COMMENTS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING GROUP ON THE PERMIT RENEWAL FOR JOHNSTON ATOLL CHEMICAL DISPOSAL SYSTEM EPA ID # TTO-570-090-001
The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) has been operating intermittently since July 1990. Since beginning operations there has been an overwhelming lack of information provided to the public concerning JACADS operational performance. At the same time there has been a major public relations campaign on behalf of the U.S. Army's Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD) to emphasize the amount of material that has passed through the system. What information has been forthcoming concerning operations has been primarily provided by Region IX EPA in the form of notices on permit modification requests (MODs) from PMCD and the eventual disposition of such requests.
The sheer number of MODs raises concerns about the capability of the facility to have been operating as permitted historically. It also calls into question the validity of the certification to Congress in 1993 of successful completion of the Operational Verification Testing (OVT) as required by law. As best we can calculate there were 357 Class I, 68 Class II and 3 Class III MODs approved for JACADS between July 1990 and July 1995.
Serious allegations have been made concerning many aspects of JACADS operations, management, safety and compliance over the period. Information has come forth reflecting the incapability to rectify specific design and compliance issues including agent releases; hazardous waste management, storage, disposal and tracking; reporting requirements; and more.
Several independent groups including the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Inc., the City Council for the City and County of Honolulu and the American Friends Service Committee Pacific Program have submitted comments on this permit renewal, all opposing issuing such a permit.
Problems at the Utah facility, the Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility (TOCDF) that mimic those having occurred at JACADS after corrections were supposed to have been implemented at JACADS cast doubt on the viability of the corrective actions taken at JACADS.
Finally, cost and schedule factors raise questions as to the capability of JACADS to actually be functioning in compliance with existing permits or future permits. For example, the projected cost of the JACADS operation in 1985 was $233 Million. The current cost is projected at more than $1.3 Billion. The projected schedule in 1985 was completion by 1995. The current completion date is 2001. Understanding the experimental nature of JACADS does little to mitigate the impact of the cost escalation and schedule slippage but rather undermines confidence in its ability to operate in a manner protective of the workers, the public and the environment. Alternative technologies for the processing of the remaining stockpile are available that would reduce the negative impacts of the current incineration treatment and offer a improved compliance capability.
The following comments will specifically address these observations and others to justify the Chemical Weapons Working Groups request for a denial of the renewal for the JACADS permit.
1) Waste Characterization: Based on emissions and residual waste characterization it appears that the exact nature of the agent and other waste streams being fed into the JACADS incinerators is not at the level required to meet the existing permit requirements. For example, admissions have come from PMCD at the TOCDF facility that they have been burning GB Ton Containers previously containing agent Lewisite (L). These admissions came only after citizens pointed to the levels of arsenic contained in the residual waste from these operations. It is suspected that the quantities of L are high enough to form "heals" of L that are being burned out of compliance with the permit. The final Risk Assessment Source Emissions Characterization (Appendix G -JACADS RA, Rev. O, December 30, 1996 APP-G-8) shows concentrations of arsenic above what would be expected based on the chemical analysis of "neat-agent" GB.
Further, information has come to our attention that various mixtures of agents and other materials have been historically mixed in efforts to develop variations on the standard agent components of the U.S. stockpile (VX, GB, H, HD, HT). Prior to issuance of a new permit for JACADS operations, EPA should require further analysis of the agent and other feed stocks to the JACADS incinerators. This should include analysis specifically for Lewisite.
2) Emissions (Stack/Fugitive) and the HHRA: The growing body of scientific evidence which focuses on the synergistic impact on the public health and the environment of emissions requires specific analysis. Army reports dating back to 1972, indicate knowledge of impacts of synergistic impacts of Chemical Agents and other material. (See "Experiments Designed to Evaluate the Additive and Synergistic Action of Military Chemical Agents With Toxic and Lethal Actions of Pesticides" [Q-005-1972]; "Potentiation of Agent Toxicity in Animals Previously Exposed to Commercial Insecticides"[A-748-1972]; Complementary Toxicological Effects of Plant Poisons and Chemical Agent in Mammals Veratune [Q-007-1972]). Previous or ongoing exposure to workers on Johnston Island (JI) to combinations of materials, including low-levels of Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) have not been adequately considered in the Human Health Risk Assessment (HHRA). According to the July 15, 1997 "Statement of Basis of Fact" on the JACADS renewal, EPA states that the "We have proposed changes from the existing permit which we believe will better protect human health and the environment." The CWWG feels that unless the synergistic impacts as referenced above, and more, are considered, the proposed changes do not go far enough to accomplish the level of protection as required in PL-99-145, that being, "maximum protection to the workers, the public and the environment."
