MARCH 3, 1997
Pages 1-123
WITNESS: TIM THOMAS
TOCDF Program Manager
for the Army
Q All right. That's my question. Now, one of those operational problems that occurred involved leaks of nerve agent GB from the filter banks into the adjoining vestibule buildings; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q All right. And this occurred the 13th of August?
A That's correct.
Q All right. Now, as I understand this incident--and please correct me--it involved the release of nerve agent from filter banks that had been briefly on-line, had been taken off-line, and after being taken off-line, under the Army's view, agent was released into the vestibules; is that correct?
A That is correct...
Q I take it that Johnston Island staff reached this conclusion not to use this procedure of closing both the inlet and outlet valves, they reached this conclusion at some point in time prior to August of '96 when you started agent operations.
A That's correct...
Q So is it fair to say that the reason you didn't take note of the abandonment of this procedure at Johnston Island before you went out with agent was essentially an oversight on your part?
A Basically was an oversight, yes.
Q How much time did it take before you actually recognized agent was present compared to when it was present?
A As I recall, it was the following day that we recognized we had agent in that vestibule.
Q To give a precise answer to my what I thought was a precise question, did employees enter one or more of the vestibules when agent was present before you recognized agent was present?
A I'm not sure. I could not answer that. I know they entered into a vestibule, but it was--we did not have enough information to correlate the time they went into the vestibule as to--in relationship as to when we saw the release.
Q So today, to this moment, the Army is unable to answer the question whether employees entered the vestibule with agent present. Is that your answer?
A That's correct.
Q How much time elapsed between that time period and the time you took the blood draws from employees?
A To my recollection only a day or so.
Q Day or so. Was that your standard procedure to wait a day to do a blood draw after someone may have been exposed?
A No. When we identified that we had agent in the vestibule, we then decided to locate those individuals and have their blood drawn. Now, it was difficult to locate some of the individuals because they were either on airplanes or out of town during that period of time.
Q All right. Now, did you consider the JACADS information where they had rejected closing both the inlet and outlet dampers, did you or your staff--
A I--
Q Pardon me. I haven't finished my question. Did you consider that information prior to agent start-up, and did you or your staff reject an adjustment at that time?
A No, we did not reject an adjustment. As I stated before, it was an oversight.
Q So you were too busy?
A No. It was just an oversight. We were focused on the issue at
hand, which is the door gaskets.
Q Well, Mr. Thomas, I think we can see from your memoranda to Gary Millar that you in particular have the ability to focus on many issues--
A Right.
Q --At the same time?
A Sure.
Q So you're basically saying they just fell through the cracks?
A Say that again.
Q Fell through the cracks, is that what you're telling me?
A Yes, it did.
Q So you've given up learning from Johnston Island?
A No, absolutely not.
Q You're just not focused on it?
A We are still evaluating our filter performance.
Q So you don't know whether you're actually putting out a new technique versus the prototype putting out--
A I know through the lessons learned program it was recommended that we go to a neoprene seal. Again, I don't have intimate knowledge of what's happening on Johnston Island.
Q You don't know whether they've proven out the use of neoprene seals at Johnston Island before they recommended you use it?
A I don't know that.
Q Now, is it your knowledge that decontamination liquid has been observed by your staff or by the contractor's staff leaking not only through cracks into the electrical equipment room, but also under air lock doors in the facility?
A I'm aware of a situation where that did occur.
Q That did occur?
A Yes.
Q All right. What I am asking is because--and I want to get to in a moment whether you map these cracks and know where they are and where they might occur next. My question is if a crack occurred in an air lock at some point in the facility where agent was present, then agent could leak under the air lock door through the crack?
A Yes, that's possible.
A I think it went--it's a continuing process, and as we identify we add cracks to the map...
Q ...I understand. And have you identified the root cause of the cracking at this point in time?
A Not in total. We believe that--at least I believe that we have a good understanding what is causing the cracks, but as you're probably well aware, cracks do occur in concrete.
Q Yes. What is your identification of the root cause at this moment?
A Right now I would lean towards the fact that the cracks--the majority of the cracks occurred in the floor adjacent to the wall that supports the deactivation furnace, and with the heating and cooling of the deactivation furnace caused the walls to expand and crack--or expand and contract which in turn caused the floor to stress at that location near that wall.
Q There have been cracks identified in locations other than near the deactivation furnace I take it?
A There have been a couple of cracks identified, yes.
Q Do you know how many are near the furnace compared to how many are not?
A The majority are near the furnace.
Q All right. The recent cracks that were added to your map in 1997, were those near the furnace?
A They were not.
Q They were not. All right. So do you have an explanation at the moment for why cracks would be appearing at this point in time unrelated to the deactivation furnace?
