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Adjust your monitor Army should at least consider a second safety system 11/18/03 Congress last week called for better systems to detect nerve gas leaks at the Anniston Army Depot and other chemical demilitarization sites around the country. Unfortunately, the Army dismissed the idea out of hand. "The Army remains firm in its belief that the current system of monitoring is effective and provides for the protection of its workers, the community and the environment," wrote Cynthia Smith, a Pentagon spokeswoman. That's too bad. The Army should at least consider adding another layer of insurance to its monitoring system at Anniston. While there are currently monitors that sound immediate alarms if nerve gas is detected in the incinerator complex, the system requires about an hour's lab work to verify whether the leak was real or just a false alarm. Congress has asked the Army to consider a system that would operate continuously and have a response within 10 seconds. It's worth a look, for obvious reasons. If an accident occurs at the incinerator, word must quickly reach those who are in harm's way. Getting immediate readings is particularly important in a system that is admittedly prone to false alarms. After a series of false alarms, it is all too easy for workers to make dangerous assumptions when a real leak occurs. As incinerator opponent Craig Williams pointed out, a real sarin leak at the Utah incinerator in 2000 was wrongly written off as another false alarm. By the time the truth was discovered and people off-site were notified, more than three hours had passed. In Anniston, which is far more populated than the site in Utah, a delay like that is unthinkable. Granted, the existing system in Anniston is prone to false alarms because it is more sensitive than the instant systems that Congress is pushing the Army to consider. But the Army doesn't have to choose one or the other. It can add a second system that would provide instantaneous monitoring for large leaks while the original monitors could still screen for low-level leaks that could pose more of a long-term hazard to incinerator workers. Given the Army's poor handling of safety issues at Anniston, its reluctance to consider a second system should probably not come as a surprise. But it's still a disappointment. |
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