COMMENTS OF GASP, OREGON CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB, OREGON WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING GROUP AND OTHER OREGON CITIZENS ON THE CLASS 3 PERMIT MODIFICATION REQUEST TO INCORPORATE RAYTHEON DEMILITARIZATION COMPANY AS CO-PERMITTEE

PERMIT NUMBER OR6 213 820 917

Submitted November 17, 1997

I) Background: In 1985 the Congress directed that the United States Stockpile of Chemical Weapons be disposed of (PL-99-145). Since that time the stockpiles have been identified as to their location and contents. One such stockpile resides at the Umatilla Army Depot Activity, (UMDA) Oregon and contains approximately 12.1% of the national stocks. This equates to approximately 3,717 tons of chemical warfare agents HD, GB and VX stored in various configurations including: Ton Containers, 155mm Projectiles, 8-inch Projectiles, M-55 Rockets, 500-lb Bombs, 750-lb Bombs, M-23 Landmines, M- 56 RKT Warheads and TMU-28 Spray Tanks. In January 1988 the Secretary of the Army made the Record of Decision (ROD) as to the method and location of the disposal facilities that would be deployed to fulfill PL-99-145. That ROD called for on-site disposal at each stockpile site using the Army's reverse- assembly and incineration process also known as Baseline.

The projected cost of disposing of the U.S. stockpile nationally, using Baseline, in 1985 was $1.7 Billion with a completion date of 1994. The current cost projection for completion is $15.6 Billion and a completion date of April 29, 2007 as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), ratified by the U.S. Senate on April 25, 1997. The CWC calls for a 10 year time period, with a one time five year extension, to complete the disposal mission. Implementing the extension, and thereby moving the date to 2012, would require approval of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as provided for by the CWC.

The previous Congressional deadline of December 31, 2004 as set by Congress in Title 50, Section 1521 Subsection (b) (5) of PL 104-133 has been superseded by Subsection (b) (2) of that law which states the following:

"If a treaty banning the possession of chemical agents and munitions is ratified by the United States, the date for completing the destruction of the United States' stockpile of such agents and munitions shall be the date established by such treaty."

Additionally, the Senate Treaty Resolutions on Ratification state the following:

Section (B) "The requirement in section 1412 of P-L 99-145 (USC 1521) for completion of the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of CW by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the U.S. by the deadline required by the Convention of April 29, 2007." and;

Section (D) "The President will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive Council of the OPCW for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Convention, if, as a result of the program of alternative technologies carried out under section 8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, (as contained in PL 104-208), the President determines that alternatives to incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention."

The President of the United States, in a letter to Senator Wendell Ford (D-KY), dated July 17, 1996, stated, "We will not pass on an opportunity to look for alternatives to incineration."

Finally, Section 8065 of PL 1054-208, directs efforts to "identify and demonstrate not less than two alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the demilitarization of assembled chemical munitions.", including those stored at UMDA. The program, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA), has identified seven technologies that have passed the initial criteria and those that pass the next level of evaluation will move to demonstrations as required under Sec. 8065. Demonstrations are scheduled to be completed by November 1998 and reported back to Congress by the required date of December 31, 1998.

II) Oregon Permit: On February 12, 1997 the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) issued a Hazardous Waste Permit to the U.S. Army for the Umatilla Chemical Disposal Facility (UMCDF) Baseline facility at UMDA. February 15, 1997 the Army awarded Raytheon Demilitarization Company (hereafter referred to as RDC or Raytheon) the contract for the UMCDF.

Subsequent to that, in March,1997, the Army submitted a Class 3 permit modification requesting to incorporate Raytheon Demilitarization Company (RDC) as a Co-Permittee on the Hazardous Waste Permit. It is concerning that modification that the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has called for comments.

It is our contention that it is improper to modify the existing permit because it is, in and of itself, void and illegal due to violations by the EQC/DEQ under 40 CFR270.10; 40 CFR 270.11 and ORS 466.120.

40 CFR 270.10 (b) states that, "When a facility is owned by one person but is operated by another person, it is the operator's duty to obtain a permit, except that the owner must also sign the permit application." (emphasis added)

40 CFR 270.11 (a) (1) states that "All applications, for a corporation, shall be signed by a responsible corporate officer." (emphasis added)

ORS 466.120 (5) requires the application information to operate a hazardous waste storage or treatment site shall include at a minimum: "The names of any persons who will be responsible for managing the operation of the site and a statement of the qualifications of such persons." (emphasis added)

In the 1995 JACADS Annual Report of RCRA Noncompliances, Revised 15 March, 1996 the Army states, "JACADS is operated by the Operations and Maintenance Contractor, Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc." (emphasis added)

Neither a responsible corporate officer's signature of Raytheon, nor Raytheon's name as operator appears on the application approved by EQC on February 12, 1997. It may be appropriate to add an operator under circumstances different than these, where there has been a legitimate change in operators. A permit modification in the current case is inappropriate in regard to and can not cure a defective permit issuance in violation of Section 40 CFR270.10; 40 CFR 270.11 and ORS Section 466.120, where, such as here, it has been known by both the applicant and the Agency from day one that some party other than the applicant would operate the facility.

Furthermore, it is our contention that the "Proposed Changes to Signature Page"; "Proposed Changes to Introduction Page"; Proposed Changes to Definitions Pages" and "Summary of Proposed Permit Condition Modifications" to change the Army from "Owner" to "Owner and Operator" and Raytheon to "Co-Operator" are admissions by the Agency of their having violated 40 CFR270.10 , 40 CFR 270.11 and ORS 466.120 and an attempt to quietly rectify and improperly dispose of these violations.

Furthermore, it is our contention that Proposed Revised Permit Conditions II.M and I.X reflect the Agency having been aware of the violations of 40 CFR270.10, 40 CFR 270.11 and ORS 466.120 and is a further attempt to quietly rectify and improperly dispose of these violations.

Modifying the signatory Requirement (Section I.X) to include the operators, Raytheon Demilitarization Company, post facto to the application and issuance confirms the violations stated above in reference to 40 CFR270.10, 40 CFR 270.11 and ORS 466.120.

These objections duly noted for the record, the following comments are hereby submitted.

III) MOD Requirements:

Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 466.060 states the criteria to be met by owner and operator before issuance of a permit. Specifically, the ORS requires that the owner and operator must demonstrate they: "...have adequate financial and technical capability to properly construct and operate the facility;" and, that; (emphasis added) "The compliance history of the owner including any present company of the owner and the operator in owning and operating other similar facilities, if any, indicates an ability and willingness to operate the proposed facility in compliance with the provisions of ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 466.890 or any condition imposed on the Permittee by the commission." (emphasis added).

It is our contention that Raytheon fails under both these requirements and therefore requests that the modification under consideration be DENIED.

A) Does Raytheon Demilitarization Company, "...have adequate financial and technical capability to properly construct and operate the facility?"

1) Technical Capability: The JACADS Experience:

Raytheon operates the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) as part of the Army's effort to fulfill PL 99-145.

Presentations made to Congress in 1987 (Report AMCPM-CD-FR-87109) projected the cost of operations to complete the disposal at JACADS would cost $233 Million. Current cost projections for completion are $1.3 Billion (Testimony of General Walter Busbee, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization [PMCD], Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, April, 1994).

Presentations of completion by 1995 were made to Congress in 1990 (Statement by Assistant Secretary of the Army before Senate Armed Services Committee, April 5, 1990). The current projected completion date is 2001, (Army Permit Renewal Application [EPA ID # TTO-570-090-001], February 27, 1995).

This translates to a cost over run of approximately 550% and a schedule slippage of approximately 6 years, demonstrating Raytheon's inadequate technical capability to operate a similar facility at UMDA. Understanding the experimental nature of JACADS does little to mitigate the impact of the cost escalation and schedule slippage but rather undermines confidence in its ability to operate in a manner offering "Maximum Protection of the workers, the public and the environment," as required under PL 99-145.

Operations at the JACADS facility require significant consideration in the context of the modifications to the DEQ permit which are the subject of these comments.

The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) has been operating intermittently since July 1990. Raytheon is the JACADS operator. Since beginning operations there has been an overwhelming lack of information provided to the public concerning JACADS operational performance. At the same time there has been a major public relations campaign on behalf of the U.S. Army's Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD) and Raytheon to emphasize the amount of material that has passed through the system. What information has been forthcoming concerning operations has been primarily provided by Region IX EPA in the form of notices on permit modification requests (MODs) from PMCD and the eventual disposition of such requests, or Freedom of Information Requests submitted to PMCD.

The sheer number of JACADS MODs since operations began raises concerns about the capability of the facility to have been operating as permitted. It also calls into question the validity of the certification to Congress in 1993 of successful completion of the Operational Verification Testing (OVT) as required by 50 USC Sec. 1521(k)(2). As best we can calculate there were 357 Class I, 68 Class II and 3 Class III MODs approved for JACADS between July 1990 and July 1995.

