SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE JOURNALS OF
DON SMITH, A QUALITY ASSURANCE SPECIALIST,
TOOELE CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL FACILITY

26 Jul 90 Wayne Sampson called and advised me that MK was
concerned about foundation cracks in the KCI pours...
DS000051

30 Jul 90 Wayne Sampson advised me that intersection of line 6 at
line 5 on MDB building lacked some required rebar. He
had a discussion with NCK [?] and recommend that they
prepare an RFI addressing this issue.
DS000052

31 Jul 90 The root cause of the footing and pier problems appears to
be the lack of proper design control on the DSIC's behalf.
DS000054

6 Aug 90 As Chief Auditor I conducted a surveillance of the
procurement system with the following questions to
address: 1) The procurement document is inadequate and
does not meet the QAM and FRE requirements. 2)
Procurement personnel are inadequately trained in
government procurement process. 3) The procurement
process is not at a level to support the systemization
process.
DS000056

14 Aug 90 Conducted a tour of the construction area with Wayne
Sampson. We examined the cement finish problem and
crack problem. During the tour I examined several
drawings at random to see if they were approved. It was
observed that the following drawings were not marked
approved by COE: [five]. I met with John Ross and
discussed the issue with him. He admitted that his staff
had uncovered the same thing.
DS000060

4 Sept 90 Conducted a review of the overall project problems which I
have become aware of. They are of sufficient magnitude as
to warrant my bringing them to the attention of the Deputy
Project Manager. They are as follows: (Not in order of
priority)
1) The quality Assurance Program is not being taken
seriously by line management. An informed surveillance
indicates that most managers have not read the Quality
Assurance Manual and are not aware of their
responsibilities with regard to the quality assurance
manual.
2) No training has been conducted or is scheduled in the
near future to train line management in the Quality
Assurance Program.
3) As a result of the lack of training in QA there is no
understanding of the purpose of an audit and a lack of
support from line management.
4) Configuration Control remains a problem. The design
contractors program is not functioning properly and there
is no effective oversight of this critical system.
5) Project control appears to be at the crisis management
level with no established management directives or policy...
6) Construction oversight is inadequate with the
construction subcontractor reporting directly to the Project
Manager, bypassing the EG&G Construction Manager who
has line responsibility for QC. The project chain of
command is violated in other areas also.
7) A project level assessment of QA implementation has not
been conducted.
8) The document and data control system is inadequate
and understaffed.
DS000069

11 Sept 90 Received a call from Wayne Sampson advising me that MK
QC was not going to issue an NCR on the cracks on #2
MDB wall between N & W. Wayne recommended that I
contact Dean and COE and find out what is going on.
DS000071

13 Sept 90 Wayne called and advised me that an NCR was on the way
up addressing the column problem.
DS000075

19 Sept 90 Wayne brought to attention that more cement was dumped
than was poured. Bee Cement is having a hard time
getting the mix under control. Adjustments were made to
water and air without any success.
DS000078

3 Oct 90 I became aware of the fact that the drawings on Rev. 3 are
being transmitted without going through the Document
and Data Control Center. I advised that I would issue an
NCR on Drawing Control.
DS000082

11 Oct 90 Keith and I discussed the apparent lack of drive in
correcting the drawing and submittals control issue. The
entire project's approach to Document and Data Control is
poor and will remain so until adequate personnel and
material resources are provided. Continued system failure
will result in some serious problems...
DS000085

7 Feb 91 At 1543 this date, I was sitting at my desk and overheard a
conversation between Kim Hopkinson and Marshall
Thompson. Mr. Thompson was attempting to have Kim
sign a release from causes or health problems which may
result from her failure to take the termination blood work.
Mr. Thompson stated, " you have a pay check coming." Ms.
Hopkinson asked Mr. Thompson, "Are you saying that you
will hold my last pay check if I don't sign this release"? Mr.
Thompson stated, "No, I am not saying that but, it is the
only hold I have once you leave." Ms. Hopkinson stated, "I
will get in touch with my attorney and get back with you
but, it may take a while. Mr. Thompson stated, "I would
like to get this resolved as soon as possible."
DS000126

6 Mar 91 Attended weekly construction meeting. Some problem
areas: 1) Non-response on several RFIs. 2) Slab placement
125--so much rebar currently in place that rebar for the
slab cannot be installed.
DS000139

2 Apr 91 I teamed up with John Jardine and we proceeded to MK QA
where we met with Brad Ott. Mr. Jardine asked to see the
current revisions of SIL. Mr. Ott produced Rev. 3. Rev. 4
was released in Nov., 90 days ago, yet Rev. 3 is still being
used. Rev. 5 may have been released by now. Submittal
control appears to have a problem.
DS000153

4 Apr 91 I overheard the PMCD Audit team state that they had
obtained objective evidence that NCRs were being negated
by Dick Jolly...There was some discussion that QA does not
have adequate independence from management to be
effective. Though I have no other objective evidence to
support this, I am not in disagreement with the
observation but do not have sufficient objective evidence to
verify my feelings. The PMCD persons also expressed some
concerns about EG&G's management attitude towards
quality.
DS000157

8 Apr 91 Upon arrival, I read the preliminary Audit Report from the
PMCD Audit 91-02. It is obvious that the report attempts
to gloss over the real problems and focus on the minor
areas. The real problem is the failure of the Corrective
Action System. Our Corrective Action System has not been
working because upper management negates findings and
pressures the QA/QC manager. None of this was even
alluded to in the preliminary report...
DS000158

...It is my opinion that the Corrective Action System failure
and the ineffectiveness of the QA/QC Program extends to
the top of the PMCD and the entire organization's attempt
to play politics instead of playing by the rules. I will now
play hard ball, requiring all to play by the rules and
documenting every non-conformance in writing...

...Jim Scott informed that Jim Bongers was not happy with
the quality of welding and may issue an NCR...
DS000159

9 Apr 91 Poor welds on NAM [?] tanks in POB, Chicago Bridge
Contractor. COE has not written NCR. COE has asked
welding person to be stopped and x-rays taken. Knurbein,
MK Site Engineer, states that MK will not stop the welder.
John Ross has not acted as yet. This information was
phoned to me by Wayne Sampson.

I called John Ross and questioned him on the Chicago
Bridge welder. He informed me that Jerry (his inspector)
had observed the surface weld to be of poor quality as had
the Army. They have requested CBI to stop the man from
welding and x-ray his completed work. CBI has refused...

...I examined the weldment on the three tanks under
construction...The center tank (Tank 102) had a welder
performing a vertical weld on the South side. From what I
examined, the resurface weld was of very poor quality and
definitely suspect.
DS000160

6 May 91 Martin came and informed me that the manufacturer of the
HVAC filters had been caught by JACADS improperly
testing the filter banks. They were observed testing the
individual units instead of the complete bank. The
individual units would show a much smaller leak rate than
the whole assembly...
DS000175

17 Jun 91 Pete Kovac, COE, paid a visit and questioned me
concerning the need to backfire 18" at the PMB. He
maintains there was an agreement to do so and someone
from EG&G waived the requirement...
DS000185

24 Jun 91 I questioned Ruth Glover about the transmittal process for
GFE drawings. She informed me that originally GFE
drawings were held until the review process was complete.
Then the final drawings were transmitted to MK. However,
MK found the process too slow and requested the drawings
with comments be transmitted as received. This has
resulted in several drawings being transmitted with hand
written comments on them and no clear indication of
drawing status other than the date. This makes the filing
process somewhat cumbersome, not to mention the
probability of using drawings that are not approved.
DS000189

25 Jun 91 Met with Ira Hall, Dean Daniels and Ron Roggia
concerning the concrete issue. Dean briefed me on what
was going on with the attempts to determine what is the
problem with the low breaks...Met with Wayne
Sampson...Mr. Sampson feels it is a one load problem. The
problem is with 15022 pour which is a 502 mix. Mr.
Sampson, when questioned, stated that he did not review
the test results on a routine basis. Apparently EG&G was
not notified when the seven day breaks came back
unsatisfactory.
DS000191

Met with Dick Jolly and Ira Hall concerning the concrete
issue. I briefed him on what was going on. Mr. Jolly
expressed the concern that MK was performing the trend
analysis and attempting to resolve the issue whereas the
concrete batch plant contractor is an EG&G contract and
we should be in charge of the investigation...

The concrete issue deals with some unsat 7 day and 28 day
breaks which were under the 4000 psi requirement. The
specific pour was 15022 and a concrete mix 502. Concrete
mix 508 also has shown some low...
DS000192

...breaks on pour 22DB-001. The batch plant, laboratories
and drivers are being examined for any spec variance. My
concern is the trend downward of the strength of the
concrete.
DS000193

31 Jul 91 The batch plant has been turning out inconsistent
concrete. Wayne and I went to the batch plant and
examined his operation. The operator was a temporary
replacement and as such inexperienced. This may be one
of the factors causing such a variance in concrete.
DS000202

3 Aug 91 Wayne informed me that 15-208-122 was poured without
COE signature on the pour card and also COE has still not
signed off on it.
DS000203

7 Aug 91 I observed the PSI concrete test equipment and noticed it
contained no readable calibration sticker on the scales and
the gauge glass on the air measuring device was broken. I
prepared and transmitted a memo to John Ross requesting
a Surveillance of PSI...
DS000208

At 1230 Wayne Sampson called and advised me that pour
15-2148 was in progress without a pour card being signed
by COE. Mr. Sampson informed that the reason the card
was not signed was the lack of approved drawings. I went
to the scene and observed the pour in progress. I also
observed at the scene. I advised Mr. Roggia that I would
write an NCR concerning the incident. He stated, "Don't
do that." I asked him for what reason. He stated,
"Because I will get in trouble." When I asked him why, he
stated that he had agreed to pour without COE approval
because he knew the drawings would be approved.
DS000211

12 Aug 91 During the pour of 1C-28-144 and 1C-27-144, the concrete
ticket recorded the 85 degrees F limitation as per 3300-13
para. 26.4 of the specifications. Gary Chrumpacker of MK
rejected the load and sent Mike to see if I would back him.
I said I would and proceeded to the pour site. Ron Roggia
and Bill Jennings arrived. I informed Mr. Roggia of the
rejected [concrete] load. Mr. Roggia ordered another
temperature of the three thermometers. One read 83
degrees F, the others read 86 degrees F and 88 degrees F,
respectively. Mr. Roggia directed the pour to proceed. I
informed him that he had assumed the risk. I then
proceeded to the PSB and informed Ira Hall and Dick Jolly
of the situation. Mr. Jolly explained the reason for the 85
degrees F limit which he said was concrete workability and
as long as the pour was small enough and there were
enough people to work the concrete it would not be an
issue. I informed them both that this was not a QA
decision and the specs were clear on the issue. I also
requested that if the decision to proceed with out of spec
concrete, then this decision should be supported by
appropriate written documentation. This has not been
done to date...

13 Aug 91 Briefed S.E.S. on yesterday's issue. It was agreed between
us that we would develop a deviation notice which will be a
mid-level hammer.
DS000215

19 Aug 91 Upon my return I met with S.E.S. He informed me that QA
had been accused of stopping work on site based on low air
on one of the concrete loads. He further stated that we
were not to stop work at anytime as he is the only one with
stop work authority...
DS000216

...In an effort to get around the concrete specifications, a
new procedure has been written, called a Request for
Variance. This procedure permits QA to document an out
of specification situation and have line management buy
off on it. I expressed my belief to S.E.S. that EG&G does
not have the authority to deviate from the specs. I further
stated that if line management criteria for such a deviation
was on solid ground then they should write a RFI to
change the specs and not just deviate from them. I stated
to S.E.S. I was opposed to such a procedure.
DS000217

20 Aug 91 I met with Dean Daniels and discussed the concrete issue.
I expressed my concern that we are accepting variations
from the specs without the authority to do so. He
concurred and stated that an RFI was the way to go.