A Again, concrete reacts as a result of--cracks are created by the settling of facility or movement of the building, and after a period of time those cracks would subside.
Q Now, why did it take you until a month or two or more after the start-up of agent operations to begin mapping the cracks that now concern you for purposes of containment?
A Because that's when we first identified the cracks, and they were not there at the start of agent operations.
Q You had no cracks at TOCDF at the start of agent operations?
A We did not.
Q Really?...
A I don't recall any specific cracks identified. Let me revise that. We--as part of our coating preparation installation we did go through and identify cracks and repair those cracks prior to applying the epoxy coating on the floors and walls.
Q When was that?
A That occurred late construction period.
Q '93 approximately?
A I don't recall exactly when that occurred.
Q During the construction process?
A Yes...
Q ...So even before systemization began, which was before agent operations, and even before finishing construction, you and your staff had knowledge that there would be cracks in the concrete because you found them and attempted to repair them; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q Do you have a document that identifies the frequency at which cracks were discovered in the past compared to the present?
A No, I do not.
Q Now, have you seen a document, either from the Army's Environmental Impact Statement work or the work done during the last hearing in this matter, or any other document produced by the Army that assesses the potential environmental impacts of operating a nerve agent disposal facility which continues to develop cracks in the concrete?
A I have not.
Q All right. Now, have there been any incidents at TOCDF during systemization or after agent operations began where your primary electrical power system went down and you lost power?
A Oh, yes, uh-huh.
A And lightning caused or some other reason?
A Potentially, yes.
Q Not quite sure what the cause was?
A In some cases I am not sure.
Q ...Now, what Mr. Millar testified, and I think the record will speak for itself on that, is that those two events have happened to some extent, you've had power losses, primary power, and you've had leaks of liquid through cracks in the concrete into electrical areas. Now, would you agree or disagree with Mr. Millar that if a power loss in he primary system due to lightning or whatever happened simultaneous with a leak
onto the electrical equipment causing a backup system to fail, that you would lose negative pressure?
A It's possible, but it's a very low probability event.
Q And you say it's low probability notwithstanding that the two types of incidents in question have occurred at TOCDF separately?
A They have occurred, but seeing both events occurring at the same time is extremely low probability.
Q I understand. Have you seen an assessment either in the Army's prior EIS work or in the more recent REC done in the prior hearing in this matter that addresses the probability and potential consequence of the simultaneous occurrence of these two events?
A I have not seen that, no.
A Once it was identified, action was taken.
Q All right. And was one of those actions to turn off a main valve supplying water to the fire suppression system?
A As I recall, Yes.
Q All right. Now, had that been a real fire, or had a real fire occurred during this time, you would not have had water supplied to your fire suppression system because that valve was turned off, right?
A Again, it was a very low probability event when we had maintenance in the area and a fire--extremely low probability.
Q Prior to this incident, what would have assessed the probability of this fire suppression system initiating accidentally? Would that have been a low probability event?
A Yeah. Generally, yes.
Q All right. But it happened? It happened?
A It filled--basically it did not release water, but it did fill the dry stand pipes that we had.
Q Now, closing that main water valve by your employees in an attempt to mitigate this incident caused an additional alarm, did it not?
A I suspect it did, yes.
Q The system automatically reacted to the closing of that valve?
A I would imagine it did, yes.
Q And the employees who closed it didn't know that that reaction would occur in that system, did they?
A To my knowledge they did not know that.
Q All right. Now, when those dampers closed automatically when this system initiated, it altered the air flow in the facility, did it now?
A To my knowledge it did, yes.
Q It did. All right. And there was a substantial loss of your negative pressure at that time, was there not?
A There was a loss of negative pressure, but not to the extent where we had any migration of agent out of our contained areas.
Q You mean there weren't any alarms?
A That's correct.
Q The loss of negative pressure was substantial, was it not?
A I don't have that data at my fingertips.
Q Do you recall it?
A I do not recall it, no.
Q Do you recall knowing it at one point in time?
A I may have. I know it was a concern. I did express a concern about that and did look into the cause of the problem, and I have been satisfied with the resolution of that issue.
Q But you don't remember how much of your negative pressure you lost?
A I know it was not enough to allow agent to migrate out into the observation corridors.
Q Was that by a narrow margin? Was it barely enough--
A I can't answer that question. I do not recall.
Q Now. during this fire suppression system malfunction you in fact went below the LCO, the limiting condition of operation, for negative pressure in the facility, did you not?
A It is possible, yes.
Q All right. And there had been no advance decision to allow any sealants in that case, had there?
A To my knowledge there was not...