Serious allegations have been made concerning many aspects of JACADS operations, management, safety and compliance over the period. Information has come forth reflecting the incapability to rectify specific design and compliance issues including agent: releases; hazardous waste management, storage, disposal and tracking; reporting requirements; and more.

Several independent groups including the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Inc.; The City Council for the City and County of Honolulu; and The American Friends Service Committee Pacific Program have submitted comments on this permit renewal, all opposing permit renewal based on RDC's past performance.

Problems at the Utah facility, the Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility (TOCDF) that mimic those having occurred at JACADS, after corrections were supposed to have been implemented at JACADS, cast doubt on the viability of the corrective actions taken at JACADS and the ability of RDC's having the technical capability to operate the facility. The following are specific areas which reflect RDC's inadequate technical capability to operate UMCDF.

2) Waste Characterization: Based on emissions and residual waste characterization it appears that the exact nature of the agent and other waste streams being fed into the JACADS incinerators is not at the level required to meet the existing permit requirements (40CFR) 270.19(a)(2) and (c)(1)(i-v) and 270.14(b)(1-2) and ORS 466.105 and others. For example, admissions have been made by PMCD at the TOCDF facility that they have been burning GB Ton Containers previously containing agent Lewisite (L). These admissions came only after citizens pointed to the levels of arsenic contained in the residual waste from these operations. It is suspected that the quantities of L are high enough to form "heels" of L that are being burned out of compliance with the permit. The final Risk Assessment Source Emissions Characterization (Appendix G -JACADS RA, Rev. O, December 30, 1996 APP-G-8) shows concentrations of arsenic above what would be expected based on the chemical analysis of "neat-agent" GB. This indicates that material other than GB, is being illegally burned at JACADS.

Further, information has come to our attention that various mixtures of agents and other materials have been previously mixed in efforts to develop variations on the standard agent components of the U.S. stockpile (VX, GB, H, HD, HT). Prior to approval of the MOD, DEQ should require further analysis of the agent and other feed stocks to the UMCDF incinerators.

The inability of RDC to properly characterize agent undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

3) Emissions (Stack/Fugitive) and the QRA & HRA: The growing body of scientific evidence which focuses on the synergistic impact on the public health and the environment of emissions requires specific analysis. Army reports dating back to 1972, indicate knowledge of impacts of synergistic impacts of Chemical Agents and other material. (See "Experiments Designed to Evaluate the Additive and Synergistic Action of Military Chemical Agents With Toxic and Lethal Actions of Pesticides" [Q-005-1972]; "Potentiation of Agent Toxicity in Animals Previously Exposed to Commercial Insecticides"[A-748-1972]; Complementary Toxicological Effects of Plant Poisons and Chemical Agent in Mammals Veratune [Q-007-1972]). Previous, ongoing or future exposure to workers and/or the public on Johnston Island (JI) or in Oregon to combinations of materials, including low-levels of Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) have not been adequately considered in the Human Health Risk Assessment (HRA). According to the July 15, 1997 "Statement of Basis of Fact" on the JACADS renewal, EPA states that the "We have proposed changes from the existing permit which we believe will better protect human health and the environment." The commentors feel that unless the synergistic impacts as referenced above, and more, are considered, the proposed MOD does not go far enough to accomplish the level of protection as required in PL-99-145, that being, "Maximum Protection to the workers, the public and the environment."

In addition to the above, commentors submit the following (A-C) as evidence of the severe shortcomings in the consideration given the impact of low-level chemical warfare agent exposures on their own or synergistically and the unreliability of the facts submitted to the EQC regarding the QRA and HRA in the permit application around which this MOD is being considered.

A) Applicability to the MOD Under Consideration:

Raytheon's obligation at Johnston Island (JI), under Congressional directive (50 U.S.C. Sec: 1521 (k)(2), was to demonstrate and prove-out the technology, baseline reverse-assembly and incineration, prior to deployment on the mainland United States. Mainland sites, including TOCDF in Utah, and UMCDF in Oregon, were and are dependant on successful completion of RDC's JI mission. Recurring problems at TOCDF similar to those identified and ongoing at JI demonstrate RDC's failure to do so either under the OVT Congressional directive and/or the CSDP mandate to insure that the U.S. Stockpile is destroyed , "while offering Maximum Protection to the workers, the public, and the environment." (PL 99-145).

Further, the oversight and ultimate accountability to Congress and all federal and state regulatory agencies by PMCD as executive agent, at all such disposal facilities, be they contracted by the same or different contractors, inextricably links the performance and compliance history of any and all existing CSDP sites to the UMCDF.

Further, PMCD has been a source of misconduct and illegal and dangerous activities at JI where RDC has allowed this to exist while performing under contract to PMCD. This indicates that RDC will follow the same pattern of complying with PMCD's requests if allowed to operate UMCDF. Oregon DEQ is obligated to deny RDC the MOD if they recognize that RDC, based on their past performance, will not stand up and refuse to comply with PMCD's illegal and or dangerous directives.

Finally, information brought to DEQ's attention in the following section of the MOD comments will demonstrate that there has been an intentional effort by PMCD and RDC to ignore and cover up known evidence of the threat of low- level agent exposure which exists at JACADS. This activity is covered under the definition of hazardous waste either as the agents exist in their current form or their by-products under ORS 466.005 (b)(A) and (B); 446.010 (1) (a) and (b) (A) and (B) and others.

This behavior of ignoring and covering up such health impacts would likely continue at UMCDF thereby violating the immediate reporting requirement contained in ORS 466 and OAR 340 among others.

Therefore, commentors present DEQ and EQC sections 1-3 below, as applicable to the MOD currently under consideration.

1) Reliability of Information Provided to the EQC and DEQ:

a) The Gulf:

In the "Report of Investigation Concerning the Missing U.S. Central Command Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Desk Logs by Office of Inspector General (IG) Department of Defense" (October 20, 1997), the IG concludes that "although directives, regulations, and internal U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Operations Center (JOC) J1 (Administration) memoranda required that Gulf War records be retained, safeguarded and archived as permanent records, the logs, in their entirety, were not safeguarded and archived by CENTCOM." (Pg. 27)

b) The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP):

Performance at JACADS by RDC is relevant to the MOD under consideration regarding the issues noted in the IG report. Additionally, since the CSDP has been declared as a Major Acquisition Program under DoD authority, with PMCD the executive agency, information concerning TOCDF operations are relevant to the Oregon MOD under consideration. Therefore commentors present the following:

" The noncompliances may be indicative of the need for improvements in quality control, standing operating procedures, record keeping, and personnel training." ( Summary Evaluation of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). MITRE Report, May, 1993 MTR 93W0000036 - Pg. 3-7).

"A detailed review of the RCRA permit showed over one hundred ambiguities, errors, omissions, and other problems in the permit itself. Many of the failure events observed indicated deficiencies in procedures, training or management priorities." (Evaluation of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System. National Research Council 1994 - Pg. 7).

"A system for documenting and tracking unexpected upsets, errors, failures, and other sources of problems that have led to "near misses" during operations of the facility should be developed as soon as possible." (NRC: Review of Systemization of the TOCDF, March, 1996-Pg. 79)

"Training and Management is comprised of seemingly unconnected events and is not currently adequate for developing required management skills." (An evaluation of Safety and Management at the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility, IHI Environmental & The Ralston Consulting Group, September 25, 1997).

The incapability of the military to follow their own directives and safeguard records concerning chemical weapons activities in the Gulf War, undermines credibility of their or their contractors to accurately document, retain, safeguard and archive records and logs in relation to their Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, and their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

2) Recent Congressional Findings Relating to Low-level Agent Exposure:

a) The Gulf

In the Report, "Gulf War Veterans' Illness: VA, DoD Continue to Resist Strong Evidence Linking Toxic Causes to Chronic Health Effects", Oversight Report of the Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, October, 1997. Adopted Unanimously by the Full Committee of the 105th Congress, 1st Session, November 5, 1997 is found the following:

"The Subcommittee finds the status of efforts on Gulf War issues by the....Department of Defense... to be irreparably flawed. We find those efforts hobbled by institutional inertia that mistakes motion for progress. We find those efforts plagued by arrogant incuriosity and a pervasive myopia that sees a lack of evidence as proof." (Pg. 1)

"The Subcommittee has examined studies of effects of low level chemical exposures on humans and animals...organophosphates that are chemically related to sarin and other warfare agents present in the Gulf War theater." (Pg. 9)

The following are findings and testimony excerpted from the Subcommittee Report:

1) Finding # 1: VA and DoD did not listen to sick Gulf War Veterans as to possible causes of their illness:

a) The Gulf: Alarms

"I heard chemical alarms sound. When I asked if these alarms meant chemicals had been detected, I was told that the chemical alarms had malfunctioned." (Col. Gilbert Roman, Deputy Commander, 311 Evacuation Hospital) (Pg. 14).