I agree that compressive strength is the main issue when it
comes to concrete. The bottom line is do we continue to
violate the rules of the game? If so, where do we stop?...
DS000218

27 Aug 91 Slab 202 has experienced honey comb. I asked Wayne to
look into the matter and assure an NCR is written or a
repair procedure is in place for use.
DS000226

11 Sept 91 Met with S.E.S. I expressed my concerns about the Audit
Program. I stated that Lynn was not a qualified auditor
and S.E.S. stated it was all we had. It is my opinion that
without a qualified QA auditor conducting the audits, the
program will be nothing more than a paper tiger. I
expressed these concerns to S.E.S.
DS000231

15 Oct 91 S.E.S. called and informed me that Richard Booth,
Engineering Manager, made the statement during today's
staff meeting that, "He was appalled at the lack of QC on
the HVAC System."...
DS000240

...Met with Richard Booth concerning his statement during
the staff meeting. He expressed several issues such as on-
site fabrication of piping , which appear legitimate...Had
morning meeting with Roger and Wayne. Roger expressed
some concern about the way machinery is being aligned
and installed...
DS000241

31 Oct 91 Prepared and transmitted RCA 911004 which deals with
installing of GFE equipment without manufacturers
instructions, contrary to the TOCDF Spec 12800 para. 3...

...Toured site with Roger. I observed pieces of equipment
not being stored IAW the posted instructions...
DS000249

11 Dec 91 Roger Grenier informed me today that MK is reducing the
information they are providing, both in their written
schedules and on the schedule board they are maintaining
in the war room. Without accurate scheduling
information, we cannot prepare in advance, to cover our
charter. We must know what is going on ahead of time. It
is my opinion that MK is deliberately trying to remove
EG&G out of the picture and discredit us...
DS000254

Toured the MDB and site with Roger Grenier. He showed
me a damaged area on the structure still caused by lifting a
vestibule [?] in place...
DS000255

13 Dec 91 During our conference call to Chem Northern, the conflict
of interest of having Elizabeth E. Kibber, wife of the MK
Construction Superintendent, performing functions as
Supervisor of Material testing for oversight of MK, is
unacceptable.
DS000257

16 Dec 91 Issued a RCA against MK for failure to ensure one of their
sub-contractors, Western Coatings failed to follow the
inspection and test plan with regard to the disinfecting
procedure for the 500,000 reservoir.
DS000258

11 Mar 92 Met with Ken L. and discussed the problems in the
electrical arena. Electrical is a major problem. Ken is
quite concerned and quoted a figure of 20M dollars to take
over design. He further feels that construction continue
until Jan 94. He mentioned that a 6 month shutdown of
electrical work could occur to give a chance for the
electrical design work to catch up with construction. There
is some indication that local COE personnel attempted to
keep the lid on this major problem...
DSOOO297

26 Mar 92 Met with Ken Langsburg. He briefed me on the situation in
the electrical arena...A brief overview of the problems are as
follows: 1) Parson's electrical design is far behind
schedule.a) The construction drawings (Title II) are not
ready. There is not one set of 100% Title II drawings on
site...b) MK is currently using conceptual drawings to
fabricate the construction drawings for field use. c) Using
conceptual drawings is a risk. As an indication, the 90%
Title II drawings reflected some significant changes. 2)
Design drawings are inadequate. a) Plan views are for
systems and are top view only. These are not useful in the
field. b) There are many inconsistencies with missing
circuits and mid-stream conduit changes...
DS000303

...Cost and scheduling have already been impacted. This
fiasco is a prime example of COE's inability to properly
manage this project. According to Dick Jolly these
problems were identified and brought to COE's attention in
Oct. of 1989.
DS000304

7 Apr 92 Discussed MDB wall 1W63 with Richard Booth. He wants
4 new Windsor Probe Test performed in the area of the
unsatisfactory test on 12/17/92. This requires damage to
the coating system...Called Ira Hall and informed him of
the intent to have 4 Windsor Probe Test conducted on 1-W -
63 in way of the previous low breaks. I requested that he
contact the appropriate line personnel in MK and inform
him of the damage.
DS000309

21 May 92 It was brought to my attention that dye penetrant testing
was not being performed. that is contrary to what I was
told by Richard Booth on May 12, 1992...

...Bob Reid discussed the need to comply with the
environmental plan. Western States may have generated
hazardous waste and not properly disposed of it. It seems
some material was discovered on last Tuesday's safety walk.
DS000335

1 Jun 92 Wayne brought to my attention a potential problem with
the batch plant. He stated that they had a problem
maintaining air and slump within specifications. He also
states that the batch plant operator was quite defensive
and not very responsive when these issues were brought to
his attention.
DS000338

3 Jun 92 Attended a meeting on the concrete issue. We discussed
the inconsistencies in the concrete, testing procedures,
inconsistencies between trucks, variations in air
intrainment, drivers' procedures, drivers may not be
following procedures, need for scheduling pours more
accurately, addition of fly ash, need to have batch plant
operator more cooperative when resolving problems...
DS000341

10 Jun 92 Jerry Wilson came to my office and expressed concern for
the protection of the north portion of slabs 9 and 10 in
that they (MK) were slow to deploy protective measures for
the newly poured concrete. Jerry does not want an MNR
written at this time. He just wants protective measures to
prevent pitting in the future.
DS000345

John Ross called and asked me if I wanted him to write an
MNR on the concrete slab. I told him that Jerry wanted to
reflect on the issue before any paper was issued.
DS000346

15 Jun 92 Observed cracks in Thursday's pour and Friday's pour. I
discussed these defects with John Ross. He believes it is
due to thermal transients, i.e. cold weather
DS000347

29 Aug 92 Met with Don R. who briefed me on the construction
issues. One of the issues was the calibration effort. Don
informed me that Pete Giello wanted to have a preparatory
meeting without following the procedure. It seems that
Pete does not understand the requirements or refuses to
follow them.

1 Sept 92 This morning I was informed that the primary electrical
system is to be turned over today, contrary to a previous
agreement between EG&G and COE. Evidently PMCD has
overridden COE. At 1415, Henry Silvestri came to S.E.S.
and stated he wanted this turnover to take place by
midnight tonight. I overheard Henry state that this was a
very political issue and he would not permit a failure in the
turnover.
DS000390

9 Sept 92 As per instruction, Don R. and Roger G. obtained objective
evidence that MK was building to and inspecting to
unapproved drawings. This information was provided to
Doug in a meeting between him, S.E.S., Don R. and
myself...

The bottom line is that there is virtually no Design Control
or Configuration management, as we (the SC) have no
control over the design contractor. MK maintains that
they perform no design work only provide recommendations
to Parsons. I could not, however, find any documented
evidence that there has been any design verification
performed on the pipe and electrical hangers.

I expressed my concern to Doug in the presence of the
above group, that we are addressing surface issues and not
dealing with major systemic failures.
DS000394

11 Sept 92 It is apparent that several meetings have been held in an
effort to resolve the Quality issues. What is disturbing is
the habit of line management to leave out QA. This may
not be an issue if line management understood quality
issues. They, however, have not demonstrated any
understanding of the quality issues at stake, particularly in
the areas of design control, configuration management,
and document control.
DS000396

14 Sept 92 Though Jeff [Biggar] is a very competent professional, I
have some serious heart burn with tasking our
subcontractor to take charge of an area which is clearly our
responsibility.
DS000405

16 Sept 92 The drawing control issue remains a big problem. We must
have a way of ensuring the plant is being built by current
drawings.
DS000408

28 Sept 92 Because of the work which has been performed to
unapproved drawings, I have some serious concerns as to
our ability to demonstrate we have built this plant to the
approved specifications.
DS000425

Don Richter called and informed me that the Red Books
were back in the field, uncontrolled and were being used for
construction. The drawings that should have been used
could not be located in two out of three controlled
stations.
DS000426

29 Sept 92 ...It is most interesting to observe the shift in power and
change in focus. QA for the moment is defranchised. This
may change after the PMCD Auditor's visit today. Our
acting QA manager shoots from the hip with little or no
consideration of the long-term results.

...My opinion is that with PMCD and COE micro managing
the project, QA will never be a viable organization. QA
exists as a lip service organization only. A dynamic QA
manager, with line management support, could change
this.
DS000427

30 Sept 92 The letter Bob spoke about was a letter written by an MK
electrician addressing electrical conduit penetrations from
A (Toxic areas) to B or C areas (less toxic or non-toxic). I
had brought this problem to the attention of S.E.S. and
Ken Langsburg many months ago.
DS000430

4 Oct 92 An MK electrician came to my house. He was quite upset
because he and his son had been laid off, from his
perspective, because of the letter that had been written to
the Down Winders. He wanted to know if I remembered
talking to him concerning the failure to meet the electrical
code for the wall penetrations for conduit. I said I did as I
had made the appropriate entry in my log. He stated that
neither he nor his son had written the letter and the
person who wrote the letter was still on site. He asked me
if I would support him. I said I would not speak with the
Down Winders or any other such organizations but would
answer any questions truthfully if asked by an appropriate
authority.

5 Oct 92 Met with Henry Silvestri and Doug Lipsey and informed
them of the meeting I had with the MK electrician. The
identity of the MK electrician was never divulged. Henry's
question to me is why didn't I shut the job down? My
answer was...
DS000434

...two fold. First was that the issue had been resolved to
the satisfaction of COE. The second was that perhaps for
the first time in my professional career I let friendship
affect my judgment. I did not state it but, it's my feeling
that S.E.S. would have overridden my shutdown order as
he had made it quite clear that I did not have shutdown
authority.
DS000435

The general position is the code has been satisfied as the
code does not specifically address this issue. As RFI #? has
been submitted to and approved by COE. However, not all
conduits have received the fix. We need to know which
penetrations have not received the sealant. Problems: 1)
Not all penetrations have received sealant. 2) The direction
has not been adequately documented.
DS000436

6 Oct 92 ...It seems it has been determined that QA will be punished
for the sins of the project. I don't know how long my
professional integrity will allow me to continue working for
an outfit like this.
DS000439

9 Oct 92 Jeff and Lynn reported back finding several unapproved
drawings in the field. I instructed them to document their
findings and write a memo to me for processing Monday.
DS000445

19 Oct 92 Met with Jeff Street and reviewed his and Lynn's finding in
the field. The findings continue to demonstrate a
programmatic failure of MK's document control program. I
directed that he write an RCA addressing this problem.
DS000451

21 Oct 92 Don Richter and I met briefly and discussed
the fact that a large number of instruments have been calibrated
and issued to the field without QC approval. This is a two-fold
problem. 1) Those in charge of the calibration effort have
resisted any QC involvement. They continue to calibrate
and issue instruments without any notification to QC/QA.
2) Our current manning levels severely hamper our ability
to properly oversee the calibration effort...
DS000454

11 Nov 92 Continued with the Audit (A9210001). It is apparent that
we are continuing to audit at the QA/QC Manager's
direction to give MK some additional time to correct the
findings we have observed...
DS000470

13 Nov 92 ...Had a brief meeting with Jeff Street and discussed the
audit with him. He and I are in concurrence that the audit
should be closed as we had ample evidence to demonstrate
a systemic failure in MIC's Document Control Program. I
also have some serious concerns with the Submittal
Control System. However, at the QA/QC Manager's
direction, we have removed this from the scope of the
Audit.
DS000472

20 Nov 92 Reviewed a consultant package. The package was for
Systemization, they already have had the people here since
Nov. 3. The services had been obtained without any
Quality involvement...
DS000478

13 Jan 93 Karl B. called back with a conference call (E staff
members)...2) NCR--gauges have been removed, client does
not want to pay expense for proper gauges (John Cluff).
DS000513

27 Jan 93 I also informed JB that our audits still demonstrated that
inspections (final acceptance) were being performed to
drawings which had not yet been approved. (Audit A92-12-
02) QFR A92-12-02-06.
DS000521

3 Feb 93 Met with JB and expressed my concern that we are
constantly identifying problem areas, writing them up in
NCRs and RCAs, yet the corrective action does not seem to
prevent recurrence. He commented that if the corrective
action procedure was in place we would be writing CARs
against those issues which were repetitive in nature. I
expressed my concern that if line management was not
paying attention to NCRs what would make them pay
attention to CARs.
DS000527

10 Feb 93 Another problem has arisen which Don R. and I brought to
line management's attention a year ago. Plant, life support
and instrument air has been built to design documents
which have not been approved. The RFIs submitted to
COE have been disapproved.