Q ...Okay. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Millar and/or others at the facility after this incident, regarding this incident, this fire suppression incident, in which you stated that because of the design of the system, there was--and I may not be quoting it, but this is the gist as I understand--that there is a tradeoff that has to be made between maintaining maximum fire suppression capability and maximum ability to prevent agent migration?
A I'm aware of that, yes.
Q All right. And there is such a tradeoff that has to be made in your view, is there not?
A Yes, there is.
Q And what is that tradeoff in your understanding?
A Well, it's a conflict between national fire protection association code and our concern about maintaining containment of agent in the facility. We had elected to close fire dampers to isolate fires in the facility to accommodate NFPA requirements; however, that authority to open those up was given back to the operators after they evaluated the decision as to whether or not is was warranted to isolate fires or maintain containment of agents in the facility.
Q So if I understand what you're saying, if you follow the fire code and you would use the dampers which would isolate the fire, shut off air flow to prevent flow of the fire; is that correct?
A That's correct. That's the intent.
Q And it may not be perfect but it would maximize your ability to do that?
A That's correct.
Q Now, on the other hand, if you do close those dampers, it disrupts
your normal air flow and your ability to maintain negative pressure; is
that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And if that air flow is disrupted and negative pressure is lost, agent migration would occur?
A Correct.
Q Now, this issue of the balancing of the desire to maximize fire suppression at the facility versus maximizing control of agent and preventing agent migration, has this issue and this design tradeoff been the subject of an analysis by the Army in either the EIS material or the recent REC or any other document that you know of that addresses the potential environmental impact in the event of a serious fire?
A I don't know because I don't know what's in the EIS or Record of- - ...
A ...We--we--what I have been able to identify to date is that we are unable to train on every situation we have at the plant...
Q ...It's fair, is it not, that we're not talking about some folks that were highly trained and then forgot? In this particular incident, when you started agent operations and approved that start-up, neither the Army nor EG&G had on site personnel trained in how to operate and maintain the fire suppression system to avoid such an incident? Is that a fair statement?
A It's a matter of degree of training, and those individuals were trained to a certain extent; maybe not to the degree you're talking about.
Mr. Harrison: All right. I'll ask my colleagues to assist me if they can to find a document that we'll offer as plaintiff's exhibit--And I believe we're going to use numbering, with your Honor's permission, starting at 301 to allow some avoidance of overlap in the prior preceding. This will be plaintiff's 301. And do you have that available, the fire suppression, your Honor: I'll show--I'll provide a copy to the clerk.
Q Mr. Thomas, I'll show you what's been marked as plaintiff's exhibit 301, ask if you can identify it? Just take a moment if you would.
A Okay.
Q Do you recognize this document, Mr. Thomas?
A I may have seen this.
Q Does it look like the outline for overhead sheets from an EG&G presentation to the Army on this incident?
A I could have been.
Q Could have been. Do you see on the first page there at the bottom it says "EG&G Defense Materials, Inc."?
A Uh-huh.
Q All right. Now, in fact, it's true, is it not, that EG&G made a presentation to you and the Army seeking additional funding for more trained personnel regarding the fire suppression system after this incident?
A As I recall there was a discussion about that, yes.
Q All right. Now, if you'll page to the second page where it says "Vision Statement". Do you see that?
A Uh-huh.
Q All right. If you could just read the statement by the little dot there for the record.
A Says, "Develop a common base of knowledge, both written and learned, that will allow operations personnel to understand the workings of the fire alarm systems and will enable them to confidently respond to the daily requirements of the TOCDF fire detection, suppression and monitoring systems."
Q All right. If you'll turn to the next page where it says "Goal and Objectives".
A Says--yeah. I have it.
Q If you would read those.
A "To formally develop the training requirements and data essential for qualifying of maintenance and operations personnel. To perform the above goal while continuing to troubleshoot and maintain the TOCDF fire systems at peak operating efficiency."
Q Stop there for the moment. Now, does this refresh your memory at all as to whether or not this information was presented to you or your staff or EG&G after this incident?
A I do recall a discussion in that area. I don't know--I don't recall the specific discussion, but I do recall a discussion.
Q Is it fair to say that whether this document is something you've seen in that discussion or not--or do you recall whether you've seen it or not?
A I don't recall it, no.
Q Is it fair to say that the goal and objectives stated on this page as you've just read was part of a discussion that you had with EG&G that there was a request for additional funding and staffing so that these goals could be achieved?
A As I recall, there probably was a discussion about that, yes.
Q All right. Now, if you'll look at that same page in this exhibit, plaintiff's 301, it says "Today's Situation," understanding it's back then, but still during agent operations. The top dot says, does it not, "To date there are no specific requirements at TOCDF for training or qualifying of fire system technicians?" Do you see that?
A Uh-huh.
Q Was that true at the time of this incident?
A It probably was, yes.