According to the Committee, " Thousands of chemical alarms sounded...only to be ignored by U.S. Commanders." (Pg.18)

Dr. Ted Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Matters, testified in Senate Hearings that, "Each of the nearly 14,000 M8A1 detector alarms deployed in the theater went off on average of two or three times a day." (Pg. 86)

Dr. Johathan Tucker, Director of the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Project, Monterey (CA) Institute for International Studies and former senior policy analyst to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illness, "DoD officials insist that all chemical agent detections by U.S. forces in the Gulf were false." (Pg. 21)

b) The CSDP: Alarms

In the report "Review of Monitoring Activities Within the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program," National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 1994 stated, " The major finding of the committee is that the monitoring system currently in use at JACADS should be improved prior to employment at sites in the continental United States. Critical to operation of chemical demilitarization facilities is the ability to monitor for the presence of agent in the effluent gases, the workplace, and the surrounding environment sufficiently quickly to alert operators to any release." (emphasis added)

In their 1996 report, "Systemization of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility," the National Academy of Sciences stated, "However, when the implementation of committee recommendations required significant research and development to create or identify new technology, the Army's response has been tentative and less effective. This is partially attributable to the fact that the CSDP is a major defense acquisition program attempting to slow cost growth attributable to previously unbudgeted requirements. In addition, the agent monitoring program did not have experience in procuring and managing research and development and has been slow to master these new skills." (emphasis added)

The 1996 NAS report concludes, "However, additional research and development, either by the Army's laboratory programs or by outside contractors, has not been initiated yet so that additional technologies that might provide longer term upgrades in monitoring capabilities can be tested and promoted." (emphasis added)

In deposition given in Federal Court in Utah, John Cluff, Assistant Program Manager for Systemization and Operations at TOCDF stated: (July 1996)

Q) Do you know whether the alarm systems used at TOCDF are identical to those used at JACADS?
A) Generally speaking they are.
Q) Are they the same brand and model?
A) Yes, sir. (Dep. Tr. 154)
Q) Has there been any alteration, modification of the alarm system at TOCDF in response to the experience with those alarms at JACADS?
A) Not that I'm aware of. (Dep. Tr. 156)

JACADS OVT Alarms:

According to CWWG calculations there were approximately 4,630 process alarms at JACADS during the one and a half year OVT. This averages out to 8.46 alarms per day. These calculations are validated by the following citations within the OVT campaign analysis by the MITRE Corporation.

"During the 500 hours of operation of the GB OVT campaign at JACADS, the network of monitors for detecting GB releases triggered 776 major process alarms, an average of 22 per day. "( Menke et al., 1991) (emphasis added)

"During the 472.8 hours of actual processing time of the VX campaign, some 3,691 major process alarms--more than 7 alarms per operating hour occurred." (Menke et al., 1991) (emphasis added)

"A total of 117 stop feed alarms occurred during the HD Ton Container test." (Menke et al., 1991).

" There were 15 alarm instances from the PAS common stack ACAMS and 31 alarm instances by the duct ACAMS during the HD projectile test." (Menke et al., 1991)

TOCDF Alarms:

Testimony given about alarms at the Utah incinerator (TOCDF) by the Army's Project Manager, Tim Thomas, contains the following exchange:

Q) How many stack alarms have occurred at TOCDF?
A) We see maybe one every week or two weeks.
Q) Is it your opinion that your certain that these alarms are not caused by agent releases?
A) Yes, I am certain of that.
Q) So what chemicals caused these alarms?
A) We don't know.
Q) You're sure it's not agent, but you 're not sure what it is? A) We're sure it's not agent.
Q) Have you ever been asked to do a validation test to determine that the stack alarms can detect agent in the stack gas?
A) I don't recall. (Transcript: March 3, 1997 Pgs. 109-114)

The incapability of the military to identify and confirm the cause of alarms in the Gulf and TOCDF and JACADS, undermines credibility of their or their contractors ability to accurately certify causes of alarms in relation to their Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, and their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

c) The Gulf: Ignoring Information:

According to Patrick Eddington, former CIA analyst, the CIA went out of its way to ignore and exclude the opinions of U.S. veterans from its official investigation. "There is no question the CIA made a concerted effort to exclude entire classes of information from its inquiry." (Pg. 83)

"A former VA health official said that many physicians displayed an unwillingness to consider veterans accounts of toxic exposure when prescribing treatment." (Pg. 85)

The Report states: "VA physicians had good reason to pursue contamination hypotheses, given the extremely high rates of veterans reporting such exposures." (Pg. 83

The Report concludes that "these combined statements demonstrate a systematic failure to incorporate evidence of toxic exposures into so-called 'Gulf War Illness' research, diagnosis, and treatment." (Pg. 83)

d) The CSDP: Ignoring Information

September 1994: Chief Safety Officer, Steve Jones is fired for refusing to ignore over 3,000 safety violations at TOCDF, 150 of which are classified as "Imminent/Catastrophic." Mr. Jones filed a DoL Wrongful Termination Act claim and was found for by the Department and awarded his job back and a half million dollars or in lieu of being rehired, a million dollars.(Depositions/Testimony/DoL Complaint/Ruling available).
March 1995: Former JACADS Comptroller, Charles Oughton stated, "Costs of JACADS continued to increase due to technical problems by bypassing the Procurement Officer and going directly to PMCD. The auditors were the same people in charge of the program (PMCD). The equipment at JACADS is a mechanical nightmare. 'Anything goes as long as the program can move ahead', has been the basis of operations at JACADS since day one.". (Tape available)
July 1995: Technical Engineer, John Hall is retaliated against for reporting safety hazards including cracks in the superstructure of TOCDF. (Deposition and Testimony available).
February 1996: Former JACADS Haz-Mat Team Member, "John Doe" brought information forward to the CWWG and a member Congress stating the following; "I worked beside the Haz-Mat commander and I witnessed the falsifying of documents; There's been no training in Haz-Mat in years out there; ACAMS go off quite frequently; I don't think they can do the state-side operations safely;" and many additional relevant statements concerning JACADS noncompliance. (Tape/Memo of 3/14/97 available under seal).
April 1996: Former Raytheon Quality Assurance Inspector, Bill Coeller, said, "My concern is how they're running the Quality Control and Quality Assurance Program out there (JACADS); We didn't have qualified inspectors doing mechanical and welding out there; On the night shift we had no engineers due to cost savings considerations." (Tape available)
October 1996: TOCDF Plant General Manager, Gary Millar is fired for "my efforts to address safety and environmental concerns." (Millar letters and Logs available)
March 23, 1997: Former TOCDF NREMT/Health Technician, James DeHaven files a complaint with OSHA's Health and Safety Office claiming systematic harassment by PMCD for his reporting concerns of worker exposure to chemical warfare agents. (OSHA complaint available).
April, 1997: Chief of Hazardous Waste Management, Trina Allen is demoted and later resigns for raising safety and compliance issues at TOCDF including the illegal burning of Lewisite, inaccurate Haz-waste management, analysis, tracking and disposal. (Deposition/DoL Complaint available).
April 1, 1997: A consultant contracted by PMCD, "John Doe" stated that PMCD and Raytheon knew of improper operations at JACADS for up to a year. "John Doe" stated that PMCD and Raytheon "made the decision to continue operating the incinerator to destroy chemical agent anyway and that it was their opinion that it was easier to ask for forgiveness than to get permission." (Affidavit available under seal, emphasis added).
April, 12, 1997: Former Clinical Laboratory Scientist, "John Doe", at JACADS in 1993 and 1996-97 wrote to the U.S. Senate stating, "I have serious concerns for the safety of the facility's workers. The safeguards are often ignored and covered up by the contractors...The effects of nerve agents and the fragility of some of the delivery systems pose a catastrophic risk to plant workers and any civilian population downwind of these new (mainland) plants. While I was in training it was impressed on me that safety was the primary mission at the facility, in reality, profit is more important to the contractors. The incidents I have observed are a source of mistrust and criminal in nature, not simply human error." (Letter available under seal, emphasis added).