This very issue is the reason why we approved building to
unapproved drawings which have been submitted to COE
for approval. This is current practice as authorized by
COE.
DS000533

3 Mar 93 Attended Staff Meeting:...25) Inst. Air Compressor--down.
Excessive Vibration. Why weren't problems caught at
factory during acceptance testing?
DS000561

1 Apr 93 1000 Attended TOCDF Safety Committee meeting...1)The
Tag out procedure was discussed. It seems there is a hole
in the system which could permit a system to be energized
after the electrician had checked it as de-energized.
DS000566

4 May 93 I am still concerned about the direction to audit the
Environmental Dept. to the QA program only and not verify
compliance to the Environmental Program. If we are to be
consistent how can we audit the other organizations to our
program and their plans and procedures as we have done to
Safety, etc.
DS000585

26 May 93 Met with JB where we debriefed the morning QAPP
meeting...4)We discussed Systemization's wanton disregard
for designer control. They are changing equipment and
installator design without adequate control. SOPs being
implemented without QA review. Control Room design
changes are being made without design authority or
documentation...
DS000596

...6) JB tasked Don R. with writing a CAR to address the
lack of control during Systemization. 7) Systemization
has operated the hot water boiler since Oct 92 with a draft
procedure. This is however what the client wants and was
negotiated with Systemization. 8) We discussed the fact
that we are performing Systemization activities and yet our
customer denies we are in the Systemization Phase.
DS000597

28 July 93 Don Richter called me into his office and informed me that
EG&G Personnel are welding in permanent equipment
without the benefit of certified welders, procedure or
material. He asked me what I thought he should do. He
stated he wanted to go and talk with Allen Reikman and
issue an NCR...Don R. returned and informed me that
Allen Reikman, Deputy Project Manager, issued a verbal
stop work for all welding by EG&G. We will follow-up with
a CAR due to the seriousness of this violation.
DS000619

24 Aug 93 Met with Jeff Street. What we are finding is a virtual
programmatic failure in the Safety and Security and Health
Branches. They have not been following the programs...

...Another Safety issue is the receipt and storage of
radioactive material. We will look into this issue
tomorrow. JB is attempting to determine what is required.
DS000632

12 Oct 93 The initial question I asked of Dave Clark
in the beginning of the Environmental Audit was:
"Are we performing any activities which are in
violation of our RCRA permit?" answer was yes.
See Audit working folder for details.
DS000661

19 Oct 93 The Environmental Audit remains a very complex issue.
EG&G maintains they are not the operator under the
RCRA permit and PMCD maintains they are. The RCRA
permit has TEAD as owner and PMCD as operator. It is my
opinion that as long as PMCD continues to micromanage
and control the budget, EG&G would be foolish to accept
the liability that the operator would have. PMCD wants to
have the control and dump the liability. A good position if
you can swing it...The development of Environmental
Branch procedures is, for the most part, complete..When
implemented they should provide the necessary controls.
Prior to this year, the controls have not been as it should
be. As an example, the first hazardous waste Manifest is
T001 which was issued on 28 Apr 93. I find it very hard to
believe that no hazardous waste was generated throughout
construction. In addition there has not been
proceduralization of the Environmental Compliance
Program prior to this time. The question is where does the
responsibility lie?
DS000663

17 Nov 93 The Audit issue was the apparent excessive time required:
1) to identify the damage 2) put item on checklist 3)
initiate corrective action. Door damage was discovered on
Oct. 10, 1993. Action is just now being taken.
DS000717

14 Dec 93 0900-1000 Met with corporate environmental auditors and
briefed them on the A93-09 Audit. We again met between
1100-1215. The auditors did not demonstrate a high level
of skill in either the audit process or environmental law.
They seemed to berate[?] several significant findings in my
audit report. It appears they came with an agenda. This
was the first visit of corporate Environmental Auditors
since the project began. I find it hard to believe that they
could perform an effective audit in 2 days when we spent
562 man hours.
DS000677

22 Dec 93 He [John McArthur] informed me that Don Winery and
crew would assume responsibility for Hazardous Waste
Management as of January 3rd, 1994. I asked John if
Winery or any of his crew had the required training and
experience. His answer was no. This will place EG&G
again in a position where they cannot demonstrate control
of their hazardous waste. A violation of law.
DS000684

23 Dec 93 Met with John McArthur regarding HM-181 training 49
CFR 172...The weak area is Hazardous Waste and Material
handling. An NOV has been issued by the North Area
regarding the training data base NED No. F333402. The
NED was issued on 11/30/93. There seems to be a
significant concern with regard to training, i.e. specific job
training is not being properly documented or scheduled.
DS000685

29 Dec 93 Met with Dave Clark and discussed the 90 day site turnover
and Hazardous Waste Management. Dr. Clark provided me
a copy of A93-3908-787[?] which requests turnover of the
90 day site , turnover as of 31 December 93. This letter
was dated 22 Dec 93 and was received by EG&G on Dec 28,
1993. Based on this letter and my observations I have
serious doubts that EG&G's hazardous waste will be
managed.
DS000689

10 Jan 94 Today LIC #1 caught fire. This makes the second fire in the
LICs. No. 2 was damaged late last year. This, to me,
clearly demonstrates that the Systemization Effort is not
being adequately controlled. It also supports my position
that we need to put Systemization back on the audit
schedule. (I was previously removed at the direction of J.
Biggar.)
DS000697

With regards to the second LIC incident, I am of the
opinion that an independent technically qualified person
(1) should conduct an investigation of this incident. Better
yet, would be an investigative team consisting of a tech rep
and headed up by an EG&G Lead Auditor. I will discuss
this with JB as soon as I am able to get hold of him. If
what I suspect is true (lack of procedures, training) then a
Corrective Action Request (CAR) should be written and a
stop work issued until adequate training and procedures
can be put in place.
DS000698

11 Jan 94 The LIC fire yesterday, again demonstrates the results of
poor communication, failure to use approved written
procedures. This dam the torpedoes, full speed ahead
attitude demonstrated by both the customer and EG&G
must be changed.
DS00697

13 Jan 94 One issue that I do not feel has been adequately looked at
is EG&G's risk mitigation. EG&G must have the freedom
to perform an activity because EG&G feels it's necessary to
reduce EG&G's exposure. An example I gave was
Environmental Auditing, Compliance Verification. The
government may only want one audit in 18 mos. EG&G
feels that one audit does not provide enough oversight and
is not willing to take the risk. EG&G must have the
organizational freedom to make these types of calls. It is
apparent that the government is in the micromanagement
mode. This could be very serious particularly in the
Environmental Compliance area.
DS000703

14 Jan 94 There is no comparison between USACMDR audits and our
audits. Their level of experience and certification is below
what EG&G required. Their audits clearly do not provide
the information necessary to identify problems within our
project. I am of the opinion that EG&G cannot afford to
reduce the audit effort. To do so would place EG&G and
our customer at risk...The Environmental Audit results is a
prime example.
DS000708

26 Jan 94 Met with Jeff Street with regard to the lack of job
descriptions for personnel handling or being exposed to
hazardous material and waste. Jeff said that Sandy
Warrington had informed Paul Chisolm of SASIC that we,
the auditors, had found nothing wrong. This is most
interesting as the audit is far from over. Jeff contacted
Paul and set him straight on the issue. Paul is in the
process of writing a non-compliance addressing inadequate
job descriptions. TEAD Environmental Inspector, Patrick
Ross, has already written two Notices of Environmental
Deficiency (NEDs) addressing the same issue. Paul has
been directed to write the NCR based on EG&G's
inadequate response...
DS000725

27 Jan 94 Some areas of concern with regard to EG&G training:...3)
We are currently not in compliance with RCRA permit from
the training standpoint. 4) We are currently generating
waste and yet we are not in compliance.
DS000727

28 Feb 94 Sandy Warrington--TEAD inspectors are issuing another
NOV because they observed three (3) personnel working in
the 90 day Haz Waste site, unsupervised. None of the
three had the required training. This is a repeat violation
from TEAD and a demonstration of the Project's continued
failure to properly manage hazardous waste. Warrington
further stated that a 90 day site manager had not been
appointed.
DS000741

JB asked me to write a response to SY94-082. Hazardous
Waste tankers. In reviewing the files it documented an
incident where hazardous waste tankers were handled by
untrained personnel. The tank trucks were driven by
persons without the proper license endorsements. The files
revealed a very poor attitude with regard to Hazardous
Waste Management

I prepared a draft and met with JB explaining the
seriousness of the situation to him. I recommended the
issue be elevated to upper level line management. JB and I
met with Joe Harney explaining the issues to him and
strongly recommended he take the issue to Henry Silvestri.
I stated that if EG&G were observed performing activities
contrary to law then there are mandatory reporting
requirements, severe criminal and civil penalties for
violation of Environmental Laws and Regulations. Joe
said he would take the issue to Henry. When JB and I met
back on site I recommended to JB that we document our
concerns in the form of a CAR or an IOM to Henry. JB
said we would wait and give Joe Harney an opportunity to
do his job. I am however, to write an IOM documenting
our concerns and sent them to Henry via Joe & Jeff.
DS000742

9 Mar 94 Met with Fred Burton and examined the CAL ventilation
system. Jeff Street was present also. Upon examination of
the ducting we found it open to the atmosphere in several
areas on the roof of the CAL, the top of the filter banks and
the down runs to the filters. The filter room doors were
also open. this is the same situation that existed on the
8th when the incident involving the #5 fume hood was
observed. This is addressed in the audit report...
DS000754

...however I think it is important enough to address here.
On March 8th I visited the CAL as part of audit A94-02
LAB. During this visit I observed the decontamination of
dilute agent (mustard) being performed under fume hood #5
in room 114 of the CAL. The two lab technicians present
were John Williams and Tom Griffith. I asked them for the
procedure they were using and they produced a controlled
copy of TE-LOP-582. Upon glancing through this procedure
I asked them what operation they were performing and they
stated "#9". (John) I asked them to demonstrate the flow
through the hood. Using the vans-o-meter I had them take
three readings at different locations in the hood. All
readings were less than 20 ft/min. I asked them why the
flow was below the 90-110 ft/min required by the Hazard
Checklist (Appendix G of the procedure) and I was informed
that the exhaust ventilation system was undergoing
modification and was inoperable. I further examined TE-
LOP--582 and noticed a memo LAB-019 from Fred Burton
specifically prohibiting any process which required the use
of a fume hood. The dilute agent they were working with
was mustard. I went and got Jack Comford, the Analytical
Branch Manager and asked him to evaluate the situation
for a possible stop work. I also informed him that the
technicians had not filled out the hazardous checklist
required by TE-LOP-582. I also directed him to provide a
memo to me explaining the incident and what action he
was going to take. I then called Fred Burton and Jeff
Biggar and advised them of the situation...
DS000755

...Jeff Biggar came immediately to the CAL. I met with him
and had him read my report (Pg 10 & 11 of my audit
working file). We then called Jack Comford in and Jeff
asked him what action he was taking. Jack informed us
that he had stopped all work requiring the use of a fume
hood pending the development of a corrective action plan.
JB informed me he was bringing Skip Hayes in on this
issue. I briefed Mike Hampton, John McArthur, Dave Clark
and Earnie Owens on the problem.