Q If you'll read that last bullet for the record.
A "Operations Personnel have limited understanding of fire systems in general and have received little or no ongoing training in the operations of these systems."
Q Was that true at the time of this incident?
A I believe it was, yes.
Q Let me be clear I understand your testimony. I'm asking you now about the type of jams that have occurred at TOCDF. How could those occur here if the entire design of the system was to work out the bugs at Johnston Island and perhaps at CAMDS, why are you now experiencing new types of problems?
A I don't know. The--the--there are--we're seeing completely different phenomena than what we ever saw at Johnston Island.
Q So you saw a breakthrough in filter bank one prior to the time you would have expected it in filter bank one; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q So you now are prepared to say that you've identified the cause of the breakthrough of agent in filter bank one with certainty?
A I believe today we have a very good indication of the cause of that...
Q ...So your answer is you have some theories but you haven't definitively picked one and you're still exploring it?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q Uh-huh. All right. Now, during the time when you were exploring alternate theories for this breakthrough of agent in filter bank one, this actually was a time that you were still operating live with agent; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And one of the theories that you essentially tested during the live operations was that it might be filter banks were not seated properly in their frames and you had employees go about tightening the bolts or nuts on those?
A Correct.
Q Now, this was essentially a trial and error approach to discovering the cause, isn't it.
A Yeah.
Q Tightening it to see if it works?
A Sure.
Q Okay. Now during this incident where the employee or employees entered the HEPA filter by mistake, they received an exposure at least on their suits, their protective suits, to agent, did they not?
A That's my understanding, yes.
Q And are you saying that anyone who enters these filter banks under these routine procedures you describe would get this type of contamination on their suits.
A It's possible, yes.
Q Now, during this incident they didn't realize at the time they were in the wrong filter bank, and they didn't realize they were getting contamination or their suits at the time; is that correct?
A They--they--I understand that they were--they knew that they were in the wrong filter bank when they decided that they--to answer your question, I guess, is yes.
Q Help me out then. I thought I just asked you did this protective equipment show a six TWA agent reading after deconning, and I thought you said no?
A I think the answer to that is they did decon, but I also think I said that they did not decon effectively.
Q I heard that, but the answer to my question is still yes?
A Yes.
Q All right. do you know why they didn't decon effectively?
A I do not.
Q Thank you. All right. Now, I asked you a question, which we didn't quite get an answer to, which is, have there been occasions where waste feed cutoffs, either your own or regulatory authorities' cutoff systems, have been bypassed or jumpered?
A We--on a limited occasion we do bypass cutoffs based on an
informed decision-making process.
Q So this employee would not have known based on his prior training that opening this damper would cause agent migration into the corridor I take it?
A As I recall, this operator did not know the extent of the effect of opening this damper.
Q All right. Is that because no one knew the effect until it happened?
A Would you repeat that, please?
Q Sure. Is the reason that your employee, who was trained-- otherwise trained in procedures, is the reason he didn't know that opening that damper would cause this agent migration in the corridor because no one had told him because no one else knew?
A The operator should have conferred with his management as part of this process. They have the knowledge necessary to look at the --what are the effects of that operation.
Q All right. Did anyone know that this migration would occur if this damper were opened? Do you know?
A It was specifically stated in the procedures not to open that damper unless under specific conditions.
Q If you can answer my question more specifically. Did anyone know that this migration of agent would occur if this damper were opened?
A No.
Q Now, in response to my prior question you noted on limited occasions jumpering or bypassing of waste feed cutoffs and interlocks occurred at TOCDF. Could you explain on what occasions that jumpering occurred?
A Again, it's based on the evaluation of the operation of the equipment. It is dependent on--upon what--it there's a failure associated with that equipment. It's really a result of an informed decision-making process that we've established to make the determination whether or not we should jumper or not. In fact, we have incorporated a --what we call a temporary change process which requires that informed decision-making process.
Q I beg your pardon. What requires this informed decision--
A It's called a temporary change procedure.
Q This is an internal procedure? It's not done by the state regulatory agency?
A No, it's not.
Q Now, the jumpering that occurs on occasion that you've noted under this case by case informed decision process, whatever it might be, these jumpers include, do they not, both jumpering of your required operating conditions and cutoffs imposed by the company or the Army itself, and also involve jumpering regulatorily required interlocks?
A We don't jump regulatory required waste feed cutoffs.
Q Never have in the life of the TOCDF?
A It is--the way I would answer that is it is our policy not to jumper regulatory required waste feed cutoffs.
Q Mr. Thomas, you understand the distinction between the two questions what is your policy and what is your practice?
A Understand, yes.
Q I want to know about your practice. Has it happened?
A I do not recall. I cannot recall a specific instance which would address that.