The recurring pattern of ignoring information by the military of relevant information in the Gulf and TOCDF and JACADS, undermines credibility of their or their contractors ability to assure Oregon DEQ that they are giving adequate attention to such information in relation to their Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, and their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

2) Finding # 2: The presence of a variety of toxic agents in the Gulf War theater strongly suggests exposures have a role in causing, triggering or amplifying subsequent service-connected illness.

a) The Gulf: Agent Exposures

"Dr. Bernard Rostker, Special Assistant for Persian Gulf War Illnesses at DoD concedes that additional incidents involving chemical agents and other toxins can't be ruled out."(Pg. 90)

"According to a study by Dr. Will Longstreth, Professor of Neurology at the University of Washington School of Medicine, people exposed to organophosphate compounds, such as pesticides and other chemicals, may be at twice the risk of developing ALS (Lou Gehrig's Disease)." (Pg. 17) Dr. Garth Nicolson, Chief Scientific Officer and Research Professor at the Institute for Molecular Medicine, states that, " Gulf War Illness is caused by multiple exposures to chemical, environmental, radiological and/or biological agents that cause chronic multisystem signs and symptoms that for the most part can be diagnosed as existing diseases. " (Pg. 31)

Dr. Nicolson also states, "Chemical exposure can cause toxicological effects and produce many but not all of the signs and symptoms of Gulf War Illness. In addition, chemical exposures can result in immunosuppression and leave an individual susceptible to infections." Pg. 32)

"U.S. troops who served in the Gulf were exposed to multiple toxins, any one of which-- alone or a combination of toxins producing a synergistic interaction-- may well be responsible for the illness reported by thousands of veterans." Committee Statement (Pg. 26)

The Committee states, "To the extent to which they were able to ascertain, scientists have confirmed that the nature of the symptoms associated with Gulf War Illness is also consistent with presumed exposures during the war." (Pg. 91)

The report concludes, "The existence of a variety of toxic agents in the Gulf is well-established, and confirmed by a host of witnesses, documents, and facts. While research has yet to cement the link between toxic exposures and delayed, chronic illness, the timing, nature, and frequency of undiagnosed illness among Gulf War veterans strongly suggest such a link does exist and will, given the appropriate interest, funding and support, be confirmed." (Pg.92)

b) The CSDP: Agent Exposures

There have been repeated agent migrations at the two operating chemical weapons incinerators. At the RDC operated JACADS incinerator the following 15 Day Incident Reports reflect not only the number but the inadequate capability of PMCD to account for the causes of such agent detections in areas often occupied by unprotected workers: CD-CO-J-8044; CD-CO-J-7028; CD- CO-J-7044; CD-CO-J-6715; CD-CO-J-6361; CD-CO-J-6322; CD-CO-J-6291; CD-CO-J-6250; CD-CO-J-6224; CD-CO-J-6191; CD-CO-J-61146; CD-CO-J- 6715; CD-CO-J-6087; and at least 30 additional incident reports currently in the possession of the CWWG. (Incident Reports available)

According to Roger Wood, former employee at JACADS; " In November 1990, he and Paul Nelson were exposed to agent GB during a 'hot cutout' incident." According to Mr. Wood; "This was the 3rd or 4th such incident for Mr. Nelson. In this incident, both our suits (DPEs) were covered with GB. After four hours, we were still unable to scrub the agent off our suits. We could not leave the toxic area due to the high levels of agent on our suits, so we had to be cut out of our gear. Blood was drawn after the incident, but I was never able to obtain my medical records." (Telephone interview with Roger Woods: Nov. 14, 1997/Statement available)

At TOCDF, the second day of operations, August 24, 1996, unprotected workers entered the charcoal filter bank vestibule and were exposed to low levels of sarin. Since then the pattern of agent migration has followed that of JACADS. On April 21 and again on April 22, 1997, workers were exposed to sarin levels in excess of protection standards of the gear (Level B) they were wearing.

Low-level exposures to workers is routine at both facilities, and release of agent out of the stack into the environment is an accepted part of the treatment process.

The recurring pattern of agent exposures to workers at TOCDF and JACADS, undermines the credibility of the military and their contractors in the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, and their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

3) Finding # 6: VA and DoD Health registry diagnosis protocols continue to be based on the unwarranted conclusion that, unless there is an immediate and acute reaction, exposures to chemical weapons and other toxins do not cause delayed or chronic symptoms:

a) The Gulf: Safe Levels of Exposure

"According to Dr. Johathan Tucker, Director of the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Project, Monterey (CA) Institute for International Studies, " Considerable information presents a variety of evidence indicating Coalition troops were exposed to low levels of chemical warfare agents. They appear to have resulted in delayed health problems in many of the exposed troops." (Pg. 20)

Dr. Howard Urnovitz, Chairman of the Calptye Biomedical Corporation and founder of the Chronic Illness Foundation stated, " Syndromes associated with organophosphate induced delayed neuropathy could explain many of the observed and unexplained illness." (Pg. 31)

Dr. Somani, Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at Southern Illinois University of Medicine stated, "Behavioral deficits [in primates] can be reliably detected in the absence of any overt [acute] signs of toxicity." (Pg. 47)

A study by Dr. Karlheinz Lohs, "Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents" (1974) concludes, "even in the case of exposure to very slight amounts [of low level mustard agents] which do not necessarily bring on acute symptoms, toxic reactions may later set in." (Pg. 45)

Results of the United States Air Force Armstrong Laboratory study, 1992 concluded, "Behavioral deficits [in primates] can be reliably detected in the absence of any overt [acute] signs of toxicity. This is extremely important when assessing the effects of low-level exposures to extremely toxic compounds such as organophosphate nerve agents." (Pg. 47)

b) The CSDP: Safe Levels of Exposure

August 24, 1996: Unprotected TOCDF workers enter agent contaminated HVAC vestibule area and alarms ring off. Since no acute symptoms are noted, workers are declared unexposed.
April 21, 1997: TOCDF workers enter a toxic area in Level B gear (protective to 50 TWA exposure). Alarms sound and reading show 1223 TWA. Workers blood is drawn for cholinesterase level measurement, but no neuropathy or other exam is administrated. Cholinesterase levels show no depression, therefore workers are declared unexposed. (Safety and Management at the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility, IHI Environmental & The Ralston Consulting Group, September 25, 1997).
April 22, 1997: Workers at TOCDF enter toxic area in protective gear not approved for this area. Alarms sound and workers are exposed. Workers blood is drawn for cholinesterase level measurement, but no neuropathy or other exam is administrated. Cholinesterase levels show no depression, therefore workers are declared unexposed. (Safety and Management at the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility, IHI Environmental & The Ralston Consulting Group, September 25, 1997).

The National Research Council (NRC) stated, "The Health Risk Assessment (HRA) does not address public risk; thus the health risk from normal operations cannot be put into the same framework. The HRA sets a criterion for a 'maximally-exposed person' but does not evaluate the number of individuals who might be exposed at that or lower levels." (Risk Assessment and Management: National Research Council, 1997. Pg. 38).

The same NRC Report states, "Latent risks to workers from exposure were calculated but not included in the results (of the QRA). One of the reasons given was, 'No study of routine exposures has been done because no problem is apparent'." ((Pg. 17-18, emphasis added)

In the Human Health section of the Army's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Oregon incinerator, May, 1996 (Pg. 4-10), the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS) is referenced for chronic health effects information. The FPEIS, in section B.2.3.2 (GB agent) states, "...there were alterations in the EGG patterns up to 1 year after exposure." and, "...there were greater differences in EEG patterns of the animals that received the series of smaller doses. This suggests it is the total amount of GB received and not the presence of clinical symptoms that determined the degree of EEG alteration." However, the conclusion states, "...the meaning of altered EEGs is not clear, and at this point it is not certain whether long-term exposure to GB could result in permanent brain dysfunction." (Pg. B-45-47, emphasis added)

Section B.2.3.3 (VX agent) of the FPEIS states, "...there is concern that brain dysfunction could occur following either acute or chronic exposure to VX." The FPEIS concludes, "More information is needed in this area before a decision can be made about the possibility of this chronic health effect." (Pg.B-48, emphasis added).

Commentors submit that the evidence presented and referenced to in the House Committee Report has not been adequately considered in the Oregon SEIS.

The avoidance of incorporating recent and previously existing evidence concerning low level agent exposure impacts by the DoD, NRC, DoA and RDC is the same attitude the House Committee noted of the DoD when it stated, "We find those efforts plagued by arrogant incuriosity and a pervasive myopia that sees a lack of evidence as proof." (House Government Reform and Oversight Committee Report, Pg. 1) The consistent ignoring of the scientific evidence concerning health impacts of low level agent exposures to workers and the public at TOCDF and JACADS, undermines the credibility of the military and their contractors in the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, concerning their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

4) Finding #7: Prematurely ruling out toxic exposures as causative, VA and DoD doctors relied on diagnoses or somataform disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) to explain Gulf War veterans' Illness. and;
Finding 8: There is no credible evidence that stress or PTSD causes the illness reported by many Gulf War veterans:

a) The Gulf: Stress vs Exposure

The Committee found that, "DoD assumed, in the absence of definitive medical evidence in support of this position [Finding # 7] or to the contrary, that many PGW illnesses were attributable to PTSD and stress, and they did not consider toxic exposures." (Pg. 101)

"Dr. Garth Nicolson, Chief Scientific Officer with the Institute for Molecular Medicine concurs. He believes "the symptoms are indicative of something else-- not stress or PTSD, but exposure to a combination of chemical or biological agents." (Pg. 104)

A study conducted by Dr. Robert Haley and colleagues at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas concluded that PGW veterans illness were attributable to "subtle brain, spinal cord and nerve damage-but not stress. The damage was caused by exposure to combinations of low-level chemical nerve agents and other chemicals." (Pg. 119)

Dr. Claudia Miller of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at San Antonio and a member of the VA's Gulf War Expert Scientific Committee, testified before the Committee that, "Stress may be a contributor to these health problems but we should be looking at potential chemical causes."

b) The CSDP: Stress vs Exposure

At a presentation given two months after TOCDF began processing agent, TOCDF psychiatrist, Dr. Hutchins stated that he "perceived morale as extremely low and stress as very high." (October 2, 1996).