I am of the opinion that this incident's ramifications are
wide spread. The ventilation system apparently has been
down since the middle of January. During this audit
which began on February 14, 1994, Jeff Street and I
witnessed various hoods in use. I do not know what
operations were taking place, but they were in use. Not
only does the lab use dilute agent but a number of other
solvents and reagents. Personnel may have been working
on the ventilation system when the hoods were in use.
This requires more investigation which I have directed the
Lab and Environmental Compliance to do and provide a
written report. From my prospective the following issues
must be examined: 1. Safety of personnel--any possible
exposures for LAB and subcontractor personnel. 2.
Violation of Federal and State permits or regulations
(Environmental/OSHA, etc.).
DS000756

7 Apr 94 I was informed by Don R. that John Jardine indicated that
the NCR 152 was not resolved because of the lack of action
on my part. Mr. Richter had explained that this was not
true as both Jeff Street and I had on many occasions gone
out to verify corrective action when we had been informed
that corrective action was complete. On each occasion we
found neither the procedure corrected nor corrective action
implemented. This included our surveillance today. Mr.
Jardine did come over yesterday and this was explained to
him. Furthermore, the audit in progress, A94-03,
continues to document the fact that the operation
personnel are not following their approved procedures. Not
just identified in NCR 152 but throughout the plant. The
attitude throughout the Plant Operations Division and
actually stated by Henry Silvestri, General Manger, is that
schedule is everything...
DS000773

...The statement was actually made by one of the
managers, "Fuck Quality, let them write NCRs." This
statement speaks to the dangerous attitudes demonstrated
by operational personnel. These issues have been elevated
to Henry Silvestri as stated by Jeff Biggar. I recommended
to JB as late as yesterday, that he must document his
taking issues to Henry. The unfortunate situation is that
our customer fosters this attitude. They consider this as a
Demil Facility and not a Hazardous Waste Incinerator.
The attitude demonstrated is "We are going to demil
rockets to hell with the Environment, Quality and Safety."
As yet this is my opinion. However, each audit we perform
continues to support this observation. Each audit report
goes to the General Manager so he cannot claim ignorance
nor can any member of line management.
DS000774

11 Apr 94 Another issue was hazardous waste mgmt. McArthur and
Snow had discovered hazardous waste being stored in non-
RCRA drums. According to McArthur, Bud Marstow had
been sent a memo asking him to inspect all his non-RCRA
waste containers and make sure they did not contain
RCRA waste. He said he had looked at all of them. The
containers were found by McArthur and Snow to contain
spent fiberglass resin. I asked them what they did about it
and they said they repackaged them and removed them.
DS000777

In addition to this they showed me pictures of hazardous
waste being stored in file cabinets allegedly under Mr.
Marstow's control. I asked them to provide me
documentation of the events described above. I will look
closely at these issues during our audit of hazardous waste
scheduled to begin April 25, 1994.
DS000778

12 Apr 94 From my experience the number of finds and concerns far
exceeds what I have seen before. The primary focus appears
to be: We are going to cut up rockets, to hell with QA,
Safety and the environment.
DS000779

In summary of my perception of the focus of our customer
and EG&G line management: The customer considers this
a Demil facility and not a Toxic waste incinerator. This
position has been expressed a number of times by John
Cluff. As such, their primary focus is schedule, cut up
rockets. This position relegates Safety and Environmental
issues and QA to a lower priority than in my opinion they
should be. This position is passed on to politically
sensitive members of EG&G line management. They in
turn pass this attitude on to their subordinates. The
result is less than adequate support of the QA, Safety and
Environmental programs.
DS000780

13 Apr 94 Jerry Shepard brought in an RFI EG-355 which addressed
an existing condition of poor original welds and leaks in
the CAL exhaust ducting. The exhaust ducting was an
issue addressed as a finding in QR's audit of the CAL (A94-
). The finding will not be cleared unless a satisfactory CAL
exhaust system is installed. This includes the leaks,
improper welding and caulking discovered during the audit
and Mr. Shepard's inspection conducted today. I met with
Don Richter and briefed him on the audit results and
explained the fact that I didn't think we could close the
finding without a secure and properly operating exhaust
system.

I met with JB and expressed my concerns about the CAL
exhaust system. While I was present he called John
Jardine and attempted to solicit his aid in resolving these
problems. Mr. Jardine did not demonstrate much interest
in the issue. JB and I discussed the fact that the
Government has directed QA/QC to only write NCRs on
SAIC related issues. I expressed my opinion that such
limitations were not in the best interest of EG&G. I
further stated that the audit program could not rightfully
be placed under such constraints. The audit program must
be able to evaluate compliance and program effectiveness in
any project related area...
DS000784

...As discussed in previous comments, the issuance of CAR
94-02, which addressed a failure to follow procedures
indicated the possibility of a bigger problem. Because of
this I directed an increased audit scope. The results of the
increased scope indicates a programmatic problem
throughout Systemization and operational activities.
Personnel are not implementing approved procedures. I
directed J. Street to continue with his efforts. We have as
yet not found compliance anywhere in the auditor's
program.

I reviewed RE-DP-00, "Contingency Procedure General
Responsibilities and Response". The procedure is very
general in nature. I compared it against Attachment No9
of the RCRA Permit. I could not verify compliance in any
way.

Jeff Street and I discussed the fact that the Configuration
Control of Software in control system cannot be
demonstrated. This verifies what James McConville stated.
(Mr. McConville is the SAIC rep who is over software
control for PMCD.) This is a serious flaw in our program.

I expressed to JB that the audit group worked hard to find
areas of program effectiveness but we had to report what we
found. I must admit it gets depressing to find problem
upon problem our charter is to report and verify.
DS000785

15 Apr 94 It is quite interesting to note that it took only seven days
to correct a problem with a stop work order when the same
problem was not corrected in six months without it.
DS000792

20 Apr 94 Attended our routine John Jardine meeting. The following
issues ere discussed: 1) The JACADS fiasco caused a 5
mo. slip at the cost of $40 million. The issue was alleged
falsification of Radiographs. The plant was re -
radiographed requiring a 5 month delay at $250M/day. Its
incredible for this to happen in this day and age..
DS000795

21 Apr 94 I called John McArthur to further discuss the apparent lack
of response to Environmental non-compliance
situations...He and I are both of the opinion that if they do
not comply now they will not comply in the near future.
The training and mindset are developed before an activity
begins. John then brought up the fact that he was not
being supported with regard to compliance issues by his
manager, Skip Hayes. He said he was ordered not to make
any direct contact with the General Manager or the
customer. I asked him if he had any objective evidence
that the Environmental Manager was hampering the
Environmental Compliance Assurance Program. I said if I
had hard evidence I was prepared to act on it. He said he
could put something together but, he was fearful that if I
did act there would be retribution against him and possibly
myself...
DS000798

25 Apr 94 During the A94-05 entry meeting yesterday, Sandy
Sanderson made a statement that with regard to
Hazardous Waste Management, our audit would uncover
conditions adverse to law. I informed him that this is not
what auditors want to hear as management should correct
these issues when discovered and not wait until they are
discovered by auditors. His response was, it would impact
budget and schedule. I advised him that such activities if
supported by documented evidence could place the auditors
in a situation where we have a mandatory reporting
requirement to regulatory agencies. Mr. Sanderson made a
veiled threat that if I went over Tim Thomas' head I could
be unemployed. My response to this was I would do my job
up to and including reporting directly to the state. This is
just another demonstration of the poor management
attitude towards Environmental Compliance. He further
stated that the only reason QA and Environmental
Compliance had jobs was to keep the company out of
trouble. Mr. Sanderson demonstrates a very poor
compliance stance.
DS000801

26 Apr 94 Very short into A94-05 it is obvious that an effective
Hazardous Waste Management Program has not been
established and as a result a number of non-compliant
conditions have occurred and will continue occurring.
DS000802

29 Apr 94 Attended the 1100 meeting chaired by Joe Harney to
discuss the Hazardous Waste Management
problems...During the meeting all issues were on the table.
The general attitude was defensive rather than compliant.
John McArthur called me after the meeting and informed
me that Skip Hayes, the Environmental Branch Manager
took the lead by downplaying the real issues and saying I
was upset because there were no procedures to audit
against. I find their lack of vision to be very narrow. I am
concerned because there is no Hazardous Waste
Management Program. They should be very concerned
about our devil may care attitude. One issue which really
distressed me was their denial of knowing there was
hazardous waste being stored in S5 [?]. The evidence is
that Brad Marston was aware of the violation and yet failed
to at upon it.
DS000803

I find it incredible that EG&G and the TOCDF Facility still
does not have an effective program to control the
Hazardous Waste generated at this facility. With all audit
reports going to the General Manager and other upper
EG&G Management and with the customer having access
to the audit files, no one can claim ignorance of the issues
described in the files. The problem is action is not being
given a high enough priority. QA, Environmental in some
cases is at the bottom of the list.

Trina Allen called and informed me of the little meeting she
attended after the audit close out. She stated that she had
informed the attendees that the audit findings were fully
justified and very serious. She further explained that I
could and would be expected to go directly to the regulatory
agencies should I become aware of a condition adverse to
law. She further stated that if she did not get results in
her new position, she assumes the position as Hazardous
Waste Coordinator in May, that she would report the non -
compliant issues directly to me and was fully convinced
that I would do my job up to and including reporting
directly to the regulatory agencies. I expressed my full
support to her efforts to establish an effective Hazardous
Waste Management program...
DS000805

Received Interoffice memo EIOC 94-03. This document
requested a 2 month delay in the implementation of
corrective action for A93-09. Basically, they want to delay
the development of a compliance assurance program. The
justification basically says we have been too busy doing
everything else to do our duty with regard to
Environmental Compliance. I met with JB and discussed
the issue with him. He agreed with my position that we
must deny their request. There are a good number of
problems in the Environmental area. The Hazardous
Waste Program to name one.
DS000806

12 May 94 Met with JB and discussed continued failure to implement
our Environmental Compliance Assurance Program. JB
directed me to write an IOM addressing this issue. The
memo will be sent to Skip Hayes with cc: to Henry
Silvestri...

