ARMY CONCEALS METHODS FOR PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS RISK TO CONTINUE INCINERATION PROGRAM; MISINFORMS CITIZENS ABOUT CAPABILITY TO DISMANTLE WEAPONS AND IGNORES OTHER PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

Prepared by
Kentucky Environmental Foundation

A national coalition of groups from communities where U.S. chemical
weapons are stored have charged that the Army has concealed
information and deceived citizens concerning their knowledge of chemical
weapons disassembly techniques in order to continue their incineration
program. Members of the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG)
have uncovered studies commissioned by the Army as far back as 1985
which show process diagrams for draining toxic agents from rockets,
detoxifying the rockets, and safely storing the agent for final treatment.
The CWWG has also located documents that show the Army had done
such processes as far back as 1983.

Yet, transcripts taken from public meetings, show both the Army
Chemical Weapons Chief Program Officer and the Chemical Weapons
Disposal Program Manager misled the communities concerning the
availability of this approach claiming it could only deal with leaking
munitions and had extremely low capability for processing large numbers
of rockets. The 1985 A.D. Little report sho

"The Army continues to put citizens and communities at risk in its
fixation to implement its incineration scheme," explained CWWG
coordinator Craig Williams. The Governor Oregon's Citizens Advisory
Commission Chairperson, Karyn Jones said, " This shows the Army has
little regard for the safety of stockpile communities. If they were truly
interested in insuring we were protected, they would have implemented
this program years ago."

The Army, in addition to hiding the facts concerning reconfiguration,
developed an emergency contingency plan in 1990 for disassembling the
most dangerous of the munitions containing nerve agent. According to
Army documents, this plan could be initiated within one year of being
funded. But rather than pursue it, the Army has chosen to use the
threat of the rockets exploding to pressure communities into accepting
incineration. In pamphlets handed out at community meetings as
recently as 1994 the Army said, " In addition, there is some concern that
the stabilizer in these weapons (the M-55 rockets) may degrade and cause
a rocket to fire."

In concert with the Army, the now retired National Research Council
(NRC) Chairman for Chemical Weapons Disposal, Dr. Carl Peterson,
testified to Congress in April, 1994, "Ignition of a rocket in an igloo
containing several thousand rockets would certainly result in substantial
release of agent; it is an event to be avoided at all costs."

The CWWG issued a press release on August 9, 1994 showing that the
Army data relied on by the NRC in annunciating this type of scenario
was off by well over 100 years. The Army has since admitted this to be
true. That notwithstanding, the Chairman of the NRC Committee
visited the communities where these materials are stored preaching the
Armys message of imminent danger if the citizens did not accept the
Army incineration plan. No mention of the decade old knowledge of
disassembling these weapons was made.

Evelyn Yates, of Pine Bluff Arkansas a leader in that community for the
push for safe chemical weapons disposal technologies and a CWWG
member reflects on the situation this way, "Think about the reliability of
the Army today...early on I would have placed my life on the line and
relied on the Army to do the right thing. However due to revelations
from the Tuskegee Report and others incidents such as the Agent Orange
cover-up, the nuclear tests in Utah and the Pacific I know their priority
is not to protect me. I'm no longer surprised, disappointed yes, but not
surprised."

In addition to concealing the information of the M-55 rocket, the Army
has chosen to ignore the majority of other risk reduction avenues named
in a 1987 risk assessment done by GA technologies. In Aberdeen, Md.,
for example, the chemical agents are stored outside within a mile of a
military airport. The GA Technologies report states that 100% of the risk
at this site is attributed to possible aircraft crashes. Yet, since 1987, the
Army has taken no action to reduce this risk, either by moving the
agents or curtailing air traffic at the airstrip. Linda Koplovitz, director of
Maryland Citizens for a Safe Environment and CWWG member said, " If
they had this ability, they kept it to themselves to move the incineration
program forward. They have spent millions on evacuation plans and
sirens as the only avenue to minimize risk to the community . It's a
shame they continue to deceive us, putting our children at risk so they
can build their incinerator."

The NRC, depending entirely on Army supplied data, has recently stated
that the Army program should continue because the risk of continued
storage is greater than the risk of incineration. The Army, not
surprisingly, has agreed. Interestingly, according to several members of
the NRC Committee, zero risk was attributed to incineration operations.
"This is outrageous," says Williams, "attributing no risk to a process that
we know has a very poor record of performance, emits toxics to the
atmosphere and is opposed by many of the main stakeholders while
ignoring approaches that would decrease storage risk by 90% to 100% is
unconscionable and irresponsible."

In Colorado, air-space restrictions would reduce risk by 90%. Pueblo
resident Ross Vincient, Chair of the Sierra Club Hazardous Materials
Committee and CWWG member observes, "The Army isn't interested in
reducing risk, but in building incinerators and for the time being,
keeping risks high serves that purpose. This is just one more in the long
list of examples of Army bad faith."

The CWWG opposes this archaic combustion technology and advocates
alternative approaches to the disposal of these munitions that are
protective of public health and the environment.

CWWG Home Page

Contact us: Chemical Weapons Working Group Kentucky Environmental Foundation P.O. Box 467 Berea, KY 40403 phone: 859-986-7565 fax: 859-986-2695 For comments about this WWW page contact Lois Kleffman.