Workers are routinely given time off for stress related ailments, when in fact they are reporting other health problems, according to former Chief of Hazardous Waste Management, Trina Allen. (By telephone, November 10, 1997).

Many of the workers who have been fired or resigned have been placed on anti- depressants for "stress," according to former Engineering Technician, John Hall. Mr. Hall suffered from symptoms similar to GWI, but was put on medication for stress. (By telephone, November 10, 1997). The continuing pattern of attributing workers health related problems to stress at TOCDF and JACADS, undermines the credibility of the military and their contractors in the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, concerning their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

5) Finding # 11:Exposures to low levels of chemical warfare agents and other toxins can cause delayed, chronic health effects:

a) The Gulf: Advocacy Science

In this finding, the Committee asserts that, "It is apparent that DoD and FDA did not evaluate and recognize the importance of the existing body of scientific literature on chronic health effects resulting from chemical warfare exposure and resulting delayed neurotoxicity."

Dr. Satu Somani, Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at Southern Illinois University of Medicine, testified that, "The literature suggests that sarin (GB) can be responsible for delayed neurotoxic effects which may not appear until years after a low level of exposure...Insecticides, insect repellants and other chemicals can also contribute to neurotoxic effects of nerve agents as sarin, soman, tabun and VX...Although we have a treatment for a single dose toxicity, there is no treatment, however for the delayed neurotoxicity." (Pg. 41). Dr. Somani continues, " Delayed neurotoxicity was first reported in the 1950's, and can occur 5 or 10 years after exposure to nerve agents. Studies have shown that organophosphate induced delayed neurotoxicity is due to inhibitions of neurotoxic esterase enzyme in the nervous system, and histopathological axonal degeneration." (Pg. 42)

Dr. Claudia Miller of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at San Antonio testified that, These illnesses {chronic illnesses and chemical intolerances} follow low level exposure to various chemicals, including pesticides, solvents and combustion products." (Pg. 43, emphasis added). Dr. Miller also stated, "I think it is premature for anyone to say that low levels of organophosphate cannot cause chronic health problems. There is a lot of literature now suggesting that is quite a possibility." (Pg. 44)

Dr. Stephanie Padilla, Environmental Protection Agency neurotoxicology expert testified, "Exposure to organophosphate may produce residual adverse effects..." and cause "...organophosphatee-induced-delayed-neuropathy. Recent studies...indicate there may be long-term health effects associated with exposure." (Pg.45)

Albert Donnay, Executive Director of the Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Referral & Resources in Baltimore submitted, "...the DoD failed to consider how these [chemical agents and pesticides] have interacted synergistically.." (Pg. 43)

Dr. Frank Duffy, Associate Professor of Neurology, Harvard University Medical School stated that "low levels of exposure to the nerve agent sarin can produce long-lasting effects. It was perfectly clear that not only were people, after [low level sarin] exposure showing long-term effects, but it was widely accepted in the pesticide industry that exposure to related compounds led to long-term consequence." (Pg. 46) Dr. Duffy, along with Dr. James Burchfiel, University of Rochester and Dr. Peter Bartels, University of Arizona said, "The research, which studied the effects of low doses of sarin on humans and primates, showed the exposure resulted in long-term or chronic, perhaps permanent changes in brain waves." (Pg. 46)

Dr. Seymor Antelman, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Psychiatry stated, "My research, published in leading scientific journals and the subject of a June 21, 1988, Science Times article, has shown that the effects of chemicals can develop and grow over time, and need not be present at the time of exposure. Such time dependent sensitization is more likely after exposure to a low-level stimulus." (Pg. 47)

Dr. Donna Heivilin, Director of Planning and Reporting for GAO's National Security and International Affairs Division stated, "A substantial body of research suggests that low-level exposure to chemical warfare agents or chemically related compounds, such as certain pesticides, is associated with delayed or long-term health effects. Low-level exposures to certain organophosphorus compounds, including sarin nerve agents, can cause delayed, chronic neurotoxic effects." (Pg. 73)

The Report states, "Many scientific and medical witnesses have testified that chemical exposures result in injury to the limbic system at the brain stem. This injury, in turn, causes neuro-immunological disorders which are often characterized as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia or multiple chemical sensitivity." (Pg. 119)

The Committee found, "The effects of low level chemical warfare agent exposure is a legitimate line of inquiry for DoD and VA to have pursued. There is no credible, scientific evidence to substantiate the DoD position that chronic symptoms cannot later develop from low level chemical exposures unless acute symptoms are observed when the exposure occurred." (Pg. 67)

b) The CSDP: Continued Ignoring of Scientific Evidence

The current safe exposure levels used by the Army in their CSDP were set in 1982 and do not consider the evidence that was available at that time or the newer evidence presented to the Committee to consider low-level health impacts of workers or the public.

The TOCDF Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) states, "Public and worker risks were calculated in terms of acute fatality risk, which is the probability of death over time due to a one-time exposure." (Report No. SAIC-96/2600 - Pg.S- 3) (emphasis added). The QRA also states, "Specific calculations of environmental effects of accidental agent releases were not performed." (Pg. S- 3).

The QRA also states, "For this study, two health consequences were included: immediate (acute) fatalities, and, for mustard agent only, the probability of induced cancer. The nerve agents have not shown carcinogenic effects and health effects that do not cause fatality are reversible." ( Pg. S-9, emphasis added).

According to the Army's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Oregon incinerator, May, 1996, they say, "All information gathered so far indicates that exposure to nerve agents GB and VX at concentrations much greater than those presented in Table 4.4 (U.S. DoD safety standards for chemical agent exposure limits-DA Pam 40-8, August 15, 1982) does not cause mutations or cancer, fetal damage, or reproductive problems. Delayed neuropathy is of concern only for GB concentrations at many times the lethal dose. No available evidence suggests that any human health effects would result from exposure to control-limit concentrations of nerve agents." (Pg. 4-10, emphasis added).

Based on the testimony given by a wide variety of scientific experts in the field, the conclusions stated by the DoD and the Army above are obviously erroneous, misleading and deliberately exclusive of evidence to the contrary.

The consistent ignoring of the scientific evidence concerning health impacts of low level agent exposures alone or in combination with other exposures to toxic material to workers and the public at TOCDF and JACADS, undermines the credibility of the military and their contractors in the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, concerning their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

6) Finding 16: Federal research strategy has been blind to promising hypotheses due to reliance on unfounded DoD conclusions regarding chemical exposures:

a) The Gulf: Dispersion: Distorting Plume Impact Distances

In this finding the Committee states, "In 1996, the DoD admitted for the first time that 300 to 400 PGW troops had likely been exposed to chemical weapons. The number of affected troops continued to be raised upward until July 1997, when DoD estimated that the number of exposed troops was estimated at 98,900." (Pg. 19)

The Report states, "This report (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 19900) predicted a dispersion of chemical warfare agents over an area ten times greater than subsequent DoD studies would show." (Pg. 28)

b) The CSDP: Conflicting Plume Distance Evidence

In Federal Court in 1996, the following exchanges took place:

To Jeff Principe, Chief Surety Officer, TOCDF.

Q) Is it your opinion that there is no reasonable worst-case scenario from TOCDF processing that could lead to a one percent lethality zone extending beyond the boundaries of the (Tooele Depot) facility?
A) It's my opinion that based on these emergency response plan scenarios and any other likely scenarios we can develop, reasonable scenarios, that we would not get a one percent lethality arc off the confines of the installation. (Tr.495- 96).

To Gary Boyd, Task Manager for Quantitative Risk Assessment for Science Applications International Corporation, under contract with PMCD.

Q) Would you acknowledge that a chemical agent released into the atmosphere in the Tooele vicinity would have the potential for traveling 25, 30 miles or more?
A) It could under certain circumstances, yes. (Tr. 982).

According to the NRC, " The Army's air dispersion code D2PC does not include statistical weather sampling, health effects models for agent exposure levels, population distribution modeling, or evacuation and sheltering needs." (Risk Assessment and Management: National Research Council, 1997. Pg. 21).