...An incident happened yesterday in which a mortar round
was uncovered while the new 90 day site was being
excavated. It seems that the requested mag sweep of the
area, required by ECP TEMF-495-SRL, was not performed
because it cost too much money. The round was
fortunately empty. Whether or not it contained mustard
agent and it leaked out has yet not been determined. The
round was removed and disposed of. TEAD considers the
issue closed with no further soil samples, environmental
closure etc. required.
DS000816

18 May 94 It is clear to me that unless EG&G takes a pro-active
stance with regards to our QA, Environmental and Safety
Programs, there will be hell to pay. EG&G will deserve
what it gets.
DS000825

24 May 94 At about 1430 I became aware of an incident which in my
opinion is very serious. It appears that a charcoal filter
bank, which may be contaminated with agent was moved
from CAMDS and installed in the CAL filter house. There
are approximately twelve personnel working on this house
installing a dual filtration system. Holes have been cut in
the house exposing it to atmosphere. In addition two QC
inspectors, Brian Hanni and Jerry Shepard, stuck their
heads in the filter house on Friday, May 20, 1994 as part of
an ongoing inspection. Both, accordant to their own
account, experienced immediate headaches. They reported
the incident to Don Richter, their supervisor who in turn
reported the incident to JB. JB called me to see if the filter
bank had not been an issue on the CAL audit. It had not.
DS000833

25 May 94 I visited with Don Richter and asked him if he could at
least get written statements from Jerry and Brian. Don
said that he had attempted to get both inspectors to report
to sick bay but both had expressed fear of losing their jobs
if they did so.

Yesterday I visited towards the end of the day with John
McArthur, Battelle Environmental, and asked him if he
was aware of the incident. He said he was not. After I
informed him of what I knew, he admitted that it was a
very serious industrial safety incident but at this point it
may not be a hazardous waste issue.
DS000835

Met with Richard Sisson and had him show Jeff and I the
filter bank in question. The filter bank was identified with
a No. 4. The filter bank had filter monitors, 6mm DAAMS
were hooked up, sampling the mid bank. Yellow caution
tape had been placed across the access doors. According to
Mr. Sisson, the tape had been placed after 1530. Brian
arrived and I asked him what access doors he had entered.
His response was the 3rd and 4th access doors from the
Intake. These doors are marked "Level A Protective
Clothing Required". He said (Brian) that both doors were
opened when they examined them. It was brought to my
attention by Mike Medenhall and Wendel Jensen that the
monitors were improperly installed and as hooked up would
not detect mustard or VX. Mr. Sisson called CAMDS and
informed them of the error.

As I viewed the No. 4 filter house (bank) the unit was open
to atmosphere at both ends. According to Mr. Sisson,
EG&G personnel had entered the end (east) door to install
monitoring equipment. This access door was marked "Level
E Protective Clothing Required" Western Sheet Metal
personnel were present working on the ducting while were
present.
DSOOO836

I also observed filter No. 8's east door open. Further
interview of Brian D. Hanni, badge no. 03007. Both he
and Jerry Shepard examined the No. 4 filter at about 1300
on Thursday May 12, 1994. Neither reported the incident
on Thursday as they were not aware the filter was
contaminated until yesterday May 24, 1994 about 1400.
Brian was talking to Ray Nelson, EG&G when Joe Magnum
walked in, says the CAL filter No. 4 was crapped up and we
have personnel contaminated. Jerry Shepard came by and
Brian briefed him on the discovery. Jerry Shepard then
reported the incident to Jeff Biggar...

...I met with Fred Burton and asked him what his view of
the incident was. He said Dave Jackson and Tim Thomas
were both aware of the contaminated No. 4 filter...He was
not aware of the current status of the filter as to whether
or...
DS000837

...not the contaminated charcoal had been removed. He
said he would keep me informed. Fred Burton agreed with
Mike that the monitoring apparatus was not properly
installed and would not detect VX as required. He directed
Mike to call Al Asket of PMCD and have him call CAMDS
and inform them of improperly installed monitor. Burton
further informed me that PMCD had directed them not to
have any contact with CAMs. The places the full burden
on PMCD.

Met with Jeff Biggar and questioned him with regard to his
actions. He said he went over to Mike Hampton to inform
him of the incident. Mr. Biggar informed me that Mike
Hampton was already working on a resolution. I briefed JB
on the results of my investigation. Don Richter came in
and Jeff asked him if Mr. Hampton had called Hanni and
Shepard and gave them further instruction. Mr. Richter
responded no!

It is clear that this is a very serious industrial safety
incident of which PMCD has the greatest portion of the
blame.

Rick Jurbala informed that Brian and Jerry had been told
by the Safety Manager not to go to medical until they
figured out what to do...
DS000838

...I called Brian Hanni and asked him about the direction
from the Safety Manager. He informed that Mr. Hampton
had said they could go to medical if they wanted but they
should perhaps wait until he looked into the issue. I asked
Mr. Hanni why he did not go. His response was, I didn't
have any symptoms remaining. I counseled him to go
anyway so that the incident could be documented.
DS000839

26 May 94 Don R. mentioned that work on the CAL filters will resume
work pending 3X certification from CAMDS and direction
from PMCD. This is the very certification Battelle
questions in their memo to Jeff Biggar, dated May 25,
1994.
DS000843

20 Sept 94 Met Dave Jackson in the PSP hall. He said,"EG&G QA
write people up internally, Environmental write people up
internally. Why can't we get EG&G Safety to write up
anyone?" I would assume there will be a significant
amount of pressure put on Safety as a result of the Steve
Jones incident and the resultant fall out.
DS000865

27 Sept 94 It seems that the Steve Jones issue will not go away. In a
discussion with another EG&G employee it appears Mr.
Jones shut down the CAL and the plant. Knowing our
customer as I do, there is no doubt in my mind that the
customer directed he be terminated.
DS000873

12 Oct 94 What concerns me at this time is the fact we can not
demonstrate compliance to our quality program. I being
one person, cannot correct this. This will require full
management support. The present effort is the third
attempt to get this resolved.
DS000882

13 Oct 94 David Jackson came by and asked for a copy of the Audit
File A93-07, Safety Security and Health...The fact that this
report does lend some credence to what Steve Jones is
saying may be an embarrassment to Henry Silvestri should
that report get in the wrong hands and be interpreted
incorrectly.
DS000884

14 Oct 94 The rodent team discovered over twenty dead mice in T-4,
the trailer where my office is. Since 33% of the mice in
this area are contaminated with the Hepa virus, this is a
very unhealthy situation. No one was warned. I donned
my gas mask once I was aware of the problem. If this many
were found in one trailer, then what is the situation
throughout the project occupied buildings?
DS000886

2 Nov 94 LIC Surge Tank was built on pad vs on stand. The
drawings were redlined by the builder instead of following
approved drawings. This appears to be a programmatic
issue. The designer control process was found as
unacceptable in a surveillance conducted by Jeff Biggar.
DS000896

3 Nov 94 I am of the opinion JB is being pressured from upper
management. His conduct and demeanor have changed
over the last several weeks. In the past he has been very
careful to avoid any indication he was effecting the audit
process.
DS000898

7 Dec 95 Met with JB, Don R. over NCR 143. Shelf Life PCP-SU-005,
Control of Shelf Life, in an effort to clear the NCR. JB
closed out NCR. They basically removed the requirement
against which the NCR was written. QAPP Rev. 1, Chapt
10 requirements have been addressed in the
aforementioned.
DS000907

14 Dec 94 Attended a 1300 staff meeting...the items discussed
were:...8) Mike commented on the fact that the control
room does not know what to do when DAAMS tubes
indicate above reporting limits. The question is what does
their procedure (OPS) say? Do they even have a procedure?
DS000912

20 Dec 94 ...I put the revised copy in JB's PQAP 3 ring binder. This
version identifies twenty-seven (27) requirements that have
not been or inadequately addressed.
DS000916

28 Dec 94 John Jardine came over and briefed us on the results of
SAIC's Surveillance of the implementation of the
Inspection and Test Program. NCR No. 8, Severity Level
One, with Show Cause against the Inspection and Test
Program. Oct. SAIC out of 702 work orders, 59 were
sampled and all had problems. Richard Harrington
presented what he was doing with I&TP. No NCR has been
written by EG&G QA/QC Branch. Mr. Jardine expressed
his concern that no NCR had been written.

29 Dec 94 Toured the CHB and MDB with Kris Snow as part of A94 -
08. Deficiencies were observed in the areas of flammable
storage, Rag control and housekeeping.
DS000920

9 Jan 95 Issued NCR 199 for a violation of 40CFR 262.34(a)(1) Improper Storage of Hazardous Waste in S4.

Issued NCR 201 for a violation of 40CFR 257.1, Improper
Storage of Non-Hazardous Waste in the TOCDF lay down
yard.
DS000926

10 Jan 95 ...Though not specifically audited, the objective evidence
examined during the audit process clearly demonstrated a
failure of TOCDF to effectively implement an
environmental compliance program.
DS000927

19 Jan 95 Received Karl Burchett's response to quality concern report
(QCR) A94-08-C3. I rejected the response as it didn't
address the concern. In addition the response (SY75-021)
indicates or documents a position that operations/plant
needs have precedence over compliance to Environmental
Laws and Regulations. In my rejection memo, QA008.95, I
clearly state that this position is unacceptable.
DS000936

28 Jan 95 Attended QA/QC Branch staff meeting. The following
issues were discussed:...3) JACADS had agent migration of
agent from an "A: to a "C" area when the rocket exploded.
Don R. is to investigate the status of the penetration at
our project. I advised the staff that this was a major issue
during the construction phase. Don R. was also here when
we raised this issue. 4) Five percent radiography of TOCDF
Systems may not have occurred...5) Stack monitors
(DAAMS) were flooded out during certification process. The
problem is being documented by CAL QC.
DS000941

2 Feb 95 I prepared a memo from me to him [Rick Reikman] giving
the examples of twenty six (26) Remedial Work Orders
issued by EG&G and forty-one (41) TEAD Notices of
Environmental Deficiencies. All of which document
recurrent violations of environmental requirements.
DS000950

From the conversation it is clear that operations
management does not demonstrate a level of understanding
of environmental requirements for the positions they hold.
Not having environmental personnel on all shifts. The
result is categorization of hazardous waste remains
uncategorized through the weekend or overnight until
Trina's group is able to deal with it the next available work
day.
DS000951

6 Feb 95 In preparing for the Hazardous Waste Audit, I have become
aware that the Hazardous Waste Management Program still
has not bee proceduralized. This was a finding in A94-05
from last year. The fact that TEAD issued forty-one Notice
of Environmental Deficiencies (NEDs) last year is a clear
indication the Hazardous Waste Management Program is
not in control.
DS000952

8 Feb 95 Our trip to JACADS was a bust as the Army would not let
our reps talk to the SC.
DS000954

21 Feb 95 Still being concerned, I called Trina Allen and asked her if
she could explain Bill's unusual behavior. She informed
me that she had written a letter to Henry Silvestri
expressing her concern at the continued mismanagement of
Hazardous Waste at TOCDF. She further explained that
she had given the letter to Bill Nieminen for his review.
According to Ms. Allen, the letter was taken to Allen
Reikman and Skip Hayes. They held a meeting today where
the letter was stopped from reaching Henry Silvestri. Ms.
Allen thinks Bill is concerned that I will find out what the
letter said and use it in the audit.