3) Hazardous Waste Disposal, Tracking and Characterization: Prior to issuance of the new permit, the EPA should explain why such huge amounts of hazardous waste are being produced by JACADS operations, what these wastes consist of (specifically), and where they are going. Additionally, the methodology of classification of this waste reaching the mainland needs to be explained in context of the permit EPA is considering issuing, as this material is being allowed to be produced and shipped off island under the Region IX permit under consideration. Specifically, it is of particular interest to the CWWG that at least three mainland reception sites are incinerators, indicating that material that is supposed to be incinerated at JI is either being shipped to the mainland for secondary incineration, or not being incinerated on JI in the first place. (Letter from Region IX EPA to Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Inc. July 25, 1997)
4) Ventilation System: According to reports filed with Region IX under 40 CFR 264.56(j) and the JACADS RCRA Permit, there have been repeated problems with the HVAC system (including but not limited to 15 day reports # CD-CO-J- 7752; CD-CO-J-8117).
The two reports referenced are very recent, as recent as May and September 1997. Many similar ventilation problems have been reported over the period of JACADS operations. These types of problems continue to occur both at JACADS and TOCDF (See TOCDF Quality Assurance Specialist, Don Smith's Journal entries DS001247:2/7/97; DS0012545:2/6/97; DS001240;1/27/97 and others).
5) Charcoal Filter Gasket Problems: Another component of the HVAC system, the charcoal filter system, continues to experience regular problems at JACADS (See 15 day reports including but not limited to CDO-J-4076; letters to Region IX from Colonel James Coverstone dated April 6,10,11,18 and May 31, 1995). This problem has yet to be rectified as witness the exact same situation at TOCDF on it's second day of operation, August 23, 1996. If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be preforming as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS.
The appropriateness of the implemented solution at both JACADS and TOCDF of leaving the vents partially open on the "stand-by" and "back-up" filters in order to maintain pressure on the gaskets, and thereby keep them from leaking, has not been determined in context of the filter bank maintenance and replacement plan. The levels of agent being absorbed in the filters that were designed to replace those that are due for change out or failure should be considered prior to issuance of the JACADS permit. In addition, the possibility of "channeling," that being the direct breakthrough of agent in the filter banks has been raised by both JACADS and TOCDF employees. This potential route of agent directly into the environment should be investigated prior to permit issuance. These issues, taken in context of EPA's statement in the July 15, 1997 Statement of Basis Fact Sheet on the JACADS permit renewal which calls the carbon filter system "an important safety feature for both workers and the environment," can not be ignored.
6) Agent Releases: There have been at least four agent releases into the environment that can be documented. It is very possible that there have been more, many more. The reliability of the monitoring systems at JACADS (see next section) cast serious doubt on the true number of releases. The willingness of PMCD to notifying the regulatory authorities and/or the public is reflected in the March 13, 1995 issue of Inside The Army wherein PMCD spokesperson Suzanne Fournier said, " There is such a small trace that quite frankly I have problems with this information getting out to environmental activists." Ms. Fournier was commenting on a live agent detection outside the JACADS facility that occurred on March 2, 1995.
Again, such releases, if rectified at JACADS and passed along to TOCDF through the Lessons Learned Program, would seem to ensure better performance at TOCDF and boost confidence in JACADS operations. However, as recently as March 3, 1997, Tim Thomas, TOCDF Project Manager testified before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board that, "...we've [TOCDF] had a confirmed number of alarms on the pollution abatement stack of six.."