Q Now, to be clear we're talking about the same things, the waste feed cutoffs, which I also call interlocks or safety interlocks--shorthand, which you may not--these would be cutoffs that would be designed to prevent your going too low in temperature and too high a temperature, assuring that you maintain liquid flow to the pollution control or so forth? These are samples of interlocks, right?
A Sure.
Q Now, are you telling me that none--no bypass of any of those types of interlocks to your knowledge has ever occurred at TOCDF?
A No. What I stated is regulatory automatic waste feed cutoffs are not bypassed. We routinely look at the operation of the equipment and we have other safety related waste feed cutoffs which we do bypass as
part of the temporary change procedures, so we do on occasion bypass those types of waste feed cutoffs.
Q Are you certain or uncertain whether you have bypassed an automatic waste feed cutoff that's required by the State?
A I do not recall of an occasion where we have bypassed an automatic waste feed cutoff that's required by a RCRA permit.
Q Don't recall?
A I do not recall.
Q All right. Now, do you recall an incident, I believe you're in systemization, when an interlock was bypassed, waste feed cutoff interlock, I presume, relating to liquid flow to I believe it was a liquid incinerator; jumper was put in place; jumper was not removed apparently from one shift to another and the incinerator got essentially flooded with liquid, requiring a replacement of the refractory brick? Do you recall that?
A As I recall, I do--I do recall that, yes.
Q All right. And who implemented the jumper in that case?
A I do not recall that.
Q Who authorized the use of the jumper in that case?
A I do not recall.
Q Was the use of the jumper in that case reported to the State Department of Environmental Quality?
A I do not recall because--probably not, because at--the incinerator was not processing hazardous waste at that time as I recall, and therefore--
Q You mean agent?
A Yes, as I recall. I'm trying to refer back. That occurred, as I recall, more than a year--year of more ago.
Q Was the incinerator processing anything at that time?
A I do not recall.
Q Has there been a report prepared on that incident?
A Again, I do not recall. There may have been.
Q Have there been any other occasions where jumpers have been used, jumpers of any kind during actual agent operations?
A Again, we use a process that's called the temporary change process, which authorizes the use of jumpers as part of an informed decision- making process.
Q Even during agent operations?
A Even during agent operations, that's correct.
Q And these bypasses or jumperings during agent operations, are these reported to the State as they happen?
A We're not required to report to the State on the bypassing, however the State has access to our logs on temporary changes.
Q Okay. Now, it's true, is it not, that you had a concern during the latter days of Mr. Millar's tenure at TOCDF as General Manger that jumpers were being used to start up the liquid incinerator and jumpers were being used to start up the deactivation furnace--continuing to be used; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Why did you have a concern about the continued use of these jumpers?
A Those jumpers or temporary changes as we call them, were related to the operation--the restarting of the incinerators after we had a power failure, and my concern was assuring that we maintained temperature in those incinerators as we went through the start-up process. What happened is that when we lost power, we would lose indication on a Kirk's Flow Meter that we have lost purge. And with a loss--
Q Purge?
A Purge, yes.
Q What does that mean?
A Basically means that NFPA requires the unit to go through a purge
to ensure that the combustible gasses in that unit are clearly removed
before restart of that facility--that unit.
Q NFPA?
A NFPA. That prevents any explosions--incinerator explosions in that unit.
Q Is this a National Fire Prevention standard?
A National Fire Protection Association requirement.
Q Is this a regulatory requirement?
A Yes, it is.
A As you mentioned before, we lose power to the facility as a result of problems with the supply of commercial power.
Q Okay. The intellectual company has a problem using power because they couldn't maintain the flow--
A Right.
Q How often does this happen?
A It happens--it happens more in the wintertime, and it happens when we have storms, things like that. I would imagine it would happen maybe two times a month or so.
Q Uh-huh. Two times a month. Do you have records on these incidents I take it?
A I'm sure the power industry has records of those.
Q That's not what I'm asking. When you have to engage in this--
A The answer to that is yes, somewhere we do have records of this.
A ...The agent is immediately destroyed as it is--once it reaches the incinerator, so there is no unburned agent in the incinerator when we stop feeding.
Q So your resonance time of agent or agent gasses is instantaneous
for destruction?
A Yes. It's not quite instantaneous, but it's extremely quick.
Q Isn't there some EPA guidance or State guidance on how long you need to maintain the hazardous waste in the temperature zone for destruction? Isn't there a resonance time?
A Yes, I'm sure there is.
Q It's a matter of seconds, isn't it?
A In this case the agent is destroyed almost immediately. We're talking microseconds.
Q How do you know it's destroyed so quickly?
A Because of analysis that was done early on the kinetics of the destruction.
Q Kinetics?
A Uh-huh.