22 Feb 95 I was informed by JB that Dave Jackson and others had a
meeting yesterday afternoon where they determined that
they do not have to comply with AR 600-85, Drug
Screening. According to one party, Dave Jackson made the
statement that he, Dave Jackson, would decide what was
necessary for this project. If true, this continues to
support the position demonstrated to date, that schedule is
all important and safety, environmental and quality issues
will not have priority over schedule.
DS000965

8 Mar 95 Issued NCR 225 for modification of the Quench Brine drain
piping in the LIC 1 & 2, DFS & MPF without an approved
ECP or permit modification approval.
DS000973

22 Mar 95 Attended an impromptu QA/QC staff meeting. The issue
was the very adverse letter we received from USACDR
regarding EG&G's quality program...The following action
is. (The letter was PM-6602/RT95-340 3/16/95.)...3) Root
Cause--how did the procedures get to the point they're at,
i.e., got approval without having all QAPP requirements.
The letter was very negative and according to JB not
supported by comments made during the meeting JB
attended just prior to this staff meeting which was also
focused on PM-6602.
DS000982

24 Mar 95 Met with JB and Jeff Street and discussed the Warehouse
Personnel's failure to implement corrective action from an
audit find in April 1994. The root issue is this disregard of
an audit finding. JB asked my recommendation. I
recommended that we issue a Corrective Action Report
(CAR) for failure to implement the proposed corrective
action and close out the long outstanding audit finding
(A94-03-06).
DS000985

28 Mar 95 JACADS had another release last week. That just gives
more fuel for the opponents of this project. JB commented
that the PAS must be in place before we go toxic. This
could lead to an 18 month delay here at the project. There
seems to be something driving schedule from a source
outside this project. What it is I don't know.
DS000986

29 Mar 95 Attended the weekly QA/QC Staff meeting. The following
issues were discussed:...3) JB maintains that the RFI
(Request for Information) is not the method by which
changes to design or configuration should be submitted or
approved. The problem is that the Government is allowing
MK to do it...5) JB to get with Skip Hayes over the RFI
issue. I mentioned that we fought this very same issue
during construction in 1992. Don R. concurred with my
statement...
DS000987

...11) QC's lack of involvement in the maintenance
inspection and testing process. This is becoming a big
issue as Lorsgren has been asking for testing and
inspection documents so they can certify the plant and
EG&G is unable to produce them.
DS000988

5 Apr 95 Met with Jeff Street and went over the results of the M&TE
Audit (A95-03). He said the M&TE Program was not
effective. I instructed Jeff Street to write it as he sees it
based on the objective evidence. The M&TE Program,
apparently, is in need of major overhaul.
DS000990

11 Apr 95 JB called QA/QC Supervisor's meeting. The topics
discussed were: 1) USACDR is here this week...They are
now in the mode of now wanting to use the work order
system as a corrective action system...
DS000992

...2) Tim Thomas feels that QA/QC should write a non -
conformance only from system failures or programmatic
non-compliant conditions. 3) The approach to writing
work orders for identified non-compliant conditions clearly
demonstrates yet another departure from reality by
USACDR...
DS000993

Met with JB and Jeff Street to go over the findings of the
M&TE Program. The findings are significant and all agreed
that the M&TE Program is not effective and would be
reported as such in the audit report. There are two major
issues associated with the failure of the calibration
program: 1) We (EG&G TOCDF) cannot demonstrate
compliance to the RCRA Permit. 2) We have been
medically qualifying personnel for the CPRP Program on
equipment which does not have a current calibration.
DS000994

28 Apr 95 It appears that there is some intense meetings going on
between TOCDF management and the State DHSW. The
topic, the RCRA Permit. The State wants a realistic RCRA
Permit. The permit mods have been submitted. However,
all changes have not been incorporated.
DS001011

1 May 95 I received a very interesting letter written from the State of
Utah to Colonel Jesse Brokenbus, TEAD Commander. The
issues were based on an inspection of TEAD by DHSW in
1994. The basis of the inspection is permit UT521009002.
The primary areas of concern were: 1. Storage of hazardous
waste in structurally unsound igloos. 2. No apparent
rationale for determining that some leaking and
unserviceable munitions are not hazardous waste. 3.
Movement and reconfiguration of munitions in a manner
not consistent with operational plans revealed to DHSW...
DS001013

...4. Inability to adequately track waste munitions with
required operating records. Prior to proceeding with
enforcement action, DHSW has requested a response
addressing corrective action no later than 15 May 95. The
RCRA permit in question is the same one that applies to
the TOCDF Project. The DHSW letter infers that
enforcement action may include an Order to Cease and
Desist hazardous waste related operations at the TEAD
facility...The letter addresses transfer of munitions out of
Area 10. I have observed OINCs with Security and
Response escorts move from Area 10 to an unknown
destination. I will log dates and times should I observe any
more.
DS001014

2 May 95 Reviewed and updated Audit File A94-08. The outstanding
issue remains A94-08-C3 which expresses concern about
the less than vigorous environmental compliance posture
demonstrated by TOCDF personnel. This issue should be
resolved one way or the other by the May 15th surveillance
of this activity.

3 May 95 Met with JB. It seems that the Government is writing us
up and reducing our fee because we failed, according to the
Government, to elevate the failure to train to PRPs to
upper management. This is in error. The lack of training
to PRPs was identified in Audit A94-01. It was again
addressed and elevated to a finding in this year's audit of
training. This is just another example of EG&G being beat
up over issues we have previously identified. There is
certainly cause for EG&G to be penalized for the failure of
EG&G line management to implement corrective action.
DS001016

The audit function is not the problem. The worse case
scenario is to have the audit function identify problems
and then not have the problems corrected. The situation
has existed since the project began and will continue until
line management accepts ownership of the problem and
assures implementation of corrective action. The other end
of the problem is our customer's inexperience and its Army
Demil attitude of we are going to chop up rockets and to
hell with the rules. I have continued to document this
problem. All organizations at TOCDF would benefit greatly
from owning their behavior, being honest and ethical in
dealing with project issues. In other words ethics in
business. Yesterday's entry about the hazardous waste
issues.
DS001017

10 May 95 Attended a QA/QC Branch staff meeting. The following
issues were discussed:...18) Stack sampling now up in the
air. Apparently the National Research Council has
crawfished once again over the PAS filter.
DS001024

The problem at the CAL not following approved procedures
was discussed. I expressed my great concern that this
apparently is still occurring. This was an audit finding last
year. Jeff Street is examining this issue in his audit of the
CAL A95-04.
DS001025

6 Jun 95 Mr. Booth went on to express his feelings that the
USACDR Audit and previously concluded EG&G audits did
not accurately reflect the status of documentation and
implementation of the TOCDF Design Control System...
DS001042

8 Jun 95 This audit resulted in significant findings against
Analytical, CAL and monitoring. This could have an
adverse impact to Surrogate Trial burns and toxic
operations.
DS001047

9 Jun 95 Richard Booth called. He informed me that it had been
discovered that the SDS tanks did not meet seismic criteria
for water (Specific Gravity of 1.1) much less meet the
criteria for the surrogate (a sg of 1.6). The State of Utah
will not permit the Surrogate Trial burns to begin until this
issue is resolved. Surrogate Trial burns are currently
scheduled to begin Monday, 12 Jun 95. He said that an
emergency ECP had been generated and drawings were
being prepared...
LDS001049

14 Jun 95 Met with John McArthur. He informed me that the ACS
flanges are leaking. Bob Reid, Dave Jackson, Skip Hayes
are aware of the problem. John McArthur is of the opinion
this must be reported to the state. An announcement was
made that there is a Perc leak in the TMA. All response
organizations were directed to respond. The leak turned
out to be about 2 cups of perc. All was contained in the
spill boundaries.
DS001056

28 Jun 95 I reviewed the Open Audits and observed that there were a
large number of items with past due Corrective Action. I
asked Jeff Street to assure that late notices have been sent
out, etc.
DS001064

10 Jul 95 We received word today that the PAS filter project is dead.
This means that $20M has gone down the drain for
nothing.
DS001068

9 Aug 95 Attended the weekly QA/QC Branch meeting chaired by JB.
The following issues were discussed: 1) Pre-Op has
resulted in excess of 200 findings as per JB...
DS001090
...3) SOPs are not being adequately covered in our
Surveillance Program. DR assigned to prepare a
surveillance schedule...8) NCR has been written against the
Surety Program, against the same issues we have written in
Audit findings and quality concern reports...11) A major
NCR is being written as part of the Pre-Op for failure to
follow procedures. There is a great deal of documentation
of our failure (the project) to follow our own procedures.
DS001091

20 Sept 95 Attended the QA/QC Staff meeting held by JB. The
following issues were discussed:...2) I asked JB to explain
what has changed with regard to following procedures. The
audit program has identified the problem of not following
procedures since the early days of the program. It has been
identified in numerous audit findings, concerns and audit
report. JB is of the opinion this will change with added
management...
DS001106

4 Oct 95 Attended QA/QC Branch Staff meeting. The following
issues were discussed: 1) DFS STB is on hold due to feed
chute problems (warped & cracked). The interesting thing
is that the chute has been a problem at CAMDS and
JACADS. The chute is having cracks welded. They will
attempt to start STB again tomorrow. 2) DFS TASCA burn
dry run is scheduled to start Monday. The lot
configuration issue has not been resolved. Current lot
configuration contains no PCBs. The Government wants
to assume 2700 ppm per unit...
DS001115

...4) The qualification of the Mountain States to perform
PCB sampling is in question. Rick J. and Kent Wilson are
to investigate...
DS001116

17 Nov 95 Jerry Medily informed me that the shift QC inspectors will
be evaluated by shift management/supervision and these
evaluations will impact merit raises. This is a definite
conflict of interest.
DS001131

20 Nov 95 There was a unique 19 Nov 95 entry made in the QC log.
From the entry it appears they may not know if the rockets
are agent or non-agent (See QC Log Pg 123).
DS001133

5 Dec 95 I toured the control room and observed general
operations...They were discussing bypassing a RCRA feed
note as requested by Mr. Hughes to increase rocket feed
rate. Ralph Dahl Harrison came in, saw me, and came
over and informed the Senior Control Room Operator that
they could not bypass a RCRA limit. From the Control
Room I went over to the Environmental Compliance Office
to catch up with inspection team. Wile there I overheard a
call from the Control Room asking permission to bypass
the same limit. John McArthur informed them they could
not do it. The sole reason for the request was to allow an
increased rocket feed rate. John Cluff is very focused on
demonstrating the ability to meet these higher feed rates. I
asked what the feed rate was at the time of my visit and
was informed that it was 24/hr. The goal feed rate is
36/hr. I am of the opinion that to bypass interlocks to
demonstrate a higher feed rate is the same as falsifying
documents. It gives false readings and though it allows a
John Cluff to claim TOCDF has met the design feed rates it
is a lie.
DS001268

11 Dec 95 I reviewed the Hazardous Waste Mgmt Corrective Action
plan prepared by J2. From what he said Tim was just going
to use it as a hammer to get DRMO in gear. That's good
because I have some serious concerns as to the legality of
what J2 is proposing...
DS001270

13 Dec 95 I again requested ISO 9000 Lead Assessor training for Jeff
Street. JB again turned the request down. I protested JB's
decision on the basis that it is our responsibility to prepare
our personnel for advancement and keep them current with
their profession. I explained to JB that we are failing in
this area as far as Jeff Street is concerned. JB remained
steadfast in his negative decision..JB's position is that the
Government wouldn't allow it...
DS001273

21 Dec 95 I was informed by John McArthur that he has been
appointed the Hazardous Waste Process Manager. This is a
direct conflict of interest as he has oversight
responsibilities over the Hazardous Waste Management
Program...
DS001279

12 Jan 96 I am somewhat surprised at the somewhat positive lean on
this pre-op. There are a number of serious issues they
clearly did not look at in depth, such as the corrective
action program and plant statusing.
DS001296

1 Mar 96 The new system shows Jeff Street as being in charge of
Quality Control. this is a conflict of interest as he audits
these functions...Jeff Biggar expressed great concern that
the QA/QC Organization is so fractionalized that the
Quality Program is at risk.
DS001298

12 Mar 96 I heard several rumors today from fairly reliable resources.
They are: 1) Gary Millar has been asked to step down by
the Government (within the week); 2) The UT State DHSW
has been directed by the governor not to do anything to
hold up going hot...
DS001308

21 Mar 96 Currently we have almost a hundred open deficiency
documents which will impact the 15 Apr 96 deadline.
Using the target dates to establish our guide path and our
current historical data, the picture is not pretty.