The consistent reliance on outdated and incomplete information concerning dispersion of agents and the contradictory testimony given concerning this issue undermines the credibility of the military and their contractors in the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, specifically at UMCDF, concerning their or their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

3) Summary:

The Committee Report information has been omitted in documents and reports which are the basis upon which the DoD, the Army and RDC contend the CSDP is safe and can be operated in compliance with the Oregon permit. The purposeful exclusion of much of this data, dating back to the 1950s, undermines the credibility of PMCD and their contractors. It also clearly negates the technical capability, the ability and willingness of the parties to operate the Program in compliance with PL 99-145 and all subsequent Congressional directives which directs that the Chemical Weapons Stockpile shall be destroyed while "providing MAXIMUM PROTECTION to the workers, the public and the environment."

Furthermore, it undermines PMCD and their contractors technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

A copy the Committee Report is available at:
www.house.gov/reform/replist.htm

4) Hazardous Waste Disposal, Tracking and Characterization: Prior to approval of the MOD, DEQ should explain why such huge amounts of hazardous waste are being produced by Raytheon at the JACADS facility, what these wastes consist of (specifically), and where they are going. Additionally, the methodology of classification of this waste reaching the mainland needs to be explained in context of the MOD DEQ is considering issuing, as this material is being allowed to be produced and shipped off island under the current Region IX permit and will no doubt be produced at the UMCDF as well. Specifically, it is of particular interest to the commentors that at least three mainland reception sites are incinerators, indicating that material that is supposed to be incinerated at JI is either being shipped to the mainland for secondary incineration, or not being incinerated on JI in the first place. (Letter from Region IX EPA to Pacific Concerns Resource Centre, Inc. July 25, 1997- Available). The large amount of hazardous waste produced by the JACADS facility undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF within permit conditions.

5) Ventilation System: According to reports filed with Region IX under 40 CFR 264.56(j) there have been repeated problems with the HVAC system at JACADS (including but not limited to 15 day reports # CD-CO-J-7752; CD-CO-J-8117).

The two reports referenced are very recent, as recent as May and September 1997. Many similar ventilation problems have been reported over the period of JACADS operations. These types of problems continue to occur both at JACADS and TOCDF (See TOCDF Quality Assurance Specialist, Don Smith's Journal entries DS001247:2/7/97; DS0012545:2/6/97; DS001240;1/27/97 and others). The inability of RDC to have adequately rectified the ventilation system at JACADS undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

6) Charcoal Filter Gasket Problems: Another component of the HVAC system, the charcoal filter system continues to experience regular problems at JACADS (See 15 day reports including but not limited to CDO-J-4076; letters to Region IX from Colonel James Coverstone dated April 6,10,11,18 and May 31, 1995). This problem has yet to be rectified as witness the exact same situation at TOCDF on it's second day of operation, August 23, 1996. If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be preforming as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS. UMCDF is not permitted as an RD&D facility and thereby should not be an experimental venue to rectify existing problems with the Baseline technology.

The appropriateness of the corrective actions at both JACADS and TOCDF of leaving the vents partially open on the "stand-by" and "back-up" filters in order to maintain pressure on the gaskets, and thereby keep them from leaking, has not been determined in context of the filter bank maintenance and replacement plan. The levels of agent being absorbed in the filters that were designed to replace those that are due for change out or failure should be considered prior to approval of the UMCDF MOD. In addition, the possibility of "channeling," that being the direct breakthrough of agent in the filter banks has been raised by both JACADS and TOCDF employees. This potential route of agent directly into the environment should be investigated prior to approval of the UMCDF MOD.

These issues, taken in context of EPA's statement in the July 15, 1997 Statement of Basis Fact Sheet on the JACADS permit renewal (EPA ID #TTO- 570-090-001) which calls the carbon filter system "an important safety feature for both workers and the environment," can not be ignored.

The ongoing problems concerning the charcoal filter system at JACADS undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

7) Agent Releases: There have been at least four agent releases into the environment that can be documented at JACADS. It is very possible that there have been more, many more. The reliability of the monitoring systems at JACADS (see next section) casts serious doubt on the reported number of releases. The willingness of PMCD to notifying the regulatory authorities and/or the public is reflected in the March 13, 1995 issue of Inside The Army wherein PMCD public affairs spokesperson Suzanne Fournier said, "There is such a small trace that quite frankly I have problems with this information getting out to environmental activists." Ms. Fournier was commenting on a live agent detection outside the JACADS facility that occurred on March 2, 1995.

Again, such releases, if rectified at JACADS and passed along to TOCDF through the Lessons Learned Program, would seem to insure better performance at TOCDF and boost confidence in JACADS operations. However, as recently as March 3, 1997, Tim Thomas, TOCDF Project Manager testified before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board that, "...we've [TOCDF] had a confirmed number of alarms on the pollution abatement stack of six.."

These occurred within less than seven months of operations. The commentors respectfully request that all common stack alarms and HVAC stack alarms reported during JACADS operations be thoroughly investigated by DEQ prior to any decision on the current MOD. Under the circumstances, continued confirmed agent detections along with an admitted reluctance to be forthcoming with agent release information, undermines the credibility of assurances given by PMCD as to the actual number of agent releases at JACADS and the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF in compliance with permit regulations.

8) Alarm System Reliability: The day prior to the March 23, 1994 agent release at JACADS for which the Army was fined, the alarm reports show the following:

ACAMS REPORT : Malfunctions: 21 and Alarms : 7

Alarms continue to ring off at an astonishing rate. Including, but not limited to, the following 15 Day Reports is reflected not only the number but the inadequate capability of PMCD and RDC to account for the causes of such alarms: CD-CO-J-8044; CD-CO-J-7028; CD-CO-J-7044; CD-CO-J-6715; CD- CO-J-6361; CD-CO-J-6322; CD-CO-J-6291; CD-CO-J-6250; CD-CO-J-6224; CD-CO-J-6191; CD-CO-J-6146; CD-CO-J-6087; and at least 30 additional incident reports currently in the possession of the commentors. Note that several of these incident reports use words like "it was suspected that the cause of the alarm was .." and/or " reported that the cause was indicative of an electrical problem in the alarm." Although meant to be presented as a final conclusion in the report which would fulfill required permit compliance in the future, these statements do not reflect an adequate capability to rectify the problem. This undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

9) Power Loss and Agent Containment: The backup power system for JACADS is claimed to be able to replace power loss in time to continue uninterrupted processing during such events. At least three times this system has not operated as designed. According to our information, on August 16, 1996, August 28, 1996 and December 19,1996 the emergency generators failed to maintain negative pressure in the MDB as designed. There has been little or no information supplied to indicate how this problem has been rectified. In the first quarter of 1997 a similar event took place at TOCDF (Documentation available).

If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be preforming as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS. This undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

10) Agent Migration (Corridors/MDB): Many of the alarm referenced to in section 6 (above) resulted in agent migrations to the upper and/or lower observation corridors. These incidents include but are not limited to incident reports CD-CO-J-8044; CD-CO-J-7028; CD-CO-J-7044. These same problems have existed at TOCDF since operations began in 1996.

If the "Lessons Learned" program, which transmits solutions developed on JACADS to TOCDF, reflects back on the capability of JACADS to be preforming as designed, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption, then obviously this problem has not been rectified at JACADS. This undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF.

11) OVT: The Secretary of Defense was required by Law to certify to Congress under, 50 USC Sec. 52 (k)(2), that the JACADS facility "successfully complete prove out of the equipment and facility at Johnston Atoll" prior to any activity for equipment prove out and systems test on the mainland. In light of the hundreds of modifications to the JACADS equipment and facility that have taken place since certification, August 24, 1993, including the more recent MODs of 1994-1997, the commentors have requested a through review and report by Region IX EPA on the standard by which the JACADS facility and equipment would be measured and considered to be identical between the period 1990 and 1994 and between 1994 and the present. Until such a report is submitted to the DEQ, commentors believe any MOD approval would be illegal.

A) According to the "Summary Evaluation of the JACADS: OVT (MTR 93W0000036: May 1993), the MITRE Corporation had the following comments on JACADS upon completion of OVT:
1)"The noncompliances may be indicative of the need for improvements in quality control, standing operation procedures, record keeping, and personnel training;
2)" There were occasions when waste was either improperly analyzed, shipped out of JI with improper labeling, or disposed of without proper authorization;
3) "the process of mapping permit requirements with actual operations, as well as the results of environmental audits, identified permit conditions (such as inspection requirements) that could not be met because either the system design or the equipment in use differed from what was assumed in the permit. Although the Army has recognized this problem and instituted operational permit changes, it had not completely resolved all procedural and administrative noncompliances at JACADS by the time OVT ended.";
4)"As a result of the DUN's unavailability, dunnage was disposed of by open burning at JI-an option not likely to be approved in the U.S.";
5)"There are other areas, however, where JACADS experience alone does not provide sufficient data to demonstrate that state environmental concerns can be addressed fully.";

B) According to the National Research Council's "Evaluation of the JACADS OVT: Part II (1994) the NRC stated:
1) "A detailed review of the RCRA permit by the Army during the first OVT campaign showed over one hundred ambiguities, errors, omissions, and other problems in the permit itself, which complicated compliance by the operations and maintenance contractor and the Army."
2) "Many of the failure events indicated deficiencies in procedures, training or management priorities;

C) The same NRC Report made the following Recommendations:
1) Give safety considerations priority over production goals;
2) Develop and demonstrate an improved agent monitoring and identification system;
3) Complete the BRA performance tests, or develop a satisfactory brine disposal alternative;
4) Eliminate furnace feed errors;
5) Demonstrate the dunnage furnace performance;
6) Develop and demonstrate the proposed hot-slag removal system for the LIC;
7) Establish a careful analysis of the operating parameters to ensure adherence to regulatory requirements;
8) Develop systems to improve overall management of safety.