Q Is this a validation in a real incinerator?
A No. It's theoretical, and it's also based on experience that we have.
Q Now, have there been stack tests done recently at TOCDF that have reported the presence of GB in stack particulate, agent GB?
A We have had stack tests, but I know of no information that would infer that we have GB in our particulate.
Q Have you ever seen a report which has the letter GB in a column reporting results from your stack particulate tests?
A I have seen that, yes.
Q All right. Now, you see in the fourth column to the right the words at the top "GB agent screen results"?
A Uh-huh.
Q Parentheses PPB?
A Correct.
Q And PPB stands for parts per billion, doesn't it?
A Yes.
Q And you see some non-zero numbers all the way down the column, do you not?
A Right.
Q Indicating by someone's estimation .3 parts per billion, 15.2 parts per billion, 4.3 parts per billion, and so forth to the bottom, indicating to me on a first glance that someone doing this analysis found indications of GB agent present at those quantities. Now, am I misreading that?
A Yes.
Q Right. Now, the numbers you see on this page TOCDF Dash 1002, these concentrations of GB agent are not below the level of detection for the instruments and methodology you used in this case, are they?
A Right, but they're below the level of confidence--a level which gives me confidence that that is actually GB.
Q Are you confident that it's not?
A I believe that based on the information that's been provided to me by my specialists, that there is a probably--good probability it is not agent.
Q So you're going to act as if it's not agent in the meantime?
A Well, look to see if we can identify agent in the stacks, but--
Q If this isn't agent, Mr. Thomas, what exactly is it?
A It's something that appears to be similar to agent but could be- - could not be. The bottom line is I'm not confident that it is agent.
Q And you're not confident that it's not?
A That's a fair assessment. We don't know what it is.
Q Now recently TOCDF experienced an ACAMS alarm in the stack, did it not.
A We--as I recall we did, yes.
Mr. Harrison: All right.
The Court: Excuse me. Was that an ACAMS alarm?
Mr. Harrison: ACAMS alarm in the stack.
Q Now, that ACAMS in that stack is placed there for a purpose and that purpose is to alarm when agent is detected; is that correct?
A That is correct. That is correct.
Q All right. Was agent detected in this case by the ACAMS?
A To my knowledge it was not.
Q It alarmed though?
A It did alarm, yes.
Q So it detected something?
A We do see on occasion ACAMS gong into alarm.
Q In the stack?
A Both in the stack and in the plant, yes.
Q How many stack ACAMS alarms have occurred at TOCDF?
A We see maybe one every week to two weeks.
Q Really?
The Court: In the stack?
The Witness: In the stack, yes.
Q So is it your opinion at this moment that you're certain that these alarms are not caused by agent release?
A Yes, I am certain of that.
Q So what exactly causes each of these ACAMS alarms?
A To my knowledge the way the gas chromatograph works is it allows a certain molecule to come out in a certain window of time, and on occasion there are other components hydrocarbons and other molecules that mimic agent, and when they come out, they may come out within the same window, and we react accordingly. So to verify that it is not agent, we pull subsequent DAAMS tubes where we take those down and analyze them on different gas chromatographs.
Q So in each of these occasions when the ACAMS in the stack has alarmed, you have done the follow-up analysis and identified the specific chemical that caused the alarm that was not agent; is that right?
A Correct.
Q So what chemicals caused the alarm?
A We don't know?
Q Then you missed my question, Mr. Thomas. My question was in each of these cases had you done a follow-up analysis and determined the chemical that caused the alarm?
A The answer is we--we've attempted to isolate that, but we have not been able to isolate it, because it would be a number of chemicals that have caused that.
Q You're sure it's not agent, but you're not sure what it is?
A We're sure it's not agent.
Q But you're not sure what it is?
A Right.
Q Okay. Now, this phenomena we've discussed, agent decomposing over time, and these degradation products occurring over time, given that this phenomena occurs, do you have data at this time that accurately reflects the chemical composition of the liquid agent waste stream you're feeding into the LIC?
A To my knowledge we do have the breakdown materials that are fed; not the exact percentages of those materials.
Q Is that based on the historic literature of what the degradation products are?
A Not just historic literature, but it's based on analysis we've done
on both the agent and the breakdown products.
Q so you're testing your liquid waste stream periodically after you started up in August to find out what--
A We have pulled samples, and we--as part of our trial burn we pulled samples in which we had determined what the--what the constituents are of that feed stream is--are.
Q Have you got the results back yet?
A Well, we have just barely completed our liquid incinerator trial burn.
Q So you don't know at this moment the chemical composition of what you fed during the trial burn?
A We have a good idea what it is, but we cannot precisely state what it is.
Q All right. During the trial burn testing or miniburn testing, were there any stack ACAMS alarms?