25 Mar 96 Once again we are setting ourselves up for failure. None of
this will work until we correct the root cause of the
problems which is lack of management support and the
failure of the Corrective Action Program. I again expressed
this opinion to JB and recommended to him that he bring
this issue to the attention of the General Manager. I also
recommended to JB that we have the same penalties in
place for the Quality Program violations as we have in
place for the safety program.
DS001319

22 Apr 96 ...Clearly EG&G has not done its job in implementing the
risk management activities required by 296FB:1910, much
less the new requirements established by the Government.
DS001334

25 Apr 96 Tom Kartecheck gave a presentation on our pre-op finding
status. The following issues were discussed...3) Problem
areas included: management attention to deficiencies,
failure to follow procedures, transcription of calibration
data, inspection and test data, work orders, sequence of
work...5) From current status of pre-op findings there are a
number of critical issues on the critical path for June 1,
1996 toxic ops date. Tom expressed his concern that we
are changing systems or still have not implemented
systems this close to toxic start.
DS001337

Skip Hayes gave a briefing on what was happening at
TOCDF. The following issues were discussed:...2) Pre-op
findings not corrected. They are closed without satisfactory
completion of corrective action...5) Gary Millar said that
the issues are what EG&G wants to do vs. the Tim Thomas
direction. Once example is Tim wants a 100% audit of
compliance to MOPs, LOPs, SOPs and PRPs. The entire
compliance staff could not accomplish this before 1 June
96...
DS001338

29 Apr 96 The other factor is that EG&G, along with local
government personnel, have not been reporting the actual
cost growth of the program. From the information provided
us during last week's account manager training, the real
estimate for the annual cost of operations is $650M. The
current budget is $110M.
DS001344

30 Apr 96 ...The extremely poor compliance posture demonstrated by
operation line management and the failure to include
compliance organizations in process activities places
compliance personnel in positions where they must be firm
and unbending in the performance of their responsibilities.
The compliance posture of the project is driven by the
customer's demil attitude. TOCDF "will chop rockets"
regardless of the quality of environmental programs has set
the tone for the operations organizations. This has existed
since the project started...
DS001351

6 May 96 ...Ray Bills presented a Corrective Action Plan to the
Government last Friday. He is somewhat perplexed as how
to deal with a customer who thinks we are much further
along in our Risk Management Program than reality
dictates. My question to Ray was, When are going to tell
our customer what they need to hear as opposed to what
they want to hear?...
DS001358

7 May 96 Personnel do not understand what their responsibilities
are, who they report to, or how they are affected by the new
organization. To be in this state of turmoil clearly
indicates TOCDF is not ready for agent operations.
Without aggressive action to gain control on Gary Millar's
part, we will not be ready in this fiscal year. I do not
believe we will make the June 1, 1996 toxic (agent) gas
start date even if aggressive action were to be put in place
immediately...
DS001348

20 May 96 Met with JB, Don Richter and Jeff Street. The purpose of
the meeting was to attempt to come up with a method to
focus our surveillance efforts based on some measurement
of risk factors. The government is quite concerned that
such a system is still not in place and we have less than
two weeks to go before scheduled toxic ops...
DS001373

29 May 96 ...Attended a meeting chaired by Ray Bills to go over the
action items resulting from today's MMRM...1) Lost $300 -
$400,000 for the Surrogate Trial burn on the MPF because
of failure to control our samples...
DS001378

...11) Rick Jurbala brought up yet another example of
procurement violating procedures. The issue was the
Subcontractor for change of our uninterrupted power
supply batteries...
DS001379

30 May 96 Attended a meeting on Corrective Action for the sampling
feedback which resulted in the disqualification of the metal
parts furnace surrogate trial burn. The packaging and
temperature controls were violated during the transfer of
the samples from the CAL refrigerator to the Air Toxics Ltd.
in Johnson, CA. The samples were not properly prepared
for shipment. Air Toxics personnel found the samples to be
at ambient temperature when they broke the custody seal...
DS001380

3 Jun 96 ...The purpose of the meeting was to identify any areas we
consider a significant risk to this operation...1) Procedural
Compliance. The current mindset of operational personnel
with regard to following procedures is unsatisfactory.
Violations occurred during surrogate trial burns which
resulted in an NOV...4) Are manning levels adequate to
meet LCOs, taking into consideration possible attrition
rate?...6) Environmental Concerns: c) Lack of compliance
understanding at operator level...8) Emergency response--
across the board. Particularly when it comes to mutual
aid. We simulate but do not exercise systems as we
should...
DS001384

6 Jun 96 The CAL HVAC is not working. The____[?] system and the
ventilation system for the hoods has questional integrity.
Each of these items is a potential show stopper for EG&G's
readiness to enter toxic operations on 17 Jun 96. Stan
Duncan, EG&G Safety, stated that he had brought this to
the attention of Sam Guello several weeks ago...
DS001387

11 Jun 96 ...If we do not go operational in the near future, we may
not go at all. Already we have great difficulty in getting
sufficient operations personnel to meet limited conditions
of operation.
DS001389

9 Jul 96 If EG&G cannot demonstrate control of day to day
activities how can we hope to handle long-range planning,
mitigation of risk, etc.
DS001405

12 Jul 96 Spent several hours reviewing the RMPR compliance matrix
and pulling out the requirements that were not in scope of
EG&G's contract with the Government (DACA87-89-C -
0396). Just on the initial sweep I identified 53 RMPR
requirements that are out of scope.
DS001408

18 Jul 96 Battelle did not get the Oversight portion of the Chem
Demil Program. It seems SAIC has gotten their fingers in
all the pies. They write the RFP, review the responses and
then get the award. There seems to be definite conflicts of
interest, but the Government seems to be on board. I
wonder what the Inspector General would say.
DS001414

22 Jul 96 It is my observation that Tim Thomas and Dave Jackson
are very concerned about the issue with RMPR. From the
comments Tim made during our meeting with him on 12
Jul 1996, he has apparently made commitments to some
very high level sources, that EG&G was in substantial
compliance with the RMPR. I also believe that Ray Bills
may not have communicated the issues to the Government
in as effective manner as he could have. What is clear is a
substantial rift now exists between EG&G and the
Government over this issue. My concern is that we will
expend so much energy fighting over who does what to
whom that we will lose sight of the fact that an effective
risk management program will provide for an effective base
for bringing all our processes under control and allow the
project to move from a re-active crisis control mode to a
pro-active mode...
DS001418

30 Jul 96 A number or personnel came to me today expressing their
frustration at not being able to see how what they are
doing is making a difference. Compliance personnel in
general are very demoralized as they are being treated as
being a hindrance instead of a valued member of the
project team. The problem is two-sided and a product of a
broken corrective action system.
DS001442

2 Aug 96 Chris Pickrell came by and asked me what I thought of his
draft letter, RT96-1030. I expressed my opinion that he
should not send it as it places Tim Thomas at risk. The
letter provides an extremely broad interpretation of the
RMPR requirements for those areas where the EG&G
compliance matrix indicates EG&G is not in full
compliance. The intent of the letter appears to be to get
EG&G to change its compliance matrix to indicate full
compliance.
DS001446

12 Aug 96 It is clear at this point that EG&G is behind the curve
when it comes to implementing PIMS. EG&G wants to
hold CAMs responsible yet they are not playing to the PIMS
rules. Jim Cowart, hopefully will be able to turn things
around. If he does, it will be the first time in the history of
this project that EG&G will have gained control of the
budget and schedule.
DS001453

Attended the 1300 meeting which was supposed to be with
Jim Cowart. From listening to the conversation between
Sam Giello, Alex Margin and Mike Payless, it appears that
Project Control wants us to redo our DSIS to conform to
the original negotiated Operations budget that in no way
reflects reality.

I can not believe what I just heard. Mike asked me to
prepare a DSIS showing my negotiate hours as performing
QA Audit Supervisor functions while continuing my out of
scope effort. I informed Mike that to perform out of scope
work and charge hours to in scope effort is contract fraud.
He agreed. I further stated I would not be part of this
effort. I further stated that no job is worth surrendering
my ethics.

As Ray Bills will be gone until next Monday, I explained my
position to Jeff Biggar. Jeff admitted he had been asked to
do the same thing. He is to attend the Department
Managers meeting today to discuss this very effort. It is
very apparent to me that this is a blatant effort to achieve
PIMS validation at all cost. Even to the point of
committing contract fraud. I explained to JB that I would
not have any part of it. I told JB I would not prepare a
fraudulent work package.
DS001455

14 Aug 96 Procurement/Logistics is supposed to revise the PIMS to
reflect the SSISs we CAMs submitted a number of weeks
ago. They are to reflect reality instead of some magic
number that was negotiated with the Government without
an impact assessment which has been the practice up to
this point.
DS001456

15 Aug 96 The Government is focused on the ONC issue. It appears
that they allowed the certifications to expire. Without a
valid certification the ONC can not carry chemical
munitions thus precluding the start of toxic operations
now scheduled to start a week from today.
DS001460

23 Aug 96 The first fiasco happened today. It appears QC Personnel
do not have the appropriate certification for the job they
are performing. The LCO require a certified QC person in
order to operate. Apparently Don R. and JB are trying to
get a deviation request walked through.
DS001464

26 Aug 96 Met with Ray Bills, Harry Sutton, Jeff Biggar and Kris
Snow. The purpose of the meeting was to see where the
department stands with regard to our response to the filter
vestibule incident (1430, 24 Aug 96). I was not given any
assignments. Kris Snow did bring up two serious issues.
One was the hazardous waste generated in the MDB and
the lack of procedures to adequately control this waste.
The second was the fact that the ECR was a lot more
contaminated than the ACAMS was indicating. She
informed us that a hot exit had to be made when the
attempts to decon a PPE suit failed See the RM Project
File for additional details.
DS001467

28 Aug 96 Saturday's incident is having some significant impact.
Though I have no first hand knowledge or objective
evidence there may have been as much as a three hour
delay between when the high levels were detected in Filter
107 and 108 vestibules (3.62 TWA) and the results faxed to
the Control Room and the time the Government was
informed and corrective action initiated. What is even
more distressing is the fact that the alarm was not
sounded as required by procedure.
DS001468

...If the information on the Government's intent to declare
the Vestibule (filters) a secondary containment, then the
vestibule must meet the requirements of 40CFR264.1100
which it currently does not. In fact, the vestibule leaks
when it rains. I am going to bring up both these issues
with Ray Bills at my first opportunity.