D) The NRC listed a number of specific safety and compliance incidents and concluded that,"All these cases indicate that concern with production has been allowed to compromise plant safety, with greater speed but more errors."

Based on the continuing patterns of not having had the capability to address these observations and recommendations since they were made (ie: recent JACADS and TOCDF incidents and problems), commentors assert that RDC does not have the technical capability to operate the UMCDF in compliance with the permit.

It is also the position of the commentors that JACADS has not successfully completed OVT and that fact undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF in compliance with the permit.

12) Upset Conditions: The commentors have requested a month to month analysis of the number of times JACADS has operated in upset or non-steady state operations since operations began in 1990. We have also requested the specific causes and results, including, but not limited to the number of Automatic Waste Feed Cutoffs (AWFC)that resulted from these conditions. The MOD should not be approved until such time as the DEQ has conducted a thorough investigation of RDC's ability to operate the incinerators without excessive AWFC's and insure this function is in compliance with applicable law, in light of their performance at JACADS. Continuing operations in upset conditions and frequent AWFC problems undermines the technical capability of RDC to operate the UMCDF in compliance with the permit.

13) General Operations: Commentors submit the following facts concerning JACADS operations, from the MITRE Reports on OVT:
a) From July 16, 1990 to February 27, 1991, JACADS operated for only 500 hours while experiencing more than 900 hours of down time due to malfunctions;
b) During the same period, major process alarms were triggered on an average of 22 times daily;
c) In Congressional Testimony before the House Committee on Government Operations, April 1992, the Army admitted the JACADS facility did not have a legitimate permit for construction/operations in 1986 and 1987.

The poor performance of JACADS during and since OVT undermines the commentors belief that RDC can operate UMCDF in compliance with the permit.

B) Does Raytheon Demilitarization Company meet the following criteria: "The compliance history of the owner including any present company of the owner and the operator in owning and operating other similar facilities, if any, indicates an ability and willingness to operate the proposed facility in compliance with the provisions of ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 466.890 or any condition imposed on the Permittee by the commission."

1) Operating in Compliance with the Permit: The JACADS Experience

a) Reporting Requirements: The 1990-1996 JACADS Annual Reports of RCRA Noncompliances shows an unmistakable pattern of notification noncompliances within the RCRA regulations including, but not limited to 40 CFR 270.42; 40 CFR 264.341; 40 CFR 264.96; 40 CFR 264.196 (d)(2); 40 CFR 270.19. Noncompliance within RCRA Permit Condition VIII.4.A was also noted to have taken place at least 4 times during 1995.

This consistent pattern of inability or unwillingness to comply with the existing reporting standards undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

b) RCRA Inspection at JACADS: It is commentors understanding that EPA does one inspection per year at JACADS, depending on PMCD and RDC throughout the remaining period to report on compliance. This raises questions as to the integrity and reliability of compliance reports submitted from JACADS.

For example, in the RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report on the inspection done by EPA on September 16-20, 1995, in the "Record Review" section (Pages 14-16 ) show the Daily Operating Logs for the LIC/MPF/DFS/DUN, the Annotated Daily RCRA Alarm Reports and other Daily Reports. The period of time covered by those reports reviewed covered, on average, about two weeks to a month. Who selected which period out of the year to review and how compliance for the periods not reviewed was assured is unknown. The reliability of self generated reports from the permittee to insure compliance is a concern.

The ACAMS Trend Reports review consisted of one day's records in the 1995 inspection, while the 1994 Inspection Report does not even mention ACAMS Trend Reports as being reviewed at all. Determining the reliability and the accuracy of ACAMS alarms performance by reviewing one day Trend Report over two years appears inadequate. The new JACADS permit calls for a "More comprehensive stack monitoring program." The commentors would like to see a projected inspection plan by DEQ for UMCDF under the proposed MOD prior to issuance. The inadequacies of the JACADS Inspection Reports undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

c) Exceedences vs. Violations: The creative relationship established between EPA Region IX and PMCD and Raytheon that differentiates between an "exceedence" and a "violation" at JACADS, crafted in what we assume were negotiations between Region IX, Raytheon and PMCD remains a mystery to those of us interested in the operations of the JACADS facility.

For example, the RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report of August 13- 17, 1994, page 15 states that the exceedence under Module V, page V-20, agent stack emission concentration , represents a violation of the RCRA permit. To the EPA's credit, this violation resulted in a fine. However, in the same report, page 17, the facility was storing hazardous waste in several areas not permitted as such under Module III, Table D2-1. This situation was classified as a "potential violation." It would seem that if hazardous waste is being stored in violation of the permit, then it is a violation, not a "potential" violation. If emissions are above permitted levels, it would seem that this is a violation, not an exceedence.

There were 1436 non-operational and 50 operational exceedences during OVT and no violations throughout the same period, 1990 to August 1993. Please identify any similarities or differences from the JACADS arrangement with EPA and UMCDF's arrangement with DEQ.

Commentors urge DEQ follow EPA's recommended changes in the JACADS permit renewal under it's "omnibus" authority under 40 CFR 270.32(b)(2). Specifically, DEQ should include the following changes in the RDC/PMCD JACADS permit under modules: V.B.5 & V.C.5; VII; VI; II.P; I.E.9.e & f; V.B.1 & 3; V.O; II.C; V.E.2.c; V.I; I.E.16; V.E.2.c and develop an inspection and compliance plan consistent with these changes. If DEQ does not plan to incorporate these changes, that Region IX feel are necessary to insure public and environmental protection, please explain why not.

Not knowing which of the above changes will be incorporated in the permit, and not having a inspection and compliance plan incorporating any these changes undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

d) Permit Modifications: The sheer number of modifications over the life of JACADS operations is alarming. As best the commentors can calculate there were 357 Class I, 68 Class II and 3 Class III MODs approved for JACADS between July 1990 and July 1995. It is of concern also that within 24 hours of receiving the current Temporary Authorization (TA) under which JACADS is currently operating, PMCD submitted 14 additional Class II permit modifications. Of concern as well is the section on the Waste Analysis Plan, on page 15 of the EPA RCRA Compliance Evaluation Inspection Report, September 16-20, 1995. (See also Section 1 of these comments). In the Report it is noted that the analytical techniques part of the waste analysis plan were omitted from the MOD request or April 30, 1990, yet that MOD was approved by EPA (without this information) in May of 1991.

The omission was not discovered until 1994 . Following this, additional modifications to the waste analysis plan became effective in June 1995, by default, based on EPA's inaction on the MOD request. Further revisions to the waste analysis plan were submitted, some approved , some denied.

What this culminates in is a bureaucratic morass within which the waste analysis plan in seemingly unidentifiable. Any deficiencies that may have been part of the August 15, 1994 JACADS MOD have therefore not been addressed. However, an additional waste analysis MOD was denied due to "technical discrepancies" in September 1995. This implies that JACADS has been operating out of compliance with the existing permit. What components within the existing waste analysis plan are being exceeded, violated, or meet the Congressional directive of "Maximum Protection" remain unclear.

A complete review of the current waste analysis plan should be undertaken by DEQ and made available to the public prior to any decision on the current permit MOD for UMCDF.

Not knowing the waste analysis plan undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

e) RCRA Annual Status Reports 1989-1995: In spite of the rhetorical position taken by RDC/PMCD in their Annual Status Reports through the period cited in this section that, " The Army and its Operations and Maintenance Contractor (Raytheon) are committed to operating the JACADS facility in compliance with all environmental and other regulatory requirements." a review of the Reports show a pattern of continuing non-compliance. The numbers and severity of the non-compliances have not changed significantly during the period. This shows that Raytheon lacks the "ability and willingness to operate the proposed facility in compliance with provisions of ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 466.890 or any condition imposed on the Permittee by the commission." as required to approve the current MOD.

f) PCB Trial Burns and the DUN: UMCDF is modeled after TOCDF, which in turn is modeled after JACADS. At TOCDF, PMCD and the operators, EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. have recently failed the TSCA Trial Burns for PCB's (Salt Lake City Tribune: October 18, 1997).