A I do not recall.
Q Then that's the answer. Do you understand that the letter written to you by EG&G stating that they were ready for agent operations, the letter which you referred to as a part of your decision, was it actually signed by an employee of Mr. Millar while Mr. Millar was on travel and without Mr. Millar's approval?
A I was not aware of that.
Q ...What are those five combustion units at TOCDF?
A We have two liquid incinerators, one metal parts furnace, one deactivation furnace and one dunnage incinerator.
Q And all five of those units operated smoothly and without difficulty since agent operations?
A Not since agent operations, no.
Q All right. How would you describe--which of the units did not
operate smoothly and without problem?
A One unit was not operated, so I cannot comment as to whether or not is was smooth or not.
Q so the hours of operation referred to in the Army's prior brief about these five incinerators apparently were not sufficient to get one of them up to speed to operate? That would be the dunnage incinerator?
A Would you rephrase that question, please?
Q Is the dunnage incinerator operating at this time?
A It is not.
Q Has it operated at all during agent operation?
A It has not.
Q Was it operated sufficiently prior to agent operations and at the time of this prior hearing that you had confidence that it was ready to operate?
A It did.
Q So the dunnage was ready to operate in June and July of '96?
A It was.
Q Why isn't it operating?
A Because we elected to defer the permitting of that incinerator, which is a very lengthy process in light of the fact that we focused on the liquid incinerator, the deactivation furnace and the metal parts furnace.
MARCH 4, 1997
Pages 1-69
WITNESS: TIM THOMAS
Q Have you conducted any inquiry into the allegations of retaliation by EG&G against their workers?
A I have not received any formal reports of that, and so I have not conducted any investigations in that.
Q You mean apart from Mr. Millar's letter?
A Right. We had a complete investigation independent of me of Mr.
Millar's allegations.
Q So you've not conducted an inquiry?
A No, I have not.
Q So what makes you advance that EG&G is emphasizing to workers the importance of safety?
A Based on my oversight with--by myself and my staff. We're intimately involved in the activities of EG&G, and I both received information and witnessed myself the performance of their activities.
Q Now, if in fact EG&G is retaliating against employees for raising safety concerns, would that be a bit inconsistent with emphasizing safety of plant workers?
A I would say yes, that would be inconsistent.
Q Now, isn't it true that there are ACAMS that are in a ring around the ton container storage area where they're stored outside?
A To my knowledge there are not ACAMS. There's DAAMS around the outside of that.
Q All right. Are there ACAMS around the storage area in general?
A There are not.
Q Really? Are there ACAMS on the perimeter of the facility?
A We have DAAMS on the perimeter of the facility.
Q So there are no ACAMS on the perimeter?
A That's correct.
Q All right. Now, you've had some ACAMS alarms at TOCDF as you noted. Have any of those been validated by DAAMS tubes?
A Oh definitely, yes.
Q All right. These would be in areas where agent is expected to be?
Or would some be--
A No. Generally we use DAAMS in areas where we don't expect agent to go.
Q All right. so where have you detected agent in the ACAMS and then confirmed in the DAAMS?
A We--as you're well aware, if we open the munitions within the facility we always see a certain level of contamination within the center part of the facility, so we use those ACAMS to--as indicators as to the levels of agent we expect to see.
Q All right. I thought you just said that you were talking about areas where you would not expect to see--
A Maybe I misunderstood your question.
Q No problem. So have you found confirmed agent present by use of DAAMS as a backup to the ACAMS in areas where you would not expect to see agent at TOCDF?
A Yes.
Q And where was that?
A On two occasions. In the vestibule and also in the corridor when we had the release in the observation corridor--
A The brine reduction area is a cost savings piece of a system that's intended to reduce liquid brines coming from out pollution abatement system to salts so that we can handle them easier from a solid form and a liquid form.
Q Now, is the brine reduction area in use at this moment at TOCDF?
A It is not.
Q It was intended to be, was it not, as designed?
A Yes. It was intended to be, yes.
Q All right. Now, is it true or is it not true that your contractors are
taking this waste outside the state of Utah and having it disposed of at a
facility as a nonhazardous waste even if the facility is otherwise capable
of treating it as hazardous waste?
A The best I can tell you, Mr. Harrison, I haven't gotten into that level of detail, but I do know that we validated that it meets environmental requirements.
Q Do you--Have you validated that it's being handled as hazardous waste?
A I have not validated it personally if it has or not.
Q Do you know whether this residue has agent contamination in it?
A We--as I recall, we--no, it does not have agent--I'm sorry. Would you repeat?
Q Have you validated by chemical analysis that the waste you're sending off site and out of state from your pollution control system has no agent in it?
A I would have to defer to my specialist to tell you. I know we have looked at that, but I don't know the extent of that.
