's rutted dirt roads.
The situation "is becoming a potential firestorm of political confrontation
between Russian federal and local officials and the affected citizens," warns
Paul F. Walker, director of Global Green USA's Legacy Program. Global Green
USA is an affiliate of Mikhail Gorbachev's Green Cross International.
Walker
Photo By Susan Morrissey
In the study, the authors note that they have "become increasingly concerned
that the area's destitute conditions, in combination with the presence of
a dangerous weapons stockpile and an expensive destruction facility, will
create a 'perfect storm' of problems that could ultimately derail the project."
There's a history of similar projects being halted. In the mid to late 1980s,
the Soviets secretly constructed a chemical weapons destruction facility at
a military base at Chapayevsk, 500 miles southeast of Moscow. The facility,
which came to light in 1989, was to receive and destroy all of the Soviet
Union's chemical weapons.
Local citizens rebelled when they realized that tens of thousands of tons
of deadly weapons were to be shipped to their backyard. In the first visible
sign of citizen activism in the final throes of the Soviet era, the citizens
set up a permanent, round-the-clock protest encampment in front of the facility.
The Soviet government eventually caved in and, in late 1989, declared that
Chapayevsk would be used only for training. Actual destruction facilities,
government officials said, would be built near seven existing chemical weapons
storage sites, including the one at Shchuch'ye.
At first glance, Shchuch'ye-in the rural area east of the Ural Mountains in
the westernmost part of the Siberian Steppes-appears pastoral. But Walker
describes the area as the chronically unemployed inhabitants might: "It is
very flat, very wet, very agriculturally based, and very poor." To Walker,
"it seems like the end of the world."
Most of the people live in single-story wooden homes with outhouses in the
back, no running water, and little heat and electricity. Winter temperatures
hover well below freezing, and the thermometer can climb to 95 °F during
mosquito-infested summer days.
The rutted dirt roads of Shchuch'ye are flooded much of the time, especially
in the spring. Heavy trucks used to haul building material and equipment to
the destruction facility have further damaged them. With no public transportation,
residents are forced to walk these muddy roads to carry out their daily chores.
The largest town in the region--also called Shchuch'ye--has a population
of about 11,000 and serves as the administrative hub for the surrounding
15 villages of around 15,000 people. Conditions are so dire and the future
so grim that the area's young people are leaving, and the unemployed elderly
are left behind to survive on retirement incomes of about $20 a month. Housing,
Walker says, is largely free. Gas, electricity, and water, however, cost a
total of $50 or more a month, far beyond the means of the retirees. Bills
go unpaid, and utilities get turned off.
Even if the retirees could afford to pay for water, it became unavailable
because the destruction facility-about 15 miles from the town of Shchuch'ye--required
a high-pressure water pipeline. Most of the old, corroded, and poorly maintained
water-distribution lines in the town were blown out by the higher water pressure
required by the destruction facility.
As a result, water has been shut off to most of the population for the past
two years. Townspeople now draw water from wells and carry it home in buckets.
Williams
Khripunov
Holgate
Courtesy of Nuclear
Threat Initiative
The pipeline was built by the Global Partnership (GP), a coalition of about
24 countries that came together in 2002 to help Russia secure and eliminate
its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The partnership, whose nucleus
is the Group of Eight industrialized nations-Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.-pledged up to $20 billion over a 10-year
period to underwrite the disposal of the former Soviet Union's weapons of
mass destruction.
Five miles north of the town lies a facility storing 5,400 tons of the deadly
nerve agent VX. The Shchuch'ye stockpile accounts for about 14% of Russia's
total declared stocks of 40,000 tons.
Fourteen percent is not an especially impressive figure. But the Shchuch'ye
stockpile contains about 2 million portable VX-filled artillery shells that,
if stolen, can be diverted to a region south of Russia that is home to known
terrorist groups. The stockpile's location near the borders with the now-independent
states of the former Soviet Union such as Kazakhstan, plus the weapons' portability
and the economic straits of the local population, convinced the U.S. of the
need to spend $10 million to secure the site.