The CWWG respectfully requests that all common stack alarms and HVAC stack alarms reported during JACADS operations be thoroughly investigated by EPA. Under the circumstances, continued confirmed agent detections along with an admitted reluctance to be forthcoming with agent release information, undermines the credibility of assurances given by PMCD as to the actual number of agent releases at JACADS.
7) Alarm System Reliability: The day prior to the March 23,1994 agent release for which the Army was fined, the alarm reports show the following: ACAMS REPORT : Malfunctions: 21 and Alarms : 7 Alarms continue to ring off at an astonishing rate. Including, but not limited to, the following 15 Day Reports is reflected not only the number but the inadequate capability of PMCD to account for the causes of such alarms: CD-CO-J-8044; CD-CO-J- 7028; CD-CO-J-7044; CD-CO-J-6715; CD-CO-J-6361; CD-CO-J-6322; CD-CO- J-6291; CD-CO-J-6250; CD-CO-J-6224; CD-CO-J-6191; CD-CO-J-61146; CD- CO-J-6715; CD-CO-J-6087; and at least 30 additional incident reports currently in the possession of the CWWG. Note that several of these incident reports use words like "it was suspected that the cause of the alarm was ..." and/or "reported that the cause was indicative of an electrical problem in the alarm." Although meant to be presented as a final conclusion in the report which would fulfill required permit compliance in the future, these statements do not reflect an adequate capability to rectify the problem.
8) Power Loss and Agent Containment: The backup power system for JACADS is claimed to be able to replace power loss in time to continue uninterrupted processing during such events. At least three times this system has not operated as designed. According to our information, on August 16, 1996, August 28, 1996 and December 19,1996 the emergency generators failed to maintain negative pressure in the MDB as designed. There has been no information supplied to the CWWG to indicate how this problem has been rectified. Sometime in the first quarter of 1997, according to our information, a similar event took place at TOCDF.
If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be performing as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS.
9) Agent Migration (Corridors/MDB): Many of the alarm referenced to in section 6 (above) resulted in agent migrations to the upper and/or lower observation corridors. These incidents include but are not limited to incident reports CD-CO-J-8044; CD-CO-J-7028; CD-CO-J-7044. These same problems have been experienced numerous times at TOCDF since operations began August 22, 1996.
If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be performing as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS.
10) Reporting Requirements: The 1990-1996 JACADS Annual Reports of RCRA Noncompliances shows an unmistakable pattern of notification noncompliances within the RCRA regulations including, but not limited to 40 CFR 270.42; 40 CFR 264.341; 40 CFR 264.96; 40 CFR 264.196 (d)(2); 40 CFR 270.19. Noncompliance within RCRA Permit Condition VIII.4.A was also noted to have taken place at least 4 times during 1995.
With this consistent a pattern of inability or unwillingness to comply with the existing reporting standards, how does EPA plan to ensure and enforce compliance in the new permit requirements as denoted in Module I.E.16 ? Setting increased standards is one thing, but if Region IX has not been able to make PMCD comply with the existing less stringent reporting standards, what use is it to increase the requirements?
11) RCRA Inspection Schedules: Noting the many differences between the exiting permit and the proposed permit, the issue of ensuring compliance with the more stringent requirements contained in the proposed permit becomes relevant. It is our understanding that EPA does one inspection per year, depending on PMCD throughout the remaining period to report on compliance. This raises questions as to the integrity of all manner of "self-regulation" at JACADS.
For example, in the RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report on the inspection done by EPA on September 16-10, 1995, in the "Record Review" section (Pages 14-16 ) the Daily Operating Logs for the LIC/MPF/DFS/DUN, the Annotated Daily RCRA Alarm Reports and other Daily Reports. The period of time covered by those reports reviewed covered, on average, about two weeks to a month. Who selected which period out of the year to review and how compliance for the period not reviewed was assured is unknown. The reliability of sel- generated reports from the permittee to ensure compliance is also a concern.
The ACAMS Trend Reports review consisted of one day's records in the 1995 inspection, while the August 3-7,1994 Report does not even mention ACAMS Trend Reports being reviewed at all. Determining the reliability of, the accuracy of, and the compliance in the area of ACAMS alarms performance, by reviewing one day Trend Report over two years appears inadequate. The new permit calls for a "More comprehensive stack monitoring program." How this will be ensured based on the historical level of oversight is of concern. The CWWG would like to see a projected inspection plan by EPA for JACADS under the proposed permit.