Q What do you know about the testing done on this waste treatment?
A We do characterize the waste before we ship it off site.
Q For agent?
A I cannot tell you that. I know we go through a characterization process to make sure that we understand what is included in that.
Q Mr. Thomas, I don't want to beat a dead horse, but you don't know that the testing is comprehensive; is that correct?
A I believe the testing to be comprehensive. I don't recall if agent is included in that analysis.
Q You have systems of pollution control at TOCDF, do you not, that involve spraying the gas stream with a liquid or a brine?
A Yes.
Q All right--A caustic or whatever it might be--and a liquid residue
results from that?
A That's correct.
Q All right. And if the gas stream contained agent, would you not expect the residue to contain agent?
A I'm not sure where you're going. Are you asking me if I've thought about this before? The answer is no.
Q You haven't thought about it before?
A No, because I don't believe that agent is coming out of the stack, so this has not been a concern.
Q Now, you recall during the systemization phase when surrogates or agents were being used? I believe you're using, what was it, sodium fluoride, is that right, for a surrogate?
A You're talking about the brine reduction area early on?
Q Yes.
A Yes.
Q Are you aware that during that time that residue of this agent surrogate was found in the ceiling vents through the building in the brine reduction area?
A I'm not aware of that, no.
Q Now, assuming that the ceiling vents were inspected during systemization--I'm asking you to assume--and found to have a residue from sodium fluoride present--assume that--
A Uh-huh.
Q --Then would you expect that during agent operations now that there would be a residue in those vents from the brine reduction area processing just as there was during systemization?
A It's possible.
Q Have you ever been asked to do a validation test to determine that
the stack ACAMS can detect agent in the stack gas--
A Well--
Q --Wait a minute--That you refused to perform?
A I do not recall. I would suggest you talk to my specialist in the area.
Q You don't have any knowledge of that; is that your answer?
A I do not recall.
Q Mr. Thomas, during the leak of agent from the filter banks into the vestibules, how many filter banks were leaking agent at that time to your knowledge?
A We saw agent in two vestibules, filter vestibule 107 and 108.
Q No knowledge of any other leaks?
A No knowledge.
Q Were there ACAMS in the vestibules at that time?
A No, there was not.
Q All right. You see the arrow--a narrow arrow with AQS in a box above it pointing down to September 5th? Is that a time when it was not shut down but you had very little production?
A Yes, we had low production.
Q The box that says "Feed Chute" pointing to September 9th, is that a shutdown?
A That--not necessarily.
Q Were you burning agent on September 9th?
A We could have been.
Q Were you?
A There's a possibility we were.
Q Do you know or not?
A The feed chute basically suspended operation deactivation for us. It did not necessarily suspend operation with the liquid incinerator.
Q Okay. You don't recall at that time what you were doing?
A I suspect we did burn agent after we had that event in our liquid incinerator.
Q Is this the same day that there was a problem with the filter system and the filter blower motors?
A I don't recall.
MARCH 4, 1997
Pages 70-255
WITNESS: TIM THOMAS
Q Okay. All right. It says further in that paragraph, "Operator sealed all filter containment vestibules or jams with plastic sheets, spill pillow, spill socks, and duct tape." Do you see that?
A Uh-huh.
Q All right. Is it your understanding, based on that and your prior knowledge, that the vestibules are not designed to be air tight, at least as initially implemented?
A We performed smoke tests on those filter vestibules and were very satisfied, but I think as an additional measure--
Q Are they air tight, Mr. Thomas?
A Let me rephrase that. We performed smoke tests on the filter vestibules, and we did not see migration of smoke out of those vestibules. I did not mean to imply that they were air tight.
Q I understand. To your knowledge they were not designed to be air
tight, were they?
A No, they were not.
Q All right. Now, this is the letter I was referencing you to earlier, which you discussed as the letter that you received from EG&G assuring you they were ready for agent operation; is that correct?
A Right.
Q All right. Now, isn't that the signature of Mr. Sandy Sanderson there?
A It appears so. It's kind of like my scribble. It's hard to read.
Q You've seen his signature before, haven't you?
A Yes, I have.
Q All right.
A It appears it is.
Q And the little note to the left, top of Gary Millar's name, is that, you think, the word "four"?
A Yes.
Q So is it your understanding Mr. Sanderson signed this for Gary Millar?
A It is.
Q Have you made any inquiry regarding whether he was authorized to sign it?
A I have not. I assumed he was.
 CWWG Home Page |
Contact us: Chemical Weapons Working Group Kentucky Environmental Foundation P.O. Box 467 Berea, KY 40403 phone: 859-986-7565 fax: 859-986-2695 For comments about this WWW page contact Lois Kleffman. |