The Honorable Claude M. Bolton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army (ALT)/AAE
103 Army, Pentagon RM 2672
Washington, DC 20310-0103
Dear Secretary Bolton:
We are writing on behalf of the 115,000 people of Calhoun County, Alabama, who we have the privilege to represent. As you know, Calhoun County is home to the Anniston Army Depot ("AAD"), one of our nation's finest military facilities. Calhoun County also has the unfortunate distinction of being saddled with more than 2,250 tons of chemical weapons stored at the Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Facility ("ANCDF"), which is located within the parameters of AAD. Those chemical weapons must be destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC"), a process which we strongly support.
The disposal facility constructed at ANCDF is scheduled to begin operations later this year after the necessary permits are issued by the State of Alabarna and other requirements spelled out by our Congressional delegation and our Governor have been completed. Our local Emergency Management Agency, which we operate and oversee, is working diligently with federal and state officials to complete as quickly as possible the remaining items on a safety check list which Senator Shelby and Governor Riley have endorsed and validated. Those remaining items include overpressurization of schools located within a twelve mile radius of the chemical weapons stock-pile, adoption and implementation in all emergency preparedness decisions of accurate and up to date toxicity thresholds for the three deadly agents stored at ANCDF, and the implementation of a program to deal with the emergency preparedness needs of the large special needs population in our county. We have worked closely with our Governor and our Congressional delegation to make certain these items are in place before the destruction process commenced. The safety of our citizens is our number one priority now and will remain so throughout the destruction process.
The ANCDF facility will use incineration technology modeled after the incinerators which the Army constructed at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, Utah. Although these two incinerators have destroyed a significant amount of our nation's chemical weapons stockpile, the incineration of these weapons has not been achieved without some real problems. For example, the Tooele incinerator was shut down in 2000 for more than six months after there was a leak of sarin from the facility into the atmosphere. The Tooele facility also was closed for eight months beginning last year after workers were exposed to sarin at the facility. Although the Tooele facility recently reopened last month, it already has been shut down three times in the past month because of problems the facility has experienced during its transfer from destroying sarin munitions to destroying that facility's VX weapons. During this same period, activities at the Johnston Atoll incinerator were halted when VX was discovered in the waste stream. The just completed incinerator at the Umatilla, Oregon stockpile has also experienced problems in recent months, including difficulties during the trial agent bum process.
While the Army believes it can resolve any problems which may arise at ANCDF, the events at Johnston Atoll, Tooele and Umatilla strongly suggest problems may occur at ANCDF as well. In fact, earlier this week officials at the Tooele facility said shutdowns due to malfunctions "should not be unexpected" when the incinerator is ramping up to destroy another type of agent.
While we do not want to contemplate the possibility that ANCDF will not be able to complete its mission or could be significantly delayed in this process, we believe this potential contingency must be addressed. There are many potential scenarios which could occur which could cause the ANCDF facility to be shut down for a long period of time or possibly even permanently. A few examples are worker exposure or agent releases similar to those which have occurred at the Tooele and Johnston Atoll facilities, increased stringency of environment regulations for combustion facilities, legal challenges and technical problems.
As someone who has enjoyed a long and illustrious military career, we believe you must certainly appreciate the value of having a contingency plan as an option regardless of the confidence that has been placed in the original strategy. Contingency plans have always played an important role in the development and execution of military operations. The destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile here should be no different. Unfortunately, it is our understanding that no such contingency plan exists for ANCDF. This is most troubling, and we feel the matter requires your immediate attention.
Accordingly, we request that you task Mike Parker, Director of the Chemical Materials Agency, to develop such a contingency plan. We believe this plan should include, but not be limited to, the following items:
Identification of alternative treatment options for disposal of the stockpile located at AAD, including successfully demonstrated or deployed approached utilized under ACWA;
Engineering and design plans for these identified options;
State and federal permitting requirement for the deployment of these identified options; and
Cost and schedule analysis for deployment of these identified options.
Let us be clear: We are not asking that this plan be completed as a precondition for our support for the initiation of the destruction phase. However, we sincerely hope and expect this contingency plan can be developed quickly and concluded as expeditiously as possible. It is our strong desire to have these weapons r emoved from our county as quickly and safely as possible. Having a contingency plan in place at the earliest possible date can only help to serve that goal.
Thank you for your kind attention to this request. We look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely,
James A. Dunn, Chairman
Robert W. Downing, Commissioner
J. D. Hess, Commissioner
James Eli Henderson, Commissioner
Rudy Abbott, Commissioner