Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. Daily Environment Report
Wednesday, February 18, 2004
No. 31
Page A-8
ISSN 1521-9402
Hazardous Waste
Citizens Groups Allege Sarin Exposure,
Seek Burning Suspension at Alabama Facility
By Linda Roeder
A coalition of citizens groups has asked
the Defense Department to suspend
operations and investigate problems at an
Army chemical weapons incineration
facility in Alabama, alleging that workers
were exposed to the nerve agent sarin.
In a letter sent Feb. 16 to the
department, the groups urged an immediate
halt to operations at the Anniston (Ala.)
Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility
(ANCDF), "in light of the serious pattern
of events that have occurred since
operations began" in August 2003.
The letter was signed by representatives
of 16 groups, including the Chemical
Weapons Working Group, Families Concerned
About Nerve Gas, Citizens for
Environmental Justice, and the Military
Toxics Project. The letter was addressed
to Michael W. Wynne, principal deputy
undersecretary of defense/acquisition,
technology and logistics.
"Comparing ANCDF operations thus far with
the congressional mandate for the Army to
provide 'maximum protection' to workers
and the surrounding community, we believe
the Army has fallen far short of the
mark," the groups wrote.
Since the Anniston incinerator began
burning chemical weapons Aug. 9, 2003,
there have been numerous unanticipated
shutdowns, technical problems, system
malfunctions, and hundreds of chemical
agent alarms, the letter said.
Plant manager decisions have resulted in
increased worker risks, including an
incident on Feb. 4 in which at least two
workers were exposed to sarin, also known
as GB nerve agent, the groups said.
Sarin is a man-made colorless liquid that
is used in chemical warfare as a nerve
agent. It can evaporate into a gas and
spread into the environment.
'Minute Level' Detected
A statement released Feb. 4 by the
Anniston facility confirmed an alarm
sounded that day at the facility alerting
managers "that a minute level of agent was
detected in an unoccupied observation
corridor."
"Personnel in the area near the corridor
donned protective masks as a precautionary
measure and left the area per standard
operations procedures," the Army said.
Operations at the facility were
temporarily suspended.
The following day, Feb. 5, the Anniston
facility announced that workers had
resumed rocket disposal operations.
Detection of the agent was not the result
of rocket disposal operations, but
happened after two employees "had
completed some maintenance work in an
agent-contaminated room and after those
employees had exited an agent
decontamination room," ANCDF said.
However, a week later, the citizens groups
said, after being confronted with
information from anonymous sources, the
Army admitted the workers had been exposed
to a nerve agent, that alarms had sounded
in the medical clinic in addition to the
disposal building, and that the workers
were performing activities associated with
the experimental gelled rockets
destruction process when the contamination
occurred.
Craig Williams, director of the Chemical
Weapons Working Group (CWWG), told BNA
Feb. 16 that the groups are concerned
because the incinerator is scheduled to
operate for another 10 years. When it was
planned, the disposal facility was
described as a "third-generation facility"
that would benefit from lessons learned at
other Army-operated incinerators.
Instead, he said, "The same problems are
being repeated."
Allegations Disputed
However, Michael Abrams, public affairs
officer with the Anniston facility, told
BNA Feb. 19 that "it is not fact" that
workers were exposed to sarin.
Workers inside the facility during "an
event" on Feb. 4 were wearing safety
equipment and clothing, and when they
removed this clothing "a minute amount of
vapor," not liquid material, was later
detected, he said.
These workers later were examined by staff
medical officers who found they showed no
symptoms of exposure. In addition, blood
tests were performed and analyzed and
showed no indication of agent exposure,
Abrams told BNA.
During the past six months, he said, the
facility has processed 18,615 rockets and
20,775 gallons of GB. "During the past six
months, things have been going very
smoothly, except for a couple of ripples
on the pond," Abrams said.
Allegations that the facility is risking
the health of workers and nearby
residents, he said, are "outrageous."
In the previous four days, Abrams
continued, the facility processed 491
rockets but has stopped incineration for a
"planned maintenance period." The facility
expects to resume operations by Feb. 21,
he said.
In their letter, the citizens groups
criticized the Army's "deplorable lack of
honest communication and flow of
information from ANCDF on incinerator
operations." The letter said there is a
need for "an open, transparent process for
public involvement and dialogue."
The language used by ANCDF management in
describing events at the incinerator are
misleading and "significantly downplay the
serious nature of incidents," the letter
said.
For example, it cited the Army's use of
terms such as "maintenance" to imply
routine activities "when in fact it
relates to unanticipated malfunctions,
shutdowns and/or unplanned worker 'hot'
entries.
These are not merely maintenance
activities but are "breakdowns of a
serious nature, and indicate chronic
problems at the facility," the citizens
groups said.
Problems, Incidents
The letter cited several examples of
multiple technical problems, process
malfunctions, and "near miss" incidents at
the incinerator. These include:
heated discharge conveyor breakdowns,
deactivation feed chute jams,
inadequate training of workers,
inadequate contamination procedures
for workers after they leave "hot" areas,
workers being exposed to agents,
alarms triggered in the clinic after
decontamination procedures should have
rendered workers "clean," and
delayed notification of chemical events
to the Anniston Depot emergency
Operations Centers.
Many of these problems are not unique to
the Anniston incinerator, the letter said,
adding the Army has experienced identical
problems at its first- and
second-generation incinerators in the
Pacific and in Utah.
Chronic Problems
Unfortunately, the groups continued, the
Army routinely "cherry picks" safety and
procedural recommendations rather than use
its Lessons Learned Program to address
chronic problems and systemic designs
flaws.
For example, the groups pointed to the
Army's effort to increase throughput of
"gelled" M55 rockets at the Anniston
incinerator.
"The incinerators were never designed to
handle gelled rockets, and when management
tries to force the technology to function
in this manner, workers are put at
unnecessary, unacceptable risk."
A report issued in September 2003 by the
National Research Council included
specific recommendations for processing
gelled GB 55 rockets at Anniston.
"Many of these recommendations have been
completely ignored by the ANCDF management
and the Army," the letter said.
CWWG's Williams said in a statement, "This
pattern of deliberate noninformation and
misinformation is the same as the Army
used at incinerators in the Pacific and
Utah, only in Alabama it is even more
callous. In Anniston, Ala., there are more
than 75,000 residents in the immediate
impact zone who are being cut off from
information or fed fabricated reports
filled with spin and half truths."
David Christian, a member of the group
Serving Alabama's Future Environment,
said, "Unless the Army is forced to admit
the details of events like shutdowns or
worker exposures, we get piecemeal and
misleading information, if we get any
information at all."
The startup of the chemical weapons
incineration project in Alabama followed
years of protests by citizen and
environmental groups.
In January, Williams told BNA the
coalition of environmental and citizens
groups supported the efforts of
participants in a multistate team working
to develop alternative methods of
destroying chemical weapons and to learn
more about nerve agents (16 DEN A-10,
1/27/04)