At JACADS, the Region IX, EPA Statement of Basis Of Fact Sheet on the JACADS permit renewal (EPA ID # TTO-570-090-001) states, "The DUN (Dunnage Incinerator) has not processed hazardous waste since its trial burn in December 1994, since the results of the trial burn were inconclusive." So, in spite of over six years of combined operational experience, both the M-55 rocket campaigns and any applicability of use of the DUN at UMCDF is based on non existent capability rather than demonstrated performance. This reflects that RDC lacks the"technical capability" and "the ability and willingness to operate the proposed facility in compliance with provisions of ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 466.890 or any condition imposed on the Permittee by the commission," as required to approve the current MOD.

g) NEPA: What consideration has been given to alternative technologies in context of the National Research Council 's reports on alternative technologies (1993, 1994), the approval of alternative technologies by the Department of Defense for Maryland and Indiana (1997), and PL 104-208 Section 8065 of the 1997 Defense Appropriations Bill and the current Alternative Chemical Weapons Assessment that has resulted form the law? Any permit issued by DEQ and therefore any MOD to such permit would require compliance with NEPA. It is the commentors contention that the existing permit does not comply with NEPA and therefore the MOD would also be out of compliance. Such NEPA non-compliance undermines the ability and willingness of RDC to operate the UMCDF in compliance with the permit.

C) Raytheon's ability and willingness to Operating in Compliance with the Permit: Raytheon's Non-Chemical Weapons Hazardous Waste Record.

1) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Record:

Between 1987 and 1995 Raytheon manufacturing operations released approximately 10,843,716 pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment that are listed on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI is a database which provided information to the public about releases of toxic materials from manufacturing facilities into the environment. Release of this quantity of hazardous waste undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

2) RCRA Biennial Reporting System Record:

In the years 1989,1991 and 1993 Raytheon's manufacturing operations generated approximately 646,292,000 pounds of RCRA regulated and other hazardous waste. The RCRA Biennial Reporting System (BRS) data shows generation and shipment of RCRA and other hazardous waste. The generation of this quantity of hazardous waste undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

3) RCRA Information System (RCRIS) Record:

Information gathered on Raytheon's RCRIS data by commentors under U.S. Right-To-Know Laws show that during an unspecified period Raytheon has recorded 35 RCRA violations at its various manufacturing facilities. This number of RCRA violations undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

4) Superfund National Priority List (NPL):

Raytheon has been determined to be the responsible party for the Mountain View, CA Superfund Site (EPA ID CAD009205097). Raytheon's being responsible for this NPL Superfund site undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

5) Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act List (CERCLIS):

Raytheon has been listed for nine (9) sites potential and actual sites that might have to be cleaned up under Superfund. Raytheon's being named for these nine CERCLIS sites undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

6) Site Enforcement Tracking System (SETS):

Raytheon has been sent letters notifying them that they are the Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) for eighteen (18) Superfund or CERCLA sites. Raytheon's being notified for these eighteen sites undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

7) Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS):

Raytheon reported twenty-seven (27) toxic releases and spills to the National Response Center between 1988 and 1996. These releases or spills totaled 16,385 pounds of toxic material being released or spilled into the environment. Raytheon's being responsible for this number of ERNS reports undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

8) EPA's Docket Data Case List:

Between 1989 and 1995 Raytheon has been ruled against along with others as defendants in five (5) Civil Court Cases (Civil Cases: 01-82-0014; 01-93-0003; 01-93-0013; 01-94-0020; 09-90-0040) that have resulted in Consent Instruments with the Specified Cost Recovery amount totaling: $159,734,943. Raytheon's being party to this number of environmental recovery rulings undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

Raytheon has been named as one of the corporations being sued by the Federal Government (EPA) to recover nearly $1 million it spent cleaning up the Novak Landfill in Pennsylvania. ( Copyright: The Morning Call, Inc. February 1, 1997 SECOND EDITION ) Raytheon's being sued by EPA in this case undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

9) Raytheon's False Claims Act Record:

a) On August 4, 1992 Raytheon announced it would pay $2,750,000 to the United States to settle allegations that they falsified labor costs on 26 contracts for the U.S. Navy. (Copyright: U.S. Newswire, Inc. August 4, 1992).
b) On October 14, 1993, Raytheon agreed to pay $3,700,000 to settle allegations that it overcharged the Army for the manufacture of missile systems for which they were under contract. (Copyright: Associated Press, October 14, 1993, A.M. Cycle).
c) On October 28, 1994, Raytheon paid $4,000,000 to settle a lawsuit that it inflated costs on a government contract . (Copyright: Pasha Publications, Inc. Nov. 7, 1994; Section: No. 43, Vol. 11; ISSN: 8756-1700).

Raytheon's being party to this number of False Claims Act actions and their related settlements undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

10) Procurement Fraud:

According to the General Accounting Office Report (GAO/NSIAD-95-166) July 17, 1995, Raytheon pled guilty to procurement fraud that had taken place between October 1988 and December 1994. Raytheon's having pled guilty to Procurement Fraud undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

11) Worker Discrimination:

The Labor Department concluded in September 1995 that Earl Keene, a Raytheon employee, was discriminated against after he raised concern about signing off for electrical maintenance work he had not performed. (Copyright: Austin American-Statesman; Sept. 20, 1996; Metro/State; Pg. B11).

Raytheon being found guilty of discrimination against an employee who refused to sign off on work he didn't do undermines the confidence of the commentors in RCD's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

12) Mishandling of Hazardous Material:

According to the March 3, 1995 HazMat Transport News, Raytheon was fined $15,000 in an FAA enforcement action for giving Airborne Express a fiberboard package containing hazardous material, which was not described on the waybill.

Raytheon being fined for mishandling hazardous waste undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

13) Trade in Pentagon Secrets:

A 1990 government investigation revealed that Raytheon had been trading in Pentagon secrets. Raytheon pleaded guilty and paid a fine of $1 million. (Copyright: 1997 Hoover's Company Profile Database-American Public Companies).

Raytheon pleading guilty to trading in Pentagon secrets undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

14) OSHA Non-compliance:

From January 1987 to May 1992, Raytheon paid $82,090 in penalties for federal worker health and safety violations.

Ratheon's non-compliance to OSHA undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

15) Kickbacks on Defense Contracts:

In June 1996, Raytheon agreed to pay $155,309 to settle civil charges that a former executive accepted kickbacks in connection with the purchase of electronic components for various defense contracts. (Copyright: Boston Herald; June 6, 1996).

September, 1995 an ex-Raytheon employee is prosecuted for illegal kickbacks involving Raytheon defense contacts. (Copyright: PR Newswire, September 7, 1995).

Raytheon employees involvement in illegal kickbacks undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

16) Water Discharge Violations:

In May 1994, Raytheon agreed to pay a penalty of $521,000 to settle allegations of water discharge violations at the company's Wichita, Kansas, facility. In addition to the penalty, Raytheon also agreed to perform supplemental environmental projects valued at $200,000.

Raytheon being penalized for discharge violations undermines the confidence of the commentors in RDC's ability and willingness to operate UMCDF in compliance with the DEQ permit.

IV) Commentors Conclusion

Based on the above comments and the overwhelming evidence concerning RDC's unacceptable past performance both in their chemical weapons disposal activities and other hazardous waste activities, commentors strongly urge the Oregon DEQ to deny the permit modification under consideration.

Commentors believe they have demonstrated RDC's lack of technical ability, and ability and willingness to operate the UMCDF in compliance with ORS 466.060 and ORS 466.005 to 466.385 and 446.890 and other applicable state and federal regulatory requirements.

All cited material is available to the DEQ from the Chemical Weapons Working Group Office, P.O. Box 467, Berea, Ky. 40403 (606)986-7565. Those documents cited as "under seal" will be made available to DEQ upon request and agreement that they be held in confidence.

Commentors appreciate the opportunity to comment and wish to note their willingness to work with DEQ and other agencies to fulfill the United States mission of disposing of its' chemical weapons stockpile.

Respectfully Submitted,

Craig Williams, Director
Chemical Weapons Working Group

With Permission and On Behalf of:

Bob Palzer, Air Quality Coordinator
Oregon Chapter of the Sierra Club

Karyn Jones,
GASP

Paul Loney,
Oregon Wildlife Federation

With Permission And on Behalf of the following Oregon Citizens:

Karyn Jones: Hermiston, Oregon Susan Jones: Hermiston, Oregon
Debra McCoy-Burns: Irrigon, Oregon
David Burns: Irrigon, Oregon
Merle Jones: Hermiston, Oregon
John Spomer: Hermiston, Oregon
Lisa Brenner: Portland, Oregon
Stuart Dick: Hermiston, Oregon
Mark R. Jones: Hermiston, Oregon
Andriea Stine: Hermiston, Oregon
Melanie Beltane: Boardman, Oregon

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