Despite the U.S.-funded installation of security fences, guard towers, and
electronic surveillance equipment, weapons proliferation remains a constant
threat. The specter of proliferation has prompted GP countries to join forces.
To date, they have invested more than $1 billion to help Russia get rid of
the Shchuch'ye arsenal and meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The treaty calls for the elimination of all declared chemical weapons by 2012.
Russia has destroyed only 2.5% of its declared stocks, according to Rogelio
Pfirter, director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons in The Hague.
GP funding is expected to exceed $2 billion by the time the Shchuch'ye facility
is opened and turned over to the Russians, perhaps as early as mid-2008. Walker,
however, suspects it will more likely be 2009 or 2010.
The destruction complex is about 10 miles north of the stockpile site. Canada
is funding the construction of a dedicated railroad that will carry the weapons
from the arsenal to the disposal site, which sprawls over 270 acres and is
half built. When finally completed, the disposal complex will consist of more
than 100 buildings.
Neutralization of the chemical agent VX will take place in the complex's two
identical main buildings, one being built by the U.S., the other by Russia.
Trains from the stockpile will deliver weapons to these buildings, where automated
equipment will first drain VX from the munitions and then hydrolyze the nerve
agent.
The waste product of neutralization-called hydrolysate-will be pumped to a
third building and mixed with asphalt, and the bituminized hydrolysate will
be poured into drums. Once sealed, the drums will be trucked to partially
buried storage bunkers in another area of the complex, where they will be
stored indefinitely.
Walker says the bituminized hydrolysate is "slightly toxic." There will be
lots of it produced--"more than 50,000 tons that will be stored in the drums,"
he calculates.
"A big question," Walker says, "is how the bunkers are to be maintained and
whether they will remain weatherproof over the longer term." He says the local
citizenry "has low confidence in the quality of the bunkers being built by
the Russians and in the long-term maintenance and safety of the drums."
The citizens are concerned about "potential leakage of toxic wastes into the
high water table of the region," Walker explains. And they fear "major public
health and environmental consequences" once the Russians begin operating the
facility.
More immediately, citizen angst is being directed at what Walker calls the
"four-star hotel" that the U.S. has built for American workers on the site.
It is, Walker says, "the most visible and accessible building constructed
in the middle of a no-man's land." Remember, he says, "The villagers are largely
unemployed and in dire poverty, and to them, the hotel is the most visible
sign of gross negligence by the Russian federal government and by the GP
countries in ignoring the needs of the local community." The hotel's presence
has catalyzed complaints and public protests this summer, he notes.
Courtesy Of Global Green USA
The protests, Walker says, could presage the coming together of factors to
produce "a perfect storm." On the one hand is the very visible multi-million-dollar
investment in the disposal facility. On the other hand, he says, "is the growing
expectation of the local people for employment opportunities and community
investments coupled with almost complete negligence of basic community needs
by the Russians and the GP."
To date, Walker says, fewer than 100 out of the total 26,000 population of
the Shchuch'ye region have been employed at the disposal facility. Of those
employed, many have been schoolteachers, and the legacy program study states
that one school was left nearly inoperative as a result.
Igor Khripunov, associate director at the University of Georgia's Center
for International Trade & Security, underscores the findings of the legacy
program study. Khripunov, formerly a diplomat in the Soviet Union's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, says, "The sheer poverty and economic backwardness of
the Shchuch'ye area is really appalling."
Khripunov says the destruction facility is instilling in the desperate people
of Shchuch'ye and those in the Kurgan Oblast-the state in which Shchuch'ye
resides-"high, but futile, hopes for better jobs." The facility, he points
out, "needs highly trained workers, not rural, agricultural workers."