Met with Jeff Biggar and Kent Wilson. Kent briefed us on
the filter vestibule incident from the Lab perspective. Kent
present copies of the PDAR printout showing a 3.62 TWA
reading and several other readings above alarm levels. I
examined the copies he presented and verified the 3.62
TWA reading. The printouts were, however, not validated
documents.

The Government is intent on resuming agent operations
tomorrow.

Though I have a significant concern with regard to how the
entire filter vestibule incident was and is being handled, I
do not have a single piece of objective evidence to act upon.
DS001472

29 Aug 96 As directed by Ray Bills, I prepared an interoffice memo
documenting the concerns I have as the Cost Account
Manager. (RMPT96-004) In this memo I expressed my
opinion that a DR must be issued for failure to sound the
site masking alarm when the Control Room became aware
of a positive agent indication in the limited area. I also
expressed my opposition to declaring the filter vestibule
secondary containment.
DS001473

Attended the 1035 RM CAMs meeting...The following issues
were discussed...8) The Government has decided to allow
EG&G to declare the filters vestibule as secondary
containment. They are going to put gas mask filters on the
vestibule. Supposedly to prevent a release of agent in the
event the vestibule becomes positive. 9) The vestibule was
never intended to meet the requirements for secondary
containment. 10) Harry Sutton stated that the vestibule
does not meet Surety requirements. 11) Ray expressed the
Government's position that the longer TOCDF remains
shut down the greater the chance the opponents will keep
us shut down. To allow TOCDF to restart agent operations
they are significantly bending perhaps breaking the rules.
It is a very dangerous position to be found on restarting at
the sacrifice of safety, quality and the environment...
DS001470

30 Aug 96 ...I was informed that the reason the State has not let us
restart agent operations is the fact that the PDAR data
recorded an alarm set point being exceeded yet the control
room alarm did not activate. This occurred during the
filter vestibule incident...
DS001140

...The site masking alarm was sounded. The
announcement informed us that there was an ACAMS
alarm in the LIC 1 Secondary Room. The all clear to
unmask announcement was made. The Control Room
announced that the ACAMS alarm was due to the use of
chemicals in the LIC 1 Secondary Room while the ACAMS
was still running. JB informed me that the information
from Gary Harris may not have been accurate. According
to JB they were still in the process or providing
information to the State and the State has, in fact, not
authorized TOCDF to resume agent operations. Harry
Sutton, Surety Manager, came by and informed me that the
cause of the ACAMS Alarm was the monitoring personnel
forgot to take the unit off line during a routine challenge of
the unit...
DSOO1141

3 Sept 96 ...Wayne Story reported in the QC Log that agent levels
were detected in the unpack area. No levels were noted...I
informed Chris Snow of the agent in the unpack area and
also asked his people to look into it also...

Attended the RM Department meeting. A number of
significant issues were discussed...The discussions during
the meeting, it appears that the general consensus of the
RM Leadership is that EG&G is not in control of its
processes. I asked Ray, if we believe this to be the case,
why have we not documented this in our Corrective Action
system and why have we not shut the project down...
DS001143

...I met with Ray Bills and expressed my concern that the
areas of Risk have not been formally elevated to the
General Manager or the Risk Management Board. The two
specific examples I gave were the Filter Vestibule incident
and the hazardous waste problems in the MDB...

...During this meeting with Ray he informed me that John
Cluff and Chris Pickrell had beat up on a control room
operator for taking the time to complete the required
paperwork before commencing Rocket Operations. He
further informed me that Sandy Sanderson was paged four
times by John Cluff for not starting rocket operations.

This information is just another example of the local
Government personnel mindset of chopping rockets, no
matter what.
DS001145

4 Sept 96 ...I received a copy of the incident
report for the 24 Aug 96 chemical incident.
For the most part the report accurately describes the
incident. However, paragraph 1 of the report
states, "The Control Room immediately suspended
processing, notified the EOC and instituted emergency
procedures." Such was not the case. There was a two-hour
delay from the time the Control Room was made aware of
the positive agent notification from the CAL until the
Government was informed and corrective action was
initiated. Furthermore, the masking alarm was never
sounded. A violation of the contingency procedures...
DS001147

13 Sept 96 ...I am rapidly reaching the opinion that we will not be
successful if we continue on our current path. We have to
reach a breaking point at some time. Virtually everyone in
any position of responsibility I have interfaced with over
the last several months, have voiced their frustrations and
lack of faith in project leadership on both EG&G and the
Government's side of the fence...
DS001155

18 Sept 96 It appears TOCDF has another problem. Caustic is leaking
through the ECR floor into an electrical equipment room.
The exact details remain unclear. I am going to look into
the incident. A report by Robert Grimes over three years
ago documented a leak potential in the ECR sumps. No
action was even taken to correct the problems.
DS001158

19 Sept 96 Ray Bills came in and briefed us on some critical issues.
The key points were Tim Thomas' dissatisfaction with
EG&G's lack of planning and management. He is also
greatly disturbed at EG&G's demonstrated inability to
properly respond to incidents.

Ray also briefed us on the 18% caustic leak into an
electrical room in the MDB. The source of the leak has not
been determined. The plant remains shutdown. Ray also
briefed us on the fact that we will not be ready for co -
processing by 21 Oct 96. We don't have the bugs worked
out for rocket processing, much less those for co-
processing...
DS001159

The crack issue remains a mystery. There have been a
number of meetings but, I have not been privy to any of
them.
DS001161

3 Oct 96 I think my biggest problem is the fact that I think this
plant is going to kill some one I am helpless to prevent it...
DS001174

...The PMCD organization has the same mindset the Army
has demonstrated in the past. They are going to process
the munitions come hell or high water. This is the mindset
that eradicated people in the sixties and sheep in later
years...
DS001175

15 Nov 96 The Control room announced that there was a fire in the
DFS room. According to JB it was caused by a broken
hydraulic line...
DS001195

27 Nov 96 The plant is shut down once again. The problem, broken
rocket stop__[?]
DS001204

4 Dec 96 ...it is my opinion that the inspection teams are here to
whitewash things. I believe that Gary Millar will be
discredited. Once this occurs, the Army will be convinced
that they are immune and will continue with business as
usual.
DS001210

18 Dec 96 The agent trial burns have been ongoing since 16 Dec 96.
Today an incident occurred in which there were a number
of leaks discovered in the PAS sump brine loop for
chemistry and pH measurement. I examined a cut out
section of the piping. The pipe and elbow exhibited
significant corrosion which appears to be galvanic in
nature. The elbow demonstrated significant erosion
[about] 50% of original thickness. One section of the
elbow was corroded completely through. A patch was
attempted using liquid steel. According to one of the QC
inspectors, both safety and the Government bought off on
the repair. It is my opinion that the desire to sustain the
trail burn will outweigh safety.

It is quite interesting that when ever I begin to ask
questions about incidents, even members of my own
branch get nervous and shy away. Even in areas that I
have demonstrated expertise, my recommendations are
disregarded. The reason escapes me. Perhaps they are
concerned about my being a stoolie...
DS001217

31 Dec 96 The attempts to shut down TOCDF continue. Statements
are being made in the local newspaper that personnel were
exposed to agent on 17 Sept 96 without protective gear.
There was a propagation of caustic into an electrical switch
gear room...The initial word that came down the grapevine
was that agent had migrated through the cracks in the
concrete in the ECR and coming out in the electrical
switch gear room. Later in the day on the 18th of Sept. 96,
the word was passed around that it was caustic and not
agent. My concern is the fact that the ECR was
contaminated with agent. While it is true that the caustic
would have neutralized the agent, the potential still exists
that agent could have been present outside of engineering
controls. To an outsider, this smacks as just another
cover-up at TOCDF. I don't have any objective evidence to
verify the presence of agent one way or the other. The
MDB/ECR cracks in the concrete issue was brought up by
my inspection team during the construction phase of
TOCDF. As with other issues our concerns were pushed
aside by the Government in its desire to save costs and
maintenance. The thickness of the epoloid coating is also
diminished.
DS001222

22 Jan 97 The masking alarm sounded. The announcement following
the alarm said there was an unconfirmed ACAMS alarm in
the stack...
DS001238

27 Jan 97 Sunday, Jan. 26, 1997, yet another incident occurred at
TOCDF. Agent was detected in the observation corridor.
As best as I can ascertain, the HVAC was improperly
operated, resulting in positive pressure where it should not
be, a door in the corridor was opened...
DS001240

...This may have been a failure to follow procedures which
is a root cause for many of the incidents that have
occurred at TOCDF.
DS001241

28 Jan 97 ...The problem is that SAIC is ineffective and costly. In a
statement made by one SAIC employee quote, "we have
never found a use for the SAIC. It is just a waste of time
and money."

The ruling about the agent in the observations corridor
incident was due to an employee not following procedure,
Once again.

I went and asked Ray Bills what the status of the Risk
Management Program is. He informed me that Tom Kurkjy,
Tim Thomas and Henry Silvestri met and decided that they
will not fund the Risk Management Program. Though not a
surprise to me, I am very disappointed. This could have
been a way to gain control of TOCDF instead of having
TOCDF control us. It is my opinion that EG&G G and the
Government are making a very poor decision which will
have an adverse impact to TOCDF. This is just another
demonstration of cost over riding the good of the program.
It would be interesting to see how the NRC would react to
finding out that their direction to have a risk management
program was being completely disregarded...
DS001242

5 Feb 97 I completed a revision to our response to DA RM 4125. I
gave the revised draft to JB for his review. He had asked
me to tone down the response from my previous response,
which I did.

6 Feb 97 0800 The masking alarm was sounded. The control room
announced that there was an ACAMS alarm in a category C
area in the MCB. All personnel were directed to evacuate
the C area...
DS001245

...This observation corridor 115 was the location of the
alarm. This is the second alarm in a C area since last
Sunday. This is quite interesting. During constructing
there was a big fight as to how the electrical conduits were
to be packed to prevent migration of agent into the
observation corridors. Several MK electricians and an
electrical foreman (Chuck Terrie) were laid off probably
because of their vocalizing the problem. I had elevated the
issue to senior management and was told it was a non -
problem....0818 An announcement was made that it was
safe to unmask. Personnel were instructed to remain clear
of observation corridor 115.
DS001246

7 Feb 97 1039 Masking alarm sounded. ACAMS alarm in 2nd floor
observation corridor...1046 an announcement was made,
"The ACAMS cycled twice and has been reset, it is safe to
unmask".
DS001247

Marland Stanley came over to see JB. As he was leaving he
came and saw me. He briefed me on the fact that agent
escaped from the LIC 2 incinerator on seven
occasions...While it is true that agent did not escape from
engineering controls, it is also true that the carbon filters
are being loaded with agent. A worse case scenario would
be, it is summer time and power to the HVAC system loses
power. The agent would disorb and enter the atmosphere
as it has once before. Marland said he had used this very
scenario at the Risk Management Board. I asked Marland
to give me copies of his documentation and he said he
would...The incident described above is just one of many
concerns. What is happening at TOCDF is not Risk
Management, it is gambling. Risk Management is the
informed assumption of risk. Gambling is taking
uninformed risk and hoping everything will be OK without
the slightest understanding of what the real issues are.
TOCDF has been in the gambling mode since this project
began.
DS001248

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