12) Exceedences vs. Violations: The creative relationship established that differentiates between an "exceedence" and a "violation" at JACADS, crafted in what we assume were negotiations between Region IX and PMCD, remains a mystery to those of us interested in the operations of the facility. For example, the RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report of August 13-17, 1994, page 15 states that the exceedence under Module V, page V-20, agent stack emission concentration, represents a violation of the RCRA permit. To the agency's credit, this violation resulted in a fine. However, in the same report, page 17, the facility was storing hazardous waste in several areas not permitted as such under Module III, Table D2-1. This situation was classified as a "potential violation." It would seem that if hazardous waste is being stored in violation of the permit, then it is a violation, not a "potential" violation. Explain how there were 1436 non-operational and 50 operational exceedences during OVT and no violations throughout the same period, 1990 to August 1993.
13) Permit Modifications: The shear number of modifications over the life of JACADS operations is alarming. The CWWG appreciates Region IX's have kept them in the loop regarding these MODs. As best we can calculate there were 357 Class I, 68 Class II and 3 Class III MODs approved for JACADS between July 1990 and July 1995. It is of concern also that within 24 hours of receiving the current Temporary Authorization (TA) under which JACADS is currently operating, PMCD submitted 14 additional Class II permit modifications. The CWWG questions the timing of these MOD submissions and the potential impacts they may have had on the TA had they been submitted prior to the TA approval.
Of concern as well is the section on the Waste Analysis Plan, on page 15 of the EPA RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report, September 16-20, 1995. (See also Section 1 of these comments). In the Report it is noted that the analytical techniques part of the waste analysis plan were omitted from the MOD request or April 30, 1990, yet that MOD was approved by EPA (without this information) in May of 1991.
The omission was not discovered until 1994 . Following this, additional modifications to the waste analysis plan became effective in June 1995, by default, based on EPA's inaction on the MOD request. Further revisions to the waste analysis plan were submitted, some approved, some denied.
What this culminates in, in the eyes of the public, is a bureaucratic morass within which the waste analysis plan is seemingly out of control. Any deficiencies that may have been part of the August 15, 1994 MOD have therefore not been addressed. However, an additional waste analysis MOD was denied due to "technical discrepancies" in September 1995. Does this mean that JACADS has been operating out of compliance with the existing permit or applicable law? What components within the existing waste analysis plan are being exceeded, violated, or meet the Congressional directive of "Maximum Protection" remains unclear.
A complete analysis of the current waste analysis plan should be undertaken by EPA and made available to the public prior to any decision on the current permit.
14) OVT: The Secretary of Defense was required by Law to certify to Congress under, 50 USC Sec. 52 (k)(2), that the JACADS facility "successfully complete prove out of the equipment and facility at Johnston Atoll" prior to any activity for equipment prove out and systems test on the mainland. In light of the hundreds of modifications to the JACADS equipment and facility that have taken place since certification, August 24, 1993, including the more recent MODs of 1994-1997, the CWWG would request a through review and report by Region IX EPA on the standard by which the JACADS facility and equipment would be measured and considered to be identical between the period 1990 and 1994 and between 1994 and the present.
15) Upset Conditions: The CWWG would request a month to month analysis of the number of times JACADS has operated in upset or non-steady state operations since operations began in 1990. We would also request the specific causes and results, including, but not limited to, the number of Automatic Waste Feed Cutoffs that resulted from these conditions.
16) NEPA: What consideration has been given to alternative technologies in context of the National Research Council 's reports on alternative technologies (1993, 1994), the approval of alternative technologies by the Department of Defense for Maryland and Indiana (1997), and Section 8065 of the 1997 Defense Appropriations Bill.
The CWWG appreciates the willingness of Region IX EPA to accept these comments and looks forward to working with them as the U.S. mission of disposing of the stockpile of Chemical Weapons continues. It is the objective of the CWWG to ensure the safe and appropriate disposal while complying with all international obligations and Congressional law requiring "Maximum Protection of workers, the public and the environment."
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