In fact, Khripunov says, an influx of people to Shchuch'ye from the wider
Kurgan Oblast "may cause a huge problem in maintaining the security of the
facility." An influx of poor and ultimately disappointed people could result
in "more rampant crime, unless the movement of people is controlled," he says.
Such migration can be controlled, Khripunov says, "if the area is declared
a closed city." And he cites a precedent: "The only operational Russian chemical
weapons facility is at Gorny, a closed city."
Courtesy Of Defense Threat Reduction Agency
OVERVIEW Digital image offers a look at the planned 270-acre complex.
Even without an influx of outsiders, Khripunov can envision "the local population
becoming more and more restive," perhaps leading to "wildcat demonstrations
that attempt to stop deliveries to the facility or demand better jobs, more
food." He recommends what the legacy program doesn't: "the relocation of the
Shchuch'ye community."
He sees "no future in investing in the local community to improve life" for
the inhabitants. Rather, he says, it would be preferable "to build housing
elsewhere in a better environment with better jobs."
It's "a radical solution to the problem," Khripunov admits. But it's "better
than patching up one problem after another as they occur." The GP countries
"can easily put together several million dollars to help the Shchuch'ye population
seek a better life elsewhere," he insists.
As Khripunov points out, international funding for the destruction facility
has been restricted to construction within the site's fence line with no consideration
for socioeconomic needs beyond the fence. U.S. support, for example, comes
from the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program-the
so-called Nunn-Lugar funding mandated by Congress that cannot be used to
address the citizens' needs. Those needs, he says, "are today the responsibility
of the [Russian] Federal Agency for Industry, which is not doing a good job."
Changing the parameters of Nunn-Lugar funding "is not politically viable,‰
says a U.S. government official familiar with Shchuch'ye. Beyond-the-fence
issues „should be a Russian government responsibility," a condition other
donor countries concur with, the official says.
The official also does not believe that Shchuch'ye will become another Chapayevsk.
"It is not very likely given its financial and political profile. The Russian
government will not allow it to fail."
Laura S. H. Holgate, vice president for Russia/New Independent States Programs
at the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative, says cooperative threat reduction,
as a concept, "needs to be broader and more comprehensive than Congress has
allowed it to be." Holgate, who once managed the CTR program, says, "The notion
of fences, the notion that one can disaggregate a destruction facility from
the community in which it is embedded, is not realistic."
As much as Holgate would like to see changes to the CTR program, she admits
"that it won't happen without a major rethinking by Congress of how U.S. dollars
are spent." Given the politics, she admits, "I would be very surprised if
it happens."
Still, Holgate adds, "it may not even be necessary to broaden" the scope
of the CTR program because "the U.S. is already doing a lot of the outside-the-fence
stuff in Russia through U.S. Agency for International Development" programs.
Once the effectiveness of U.S. AID efforts are proven, she says, more funding
could be found and new programs launched.
Craig Williams, director of the Chemical Weapons Working Group that serves
as a watchdog of the U.S. destruction program, insists that "international
financial support" for Shchuch'ye must continue. And he complements Holgate's
points by adding that there has to be "recognition of the importance of community
acceptance of the project." Without that acknowledgment, he warns, "there
is an equal chance that Shchuch'ye will follow the path of Chapayevsk."
Continued confrontation between Russian federal and local government officials
and the citizenry could lead, "in the best of cases, to a dramatic slowdown
in the project's schedule with concomitant increased costs," Walker says.
"In the worst case, it could lead to long-term stoppage of the project and
potential civil disobedience." In either case, the viability of the international
treaty is called into question if the 2012 deadline for complete elimination
of chemical weapons is missed.
Walker also points out a closer-to-home concern if the Shchuch'ye arsenal
is not eliminated: "The potential for theft and diversion of these deadly
weapons to terrorists has major implications for homeland security."
Courtesy Of Defense Threat Reduction Agency
CONSTRUCTION The U.S. is building this destruction facility
at the Shchuch'ye complex; Russia is building an